analogous rule in Washington

2011The City contends the same is true here and that a short delay to wait for the witness could not have prejudiced Sandhu in any substantial way. ¶14 “Fairness to the defendant underlies the purpose of CrR 8.3(b).” Koerber, 85 Wn.

2011The City contends the same is true here and that a short delay to wait for the witness could not have prejudiced Sandhu in any substantial way. ¶ 14 "Fairness to the defendant underlies the purpose of CrR 8.3(b)." Koerber, 85 Wash.App. at 5 , 931 P.2d 904 .

2008Correspondingly, the jury trial right does not prohibit applying harmless error analysis to the analogous error of the failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury. ¶34 Controlling precedent dictates that the failure to submit a sentencing factor to a jury is subject to harmless error analysis. 13 Our 2002 decision in State v. Brown plainly and conclusively announced the rule governing applicability of harmless error analysis to the failure to submit an element and, by extension, a sentencing factor to the jury. 147 Wn.2d 330 , 58 P.3d 889 (2002) (considering faulty accomplice liability i

2008Correspondingly, the jury trial right does not prohibit applying harmless error analysis to the analogous error of the failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury. ¶ 34 Controlling precedent dictates that the failure to submit a sentencing factor to a jury is subject to harmless error analysis. [6] Our 2002 decision in State v. Brown plainly and conclusively announced the rule governing applicability of harmless error analysis to the failure to submit an element and, by extension, a sentencing factor to the jury. 147 Wash.2d 330 , 58 P.3d 889 (2002) (considering faulty accomplice liabili

2008Correspondingly, the jury trial right does not prohibit applying harmless error analysis to the analogous error of the failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury. ¶34 Controlling precedent dictates that the failure to submit a sentencing factor to a jury is subject to harmless error analysis. 13 Our 2002 decision in State v. Brown plainly and conclusively announced the rule governing applicability of harmless error analysis to the failure to submit an element and, by extension, a sentencing factor to the jury. 147 Wn.2d 330 , 58 P.3d 889 (2002) (considering faulty accomplice liability i

2008Correspondingly, the jury trial right does not prohibit applying harmless error analysis to the analogous error of the failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury. ¶ 34 Controlling precedent dictates that the failure to submit a sentencing factor to a jury is subject to harmless error analysis. [6] Our 2002 decision in State v. Brown plainly and conclusively announced the rule governing applicability of harmless error analysis to the failure to submit an element and, by extension, a sentencing factor to the jury. 147 Wash.2d 330 , 58 P.3d 889 (2002) (considering faulty accomplice liabili

2025State v. Demery, 144 Wn.2d 753, 758 , 30 P.3d 1278 (2001).

2025State v. Demery, 144 Wn.2d 753, 758 , 30 P.3d 1278 (2001).

2017Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wn.2d 810, 813 , 489 P.2d 1133 (1971).

2017Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wn.2d 810, 813 , 489 P.2d 1133 (1971).

2015App. 149, 162 , 974 P.2d 886 (1999). -22- No. 71052-4-1/23 a satisfaction of all four determines if the entity is the functional equivalent of a state or local agency.55 We apply an analogous test here.

2013Church. 154 Wn.2d 365, 381-82 , 113P.3d463 (2005) (Supreme Court looked to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66 (2003) for guidance but did not expressly adopt it); Nivens v. 7-11 Hoaov's Corner. 133 Wn.2d 192, 202-03 , 943 P.2d 286 (1997) (applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965), a section that was not formally adopted by a Washington court, as well as §§ 315 and 344, which were previously adopted); Bennett v. Hardy. 113 Wn.2d 912, 920 , 784 P.2d 1258 (1990) (citing but not formally adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979) as persuasive authority in adopting an analogou

2013Church. 154 Wn.2d 365, 381-82 , 113P.3d463 (2005) (Supreme Court looked to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66 (2003) for guidance but did not expressly adopt it); Nivens v. 7-11 Hoaov's Corner. 133 Wn.2d 192, 202-03 , 943 P.2d 286 (1997) (applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965), a section that was not formally adopted by a Washington court, as well as §§ 315 and 344, which were previously adopted); Bennett v. Hardy. 113 Wn.2d 912, 920 , 784 P.2d 1258 (1990) (citing but not formally adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979) as persuasive authority in adopting an analogou

2013Church. 154 Wn.2d 365, 381-82 , 113P.3d463 (2005) (Supreme Court looked to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66 (2003) for guidance but did not expressly adopt it); Nivens v. 7-11 Hoaov's Corner. 133 Wn.2d 192, 202-03 , 943 P.2d 286 (1997) (applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965), a section that was not formally adopted by a Washington court, as well as §§ 315 and 344, which were previously adopted); Bennett v. Hardy. 113 Wn.2d 912, 920 , 784 P.2d 1258 (1990) (citing but not formally adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979) as persuasive authority in adopting an analogou

2013Church. 154 Wn.2d 365, 381-82 , 113P.3d463 (2005) (Supreme Court looked to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66 (2003) for guidance but did not expressly adopt it); Nivens v. 7-11 Hoaov's Corner. 133 Wn.2d 192, 202-03 , 943 P.2d 286 (1997) (applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965), a section that was not formally adopted by a Washington court, as well as §§ 315 and 344, which were previously adopted); Bennett v. Hardy. 113 Wn.2d 912, 920 , 784 P.2d 1258 (1990) (citing but not formally adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979) as persuasive authority in adopting an analogou

2012McDougle’s Applicability in the Context of Death Claims ¶16 Citing McDougle v. Department of Labor & Industries, 64 Wn.2d 640 , 393 P.2d 631 (1964) and Scott Paper Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 73 Wn.2d 840 , 440 P.2d 818 (1968), the Department argues that Washington courts “have developed a test to determine when an intervening act breaks the causal chain between the injury and the claimed condition in the context of aggravation applications” and claims we should “apply this analogous test to the context of death claims.” 5 Appellant’s Br. at 19, 21.

2012McDougle’s Applicability in the Context of Death Claims ¶16 Citing McDougle v. Department of Labor & Industries, 64 Wn.2d 640 , 393 P.2d 631 (1964) and Scott Paper Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 73 Wn.2d 840 , 440 P.2d 818 (1968), the Department argues that Washington courts “have developed a test to determine when an intervening act breaks the causal chain between the injury and the claimed condition in the context of aggravation applications” and claims we should “apply this analogous test to the context of death claims.” 5 Appellant’s Br. at 19, 21.

2012McDougle’s Applicability in the Context of Death Claims ¶16 Citing McDougle v. Department of Labor & Industries, 64 Wn.2d 640 , 393 P.2d 631 (1964) and Scott Paper Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 73 Wn.2d 840 , 440 P.2d 818 (1968), the Department argues that Washington courts “have developed a test to determine when an intervening act breaks the causal chain between the injury and the claimed condition in the context of aggravation applications” and claims we should “apply this analogous test to the context of death claims.” 5 Appellant’s Br. at 19, 21.

2012McDougle’s Applicability in the Context of Death Claims ¶16 Citing McDougle v. Department of Labor & Industries, 64 Wn.2d 640 , 393 P.2d 631 (1964) and Scott Paper Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 73 Wn.2d 840 , 440 P.2d 818 (1968), the Department argues that Washington courts “have developed a test to determine when an intervening act breaks the causal chain between the injury and the claimed condition in the context of aggravation applications” and claims we should “apply this analogous test to the context of death claims.” 5 Appellant’s Br. at 19, 21.

2011The City contends the same is true here and that a short delay to wait for the witness could not have prejudiced Sandhu in any substantial way. ¶ 14 "Fairness to the defendant underlies the purpose of CrR 8.3(b)." Koerber, 85 Wash.App. at 5 , 931 P.2d 904 .

2000See, e.g., Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal.3d 358 , 636 P.2d 1121 , 1128-29, 178 Cal.Rptr. 783 (1981) (landslide case applying tree case analysis); Dudley, 166 A.2d at 744 ; Willis v. Maloof, 184 Ga. App. 349 , 361 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1987); Meyers v. Delaney, 529 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Iowa 1995); Burke v. Briggs, 239 N.J.Super. 269 , 571 A.2d 296, 299-300 (1990) (adopting Sprecher ); Ivancic v. Olmstead, 66 N.Y.2d 349 , 488 N.E.2d 72, 73 , 497 N.Y.S.2d 326 , 54 A.L.R.4th 523 (1985); Nationwide Ins.

2000See, e.g., Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal.3d 358 , 636 P.2d 1121 , 1128-29, 178 Cal.Rptr. 783 (1981) (landslide case applying tree case analysis); Dudley, 166 A.2d at 744 ; Willis v. Maloof, 184 Ga. App. 349 , 361 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1987); Meyers v. Delaney, 529 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Iowa 1995); Burke v. Briggs, 239 N.J.Super. 269 , 571 A.2d 296, 299-300 (1990) (adopting Sprecher ); Ivancic v. Olmstead, 66 N.Y.2d 349 , 488 N.E.2d 72, 73 , 497 N.Y.S.2d 326 , 54 A.L.R.4th 523 (1985); Nationwide Ins.

2000See, e.g., Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal.3d 358 , 636 P.2d 1121 , 1128-29, 178 Cal.Rptr. 783 (1981) (landslide case applying tree case analysis); Dudley, 166 A.2d at 744 ; Willis v. Maloof, 184 Ga. App. 349 , 361 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1987); Meyers v. Delaney, 529 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Iowa 1995); Burke v. Briggs, 239 N.J.Super. 269 , 571 A.2d 296, 299-300 (1990) (adopting Sprecher ); Ivancic v. Olmstead, 66 N.Y.2d 349 , 488 N.E.2d 72, 73 , 497 N.Y.S.2d 326 , 54 A.L.R.4th 523 (1985); Nationwide Ins.

1996Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 , 63 S.Ct. 307 , 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943).

1996Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 , 63 S.Ct. 307 , 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943).

1996The Court stated antitrust immunity by implication from a regulatory statute is strongly disfavored and only may be found where there is a "plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.” Id. at 372 . 11 An analogous analysis is found in the federal courts’ state action exemption to federal antitrust law, which provides an exemption from federal antitrust laws for anti-competitive conduct that is regulated by the state or its subdivisions.

1996The Court stated antitrust immunity by implication from a regulatory statute is strongly disfavored and only may be found where there is a "plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions." Id. at 372 . [11] An analogous analysis is found in the federal courts' state action exemption to federal antitrust law, which *691 provides an exemption from federal antitrust laws for anticompetitive conduct that is regulated by the state or its subdivisions.

1986An analogous claim was brought in Bailey v. Forks, 38 Wn.

1986An analogous claim was brought in Bailey v. Forks, 38 Wn.

1985Jendrusch v. Jendrusch, 1 Hawaii App. 605 , 623 P.2d 893 , 897 n.4 (1981); Madden v. Madden, 44 Hawaii 442 , 355 P.2d 33 , *743 38 (1960); Chock v. Chock, 39 Hawaii 657, 658-59 (1953); see also 24 Am.

1985Jendrusch v. Jendrusch, 1 Hawaii App. 605 , 623 P.2d 893 , 897 n.4 (1981); Madden v. Madden, 44 Hawaii 442 , 355 P.2d 33 , *743 38 (1960); Chock v. Chock, 39 Hawaii 657, 658-59 (1953); see also 24 Am.

1985Jendrusch v. Jendrusch, 1 Hawaii App. 605 , 623 P.2d 893 , 897 n.4 (1981); Madden v. Madden, 44 Hawaii 442 , 355 P.2d 33 , *743 38 (1960); Chock v. Chock, 39 Hawaii 657, 658-59 (1953); see also 24 Am.

1985Jendrusch v. Jendrusch, 1 Hawaii App. 605 , 623 P.2d 893 , 897 n.4 (1981); Madden v. Madden, 44 Hawaii 442 , 355 P.2d 33 , *743 38 (1960); Chock v. Chock, 39 Hawaii 657, 658-59 (1953); see also 24 Am.

1980Thorsteinson v. Waters, 65 Wn.2d 739, 748 , 399 P.2d 510 (1965); Jackson v. Pennington, 11 Wn.

1980Thorsteinson v. Waters, 65 Wn.2d 739, 748 , 399 P.2d 510 (1965); Jackson v. Pennington, 11 Wn.

1980Thorsteinson v. Waters, 65 Wn.2d 739, 748 , 399 P.2d 510 (1965); Jackson v. Pennington, 11 Wn.

1973This is not a case of refusal to consent to‘state representation by a legal intern under the analogous rule of State v. Schultz, 145 Wash. 644 , 261 P. 385 (1927), clarifying State v. Heaton, 21 Wash. 59 , 56 P. 843 (1899), both cases decided long prior to APR 9.

1973This is not a case of refusal to consent to‘state representation by a legal intern under the analogous rule of State v. Schultz, 145 Wash. 644 , 261 P. 385 (1927), clarifying State v. Heaton, 21 Wash. 59 , 56 P. 843 (1899), both cases decided long prior to APR 9.