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11 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
LaBarge v. City of Concordiagreen2 sentences2017Appellants argue that the superior court erred in granting the Appellees summary judgment on these claims based on issue preclusion (formerly known as collateral estoppel) after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Heitz. 13 The most analogous claim is for slander of title, which Kansas courts define as “a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property, causing him injury.” LaBarge v. City of Concordia, 23 Kan. 2016Appellants argue that the superior court erred in granting the Appellees summary judgment on these claims based on issue preclusion (formerly known as collateral estoppel) after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Heitz. 12 The most analogous claim is for slander of title, which Kansas courts define as “a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property, causing him injury.” LaBarge v. City of Concordia, 23 Kan. | 2 | 2 |
State v. LYCHWICKgreen2 sentences2010Although acknowledging the standard of review of the trial court's denial of a Rule 20 motion is an abuse of discretion, see State v. Lychwick, 222 Ariz. 604, 117 , 218 P.3d 1061, 1063 (App.2009), Hinden argues “this standard is erroneous, because a trial court's ruling on a Rule 20 motion is not discretionary” and because "the standard for an appellate court's review of an analogous claim of insufficiency of the evidence, when raised for the first time on appeal in the absence of a Rule 20 motion below, is necessarily de novo.” We need not address the seeming inconsistency in these two standa 2010Although acknowledging the standard of review of the trial court's denial of a Rule 20 motion is an abuse of discretion, see State v. Lychwick, 222 Ariz. 604, 117 , 218 P.3d 1061, 1063 (App.2009), Hinden argues “this standard is erroneous, because a trial court's ruling on a Rule 20 motion is not discretionary” and because "the standard for an appellate court's review of an analogous claim of insufficiency of the evidence, when raised for the first time on appeal in the absence of a Rule 20 motion below, is necessarily de novo.” We need not address the seeming inconsistency in these two standa | 2 | 2 |
State v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2010See State v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 390, 114 , 26 P.3d 1161, 1164 (App.2001). 3 . 2010See State v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 390, 114 , 26 P.3d 1161, 1164 (App.2001). 3 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Valverdegreen2 sentences2015See State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 , ¶¶ 9-12 & n. 2, 208 P.3d 233 , 235-36 & 236 n. 2 (2009) (discussing different standards of appellate review); see also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.2004) (noting fundamental error is similar to, but somewhat broader than, federal plain error standard); State v. Henderson, 209 Ariz. 300, n. 4 , 100 P.3d 911 , 916 n. 4 (App.2004) (“plain error” is “the closest analogue to our doctrine of fundamental error”), vacated in part on other grounds, 210 Ariz. 561 , 115 P.3d 601 (2005). ¶ 31 These requirements of Rule 21.2 are neither onerous no 2015See State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 , ¶¶ 9-12 & n. 2, 208 P.3d 233 , 235-36 & 236 n. 2 (2009) (discussing different standards of appellate review); see also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.2004) (noting fundamental error is similar to, but somewhat broader than, federal plain error standard); State v. Henderson, 209 Ariz. 300, n. 4 , 100 P.3d 911 , 916 n. 4 (App.2004) (“plain error” is “the closest analogue to our doctrine of fundamental error”), vacated in part on other grounds, 210 Ariz. 561 , 115 P.3d 601 (2005). ¶ 31 These requirements of Rule 21.2 are neither onerous no | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gendrongreen2 sentences2015In Arizona, we apply the analogous standard of fundamental error review when an instruction-related issue has not been preserved below, see State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 54 , 859 P.2d 156, 164 (1993); State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 154-55 , 812 P.2d 626, 627-28 (1991), except in those very rare circumstances involving structural error, which is not present here. 2015In Arizona, we apply the analogous standard of fundamental error review when an instruction-related issue has not been preserved below, see State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 54 , 859 P.2d 156, 164 (1993); State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 154-55 , 812 P.2d 626, 627-28 (1991), except in those very rare circumstances involving structural error, which is not present here. | 1 | 1 |
Armando Castillo v. James McFadden Arizona Attorney Generalgreen1 sentence2015See State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 , ¶¶ 9-12 & n. 2, 208 P.3d 233 , 235-36 & 236 n. 2 (2009) (discussing different standards of appellate review); see also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.2004) (noting fundamental error is similar to, but somewhat broader than, federal plain error standard); State v. Henderson, 209 Ariz. 300, n. 4 , 100 P.3d 911 , 916 n. 4 (App.2004) (“plain error” is “the closest analogue to our doctrine of fundamental error”), vacated in part on other grounds, 210 Ariz. 561 , 115 P.3d 601 (2005). ¶ 31 These requirements of Rule 21.2 are neither onerous no | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schurzgreen2 sentences2015In Arizona, we apply the analogous standard of fundamental error review when an instruction-related issue has not been preserved below, see State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 54 , 859 P.2d 156, 164 (1993); State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 154-55 , 812 P.2d 626, 627-28 (1991), except in those very rare circumstances involving structural error, which is not present here. 2015In Arizona, we apply the analogous standard of fundamental error review when an instruction-related issue has not been preserved below, see State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 54 , 859 P.2d 156, 164 (1993); State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 154-55 , 812 P.2d 626, 627-28 (1991), except in those very rare circumstances involving structural error, which is not present here. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dugangreen1 sentence2014Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10. 9 STATE v. DELGADO Decision of the Court committing the lesser offense.’”) (citing State v. Dugan, 126 Ariz. 194 , 195, 608 P.2d 771, 772 (1980)). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Farrahgreen2 sentences1985Our Supreme Court stated that the “evidence ... must be clear and positive,” Lewis v. Farrah, 65 Ariz. 320, 323 , 180 P.2d 578, 580 (1947), which is an analogous standard. 1985Our Supreme Court stated that the “evidence ... must be clear and positive,” Lewis v. Farrah, 65 Ariz. 320, 323 , 180 P.2d 578, 580 (1947), which is an analogous standard. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2015See State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 , ¶¶ 9-12 & n. 2, 208 P.3d 233 , 235-36 & 236 n. 2 (2009) (discussing different standards of appellate review); see also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.2004) (noting fundamental error is similar to, but somewhat broader than, federal plain error standard); State v. Henderson, 209 Ariz. 300, n. 4 , 100 P.3d 911 , 916 n. 4 (App.2004) (“plain error” is “the closest analogue to our doctrine of fundamental error”), vacated in part on other grounds, 210 Ariz. 561 , 115 P.3d 601 (2005). ¶ 31 These requirements of Rule 21.2 are neither onerous no 2015See State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 , ¶¶ 9-12 & n. 2, 208 P.3d 233 , 235-36 & 236 n. 2 (2009) (discussing different standards of appellate review); see also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.2004) (noting fundamental error is similar to, but somewhat broader than, federal plain error standard); State v. Henderson, 209 Ariz. 300, n. 4 , 100 P.3d 911 , 916 n. 4 (App.2004) (“plain error” is “the closest analogue to our doctrine of fundamental error”), vacated in part on other grounds, 210 Ariz. 561 , 115 P.3d 601 (2005). ¶ 31 These requirements of Rule 21.2 are neither onerous no | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2015See State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 , ¶¶ 9-12 & n. 2, 208 P.3d 233 , 235-36 & 236 n. 2 (2009) (discussing different standards of appellate review); see also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.2004) (noting fundamental error is similar to, but somewhat broader than, federal plain error standard); State v. Henderson, 209 Ariz. 300, n. 4 , 100 P.3d 911 , 916 n. 4 (App.2004) (“plain error” is “the closest analogue to our doctrine of fundamental error”), vacated in part on other grounds, 210 Ariz. 561 , 115 P.3d 601 (2005). ¶ 31 These requirements of Rule 21.2 are neither onerous no 2015See State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 , ¶¶ 9-12 & n. 2, 208 P.3d 233 , 235-36 & 236 n. 2 (2009) (discussing different standards of appellate review); see also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.2004) (noting fundamental error is similar to, but somewhat broader than, federal plain error standard); State v. Henderson, 209 Ariz. 300, n. 4 , 100 P.3d 911 , 916 n. 4 (App.2004) (“plain error” is “the closest analogue to our doctrine of fundamental error”), vacated in part on other grounds, 210 Ariz. 561 , 115 P.3d 601 (2005). ¶ 31 These requirements of Rule 21.2 are neither onerous no | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Legal Economic Evaluations, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
green
2 sentences2004In Lackey v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court declined to review an analogous claim, namely, that execution of a defendant after he spent many years on death row would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 514 U.S. 1045 , 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995). 2004In Lackey v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court declined to review an analogous claim, namely, that execution of a defendant after he spent many years on death row would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 514 U.S. 1045 , 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Morrow v. United States
green
2 sentences2004In Lackey v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court declined to review an analogous claim, namely, that execution of a defendant after he spent many years on death row would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 514 U.S. 1045 , 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995). 2004In Lackey v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court declined to review an analogous claim, namely, that execution of a defendant after he spent many years on death row would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 514 U.S. 1045 , 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Lackey v. Texas
green
2 sentences2004In Lackey v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court declined to review an analogous claim, namely, that execution of a defendant after he spent many years on death row would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 514 U.S. 1045 , 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995). 2004In Lackey v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court declined to review an analogous claim, namely, that execution of a defendant after he spent many years on death row would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 514 U.S. 1045 , 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Green v. United States
green
2 sentences1999The policy behind the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. *526 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2 1999The policy behind the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. *526 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2 | 1 | 1999–1999 |
United States v. Jorn
green
2 sentences1999The policy behind the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. *526 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2 1999The policy behind the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. *526 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2 | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cty., No. Jv-508801
green
2 sentences1998JV-508801, JV-509882, and JV-510161, 183 Ariz. 175 , 901 P.2d 1205 (App.1995). 1998JV-508801, JV-509882, and JV-510161, 183 Ariz. 175 , 901 P.2d 1205 (App.1995). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Brady
green
2 sentences1979Defendant relies on State v. Brady, 2 Ariz.App. 210 , 407 P.2d 399 (1965) as representing an analogous requirement for the crime of burglary, A.R.S. § 13-302. 1979Defendant relies on State v. Brady, 2 Ariz.App. 210 , 407 P.2d 399 (1965) as representing an analogous requirement for the crime of burglary, A.R.S. § 13-302. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.