analogous claim in Pennsylvania

2017Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 895 (1991).

2012By contrast, the analogous rule in Pennsylvania “has consistently served to bolster the twin aims of Article I, Section 8; to-wit, the safeguarding of privacy and the fundamental requirement that warrants shall be issued upon proba ble cause.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 535 Pa. 560 , 637 A.2d 251, 256 (1993) (quoting Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 899 ).

1975Where there is a possibility that the insurance contract covers the claim, it is the duty of the company to defend: Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 396 Pa. 582, 589, 590 , 152 A. 2d 484, 488 (1959); Gedeon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 410 Pa. 55, 58, 59 , 188 A. 2d 320, 321, 322 (1963); Eastern Equipment Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 38 D. & C. 2d 499 (C.P.

1975Where there is a possibility that the insurance contract covers the claim, it is the duty of the company to defend: Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 396 Pa. 582, 589, 590 , 152 A. 2d 484, 488 (1959); Gedeon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 410 Pa. 55, 58, 59 , 188 A. 2d 320, 321, 322 (1963); Eastern Equipment Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 38 D. & C. 2d 499 (C.P.

1975Where there is a possibility that the insurance contract covers the claim, it is the duty of the company to defend: Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 396 Pa. 582, 589, 590 , 152 A. 2d 484, 488 (1959); Gedeon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 410 Pa. 55, 58, 59 , 188 A. 2d 320, 321, 322 (1963); Eastern Equipment Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 38 D. & C. 2d 499 (C.P.

1975Where there is a possibility that the insurance contract covers the claim, it is the duty of the company to defend: Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 396 Pa. 582, 589, 590 , 152 A. 2d 484, 488 (1959); Gedeon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 410 Pa. 55, 58, 59 , 188 A. 2d 320, 321, 322 (1963); Eastern Equipment Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 38 D. & C. 2d 499 (C.P.

2025Co., 106 A. 724, 727 (Pa. 1919) (stating, “[a]n obstruction in a public highway does not gain a legal status by lapse of time nor by inaction[;] laches will not be imputed to the [C]ommonwealth”); Commonwealth v. Moorhead, 12 A. 424, 426 (Pa. 1888) (stating, “public rights are not destroyed by long-continued encroachments or permissive trespasses”); Williamstown Borough, 591 A.2d at 715 ; A.D.

2015See Williamstown Borough Authority, 591 A.2d at 715 (holding that the doctrine of laches cannot succeed where the analogous claim of adverse possession fails); Glen Hope Borough v. Kitko, 424 Pa.Super. 67 , 621 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1993) (holding that estoppel, like laches, cannot succeed against a government entity where a claim of adverse possession would fail).

2021In light of the above, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, we apply the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States that, “[s]o long as the accused is made aware of the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-representation’ during postindictment questioning, by use of the Miranda warnings, his waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at such questioning is ‘knowing and intelligent.’” Patterson, 487 U.S. at 300 , 108 Nevertheless, it is difficult if not impossible to apprehend Patterson’s approach of generally adjudging the efficacy of a waiver of the right to counsel for Sixth Amendm

2021On this point, I agree with Justice Wecht that Agent Peacock’s assuaging of appellant’s culpability, in addition to his failure to advise appellant of the charges against him, leads to the conclusion the Commonwealth failed to prove appellant “truly understood the ‘full dangers and disadvantages of’ waiving his right to counsel or 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 I also reiterate the majority’s point that “this Court may take a different view when presented with an analogous claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution[.]” Majority Opinion at 13. that those risks were adequately expla

2025Co., 106 A. 724, 727 (Pa. 1919) (stating, “[a]n obstruction in a public highway does not gain a legal status by lapse of time nor by inaction[;] laches will not be imputed to the [C]ommonwealth”); Commonwealth v. Moorhead, 12 A. 424, 426 (Pa. 1888) (stating, “public rights are not destroyed by long-continued encroachments or permissive trespasses”); Williamstown Borough, 591 A.2d at 715 ; A.D.

2025Co., 106 A. 724, 727 (Pa. 1919) (stating, “[a]n obstruction in a public highway does not gain a legal status by lapse of time nor by inaction[;] laches will not be imputed to the [C]ommonwealth”); Commonwealth v. Moorhead, 12 A. 424, 426 (Pa. 1888) (stating, “public rights are not destroyed by long-continued encroachments or permissive trespasses”); Williamstown Borough, 591 A.2d at 715 ; A.D.

2025T]hus, we are not bound by the trial court's decision on the issue.” Fulton, 106 A.3d at 131 . - 10 - J-A23021-24 laches.]”5 PA Energy, 120 A.3d at 1014-1015 (reiterating that, “the doctrine of laches cannot succeed where the analogous claim of adverse possession fails”); see also City of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R.

2021As such, I would hold appellant’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was unknowing based “upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case[.]” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).

2021Op. at 12, I am dismayed by the perpetuation of what the late Justice Arthur Goldberg long ago described as a system of criminal justice that has “come[] to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens’ abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights.” Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).

2020See Causby, 328 U.S. at 260-61 , 66 S. Ct. at 1065 .

2020See Causby, 328 U.S. at 260-61 , 66 S. Ct. at 1065 .

2019In Lekka, we phrased the question of whether a sentence constitutes a de facto LWOP sentence as whether a defendant has a “meaningful chance of survival until he completes his . . . minimum sentence to enjoy his time at liberty at parole, should he be granted release.” Id. at 358 .14 An analogous claim of a de facto LWOP sentence was raised by the appellant in Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 420, 441 (Pa. Super. 2018), wherein an appellant who was incarcerated at age 17 was sentenced to a minimum of 60 years of confinement and would not be paroled until he was 77 years old.

2019This Court concluded that this sentence was not a de facto LWOP sentence, because “[a]lthough he may not live this long, he has a chance of being released into society.” Id. at 441 .

2019See 1 Pa.C.S. §1928(b)(8). (continued…) [J-108-2018] - 12 In terms of judicial deference to the Board’s construction of the Act, Dealers cite Alpha Auto Sales, Inc. v. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, 537 Pa. 353 , 644 A.2d 153 (1994), for the proposition that “great deference” is due to the Board.

2019See 1 Pa.C.S. §1928(b)(8). (continued…) [J-108-2018] - 12 In terms of judicial deference to the Board’s construction of the Act, Dealers cite Alpha Auto Sales, Inc. v. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, 537 Pa. 353 , 644 A.2d 153 (1994), for the proposition that “great deference” is due to the Board.

2015See Williamstown Borough Authority, 591 A.2d at 715 (holding that the doctrine of laches cannot succeed where the analogous claim of adverse possession fails); Glen Hope Borough v. Kitko, 424 Pa.Super. 67 , 621 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1993) (holding that estoppel, like laches, cannot succeed against a government entity where a claim of adverse possession would fail).

2015See Williamstown Borough Authority, 591 A.2d at 715 (holding that the doctrine of laches cannot succeed where the analogous claim of adverse possession fails); Glen Hope Borough v. Kitko, 424 Pa.Super. 67 , 621 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1993) (holding that estoppel, like laches, cannot succeed against a government entity where a claim of adverse possession would fail).

2012By contrast, the analogous rule in Pennsylvania “has consistently served to bolster the twin aims of Article I, Section 8; to-wit, the safeguarding of privacy and the fundamental requirement that warrants shall be issued upon proba ble cause.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 535 Pa. 560 , 637 A.2d 251, 256 (1993) (quoting Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 899 ).

2012By contrast, the analogous rule in Pennsylvania “has consistently served to bolster the twin aims of Article I, Section 8; to-wit, the safeguarding of privacy and the fundamental requirement that warrants shall be issued upon proba ble cause.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 535 Pa. 560 , 637 A.2d 251, 256 (1993) (quoting Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 899 ).

2006See generally Searles, 856 A.2d at 92 n. 5.

2006See generally Searles, 856 A.2d at 92 n. 5.