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7 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1859–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2022Though Rule 119.02 refers only 8 See Rules 24.035(j) & 29.15(j) (setting forth the analogous requirement regarding motion court findings in postconviction proceedings); see also supra note 6 (addressing Rule 78.07(c)); Johnson v. State, 388 S.W.3d 159, 168 (Mo. banc 2012) (holding that Rule 78.07(c) applies to Rule 24.035 and Rule 29.15 postconviction motions). 13 to "judgments" and not to "orders," the intent is plain. | 1 | 1 |
Houston v. Lackgreen1 sentence2019The United States Supreme Court adopted an analogous rule when interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 273-75 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Shaw v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louisgreen1 sentence2004Louis, 344 S.W.2d 32, 36-37 (Mo.1961), which requires a civil plaintiff to discuss damages in the first portion of closing argument or be barred from raising the issue in rebuttal, would be applied in criminal cases to the issue of punishment. 1 In Peterson it was found that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling defense counsel’s objection when the prosecutor asked the jury to impose the “maximum sentence” in the rebuttal portion of closing argument after neither he nor defense counsel discussed the issue of punishment in the preceding portions of closing argument. 423 S.W.2d at | 1 | 1 |
State v. Petersongreen1 sentence2004Louis, 344 S.W.2d 32, 36-37 (Mo.1961), which requires a civil plaintiff to discuss damages in the first portion of closing argument or be barred from raising the issue in rebuttal, would be applied in criminal cases to the issue of punishment. 1 In Peterson it was found that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling defense counsel’s objection when the prosecutor asked the jury to impose the “maximum sentence” in the rebuttal portion of closing argument after neither he nor defense counsel discussed the issue of punishment in the preceding portions of closing argument. 423 S.W.2d at | 1 | 1 |
Edelblute v. Waddell & Reed, Inc.green2 sentences1976Payment § 57, p. 262; Neal v. Gideon, 157 Kan. 1 , 138 P.2d 419, 420 [3, 4] (1943); Edelblute v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 171 Kan. 508 , 233 P.2d 757, 761 [6, 7] (1951); and Carry v. Homer, 195 Kan. 475 , 407 P.2d 538, 542 [1] (1965), et seq., and cases and authority cited. 1976Payment § 57, p. 262; Neal v. Gideon, 157 Kan. 1 , 138 P.2d 419, 420 [3, 4] (1943); Edelblute v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 171 Kan. 508 , 233 P.2d 757, 761 [6, 7] (1951); and Carry v. Homer, 195 Kan. 475 , 407 P.2d 538, 542 [1] (1965), et seq., and cases and authority cited. | 1 | 1 |
Carry v. Homergreen2 sentences1976Payment § 57, p. 262; Neal v. Gideon, 157 Kan. 1 , 138 P.2d 419, 420 [3, 4] (1943); Edelblute v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 171 Kan. 508 , 233 P.2d 757, 761 [6, 7] (1951); and Carry v. Homer, 195 Kan. 475 , 407 P.2d 538, 542 [1] (1965), et seq., and cases and authority cited. 1976Payment § 57, p. 262; Neal v. Gideon, 157 Kan. 1 , 138 P.2d 419, 420 [3, 4] (1943); Edelblute v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 171 Kan. 508 , 233 P.2d 757, 761 [6, 7] (1951); and Carry v. Homer, 195 Kan. 475 , 407 P.2d 538, 542 [1] (1965), et seq., and cases and authority cited. | 1 | 1 |
Neal v. Gideongreen2 sentences1976Payment § 57, p. 262; Neal v. Gideon, 157 Kan. 1 , 138 P.2d 419, 420 [3, 4] (1943); Edelblute v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 171 Kan. 508 , 233 P.2d 757, 761 [6, 7] (1951); and Carry v. Homer, 195 Kan. 475 , 407 P.2d 538, 542 [1] (1965), et seq., and cases and authority cited. 1976Payment § 57, p. 262; Neal v. Gideon, 157 Kan. 1 , 138 P.2d 419, 420 [3, 4] (1943); Edelblute v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 171 Kan. 508 , 233 P.2d 757, 761 [6, 7] (1951); and Carry v. Homer, 195 Kan. 475 , 407 P.2d 538, 542 [1] (1965), et seq., and cases and authority cited. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dorris v. State
green
1 sentence2019Given our disposition, we need not decide in this case the precise time at which an inmate’s pro se motion is considered to have been “deposited in the mail” within the meaning of Rule 24.035(b). 6 360 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. banc 2012)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Mulhall
green
2 sentences1979Judge Faris, concurring in Kester , stated, 201 S.W. at 64: “I have long doubted the correctness of the rule announced in State v. Mulhall, 199 Mo. 202 , 97 S.W. 583 , 7 L.R.A., N.S., 630, 8 Ann.Cas. 781, and State v. Williamson, 203 Mo. 591 , 102 S.W. 519 , 120 Am.St.Rep. 678 , because I deem it opposed to good reasoning; to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, and to the analogous rule in murder cases wherein the death alleged resulted from shooting at A., and striking and killing B., and wherein we say in effect that the intent follows the bullet. 1979Judge Faris, concurring in Kester , stated, 201 S.W. at 64: “I have long doubted the correctness of the rule announced in State v. Mulhall, 199 Mo. 202 , 97 S.W. 583 , 7 L.R.A., N.S., 630, 8 Ann.Cas. 781, and State v. Williamson, 203 Mo. 591 , 102 S.W. 519 , 120 Am.St.Rep. 678 , because I deem it opposed to good reasoning; to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, and to the analogous rule in murder cases wherein the death alleged resulted from shooting at A., and striking and killing B., and wherein we say in effect that the intent follows the bullet. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Williamson
green
2 sentences1979Judge Faris, concurring in Kester , stated, 201 S.W. at 64: “I have long doubted the correctness of the rule announced in State v. Mulhall, 199 Mo. 202 , 97 S.W. 583 , 7 L.R.A., N.S., 630, 8 Ann.Cas. 781, and State v. Williamson, 203 Mo. 591 , 102 S.W. 519 , 120 Am.St.Rep. 678 , because I deem it opposed to good reasoning; to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, and to the analogous rule in murder cases wherein the death alleged resulted from shooting at A., and striking and killing B., and wherein we say in effect that the intent follows the bullet. 1979Judge Faris, concurring in Kester , stated, 201 S.W. at 64: “I have long doubted the correctness of the rule announced in State v. Mulhall, 199 Mo. 202 , 97 S.W. 583 , 7 L.R.A., N.S., 630, 8 Ann.Cas. 781, and State v. Williamson, 203 Mo. 591 , 102 S.W. 519 , 120 Am.St.Rep. 678 , because I deem it opposed to good reasoning; to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, and to the analogous rule in murder cases wherein the death alleged resulted from shooting at A., and striking and killing B., and wherein we say in effect that the intent follows the bullet. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Rosecrans v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1889That rule is that, ‘ ‘where the testimony offered in support of the allegations of the party who sustains the burden of proof is, if believed, sufficient to make out his. case, and is clear, consistent' with itself, delivered by an unimpeached, witness, and no circumstance is developed tending to cast suspicion upon it, and no substantial countervailing evidence is offered by the other party, if the jury, nevertheless, disregard it, and return a verdict against it, it will be the duty of the trial court on motion for new trial, and of the appellate court on appeal or error, to set it aside as | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Steamboat Raritan v. Smith
neutral
1 sentence1859It was remarked in the case of the Steamboat Raritan v. Smith, 10 Mo. 527 , that, as our system of proceeding in rem against vessels had its origin in the maritime law, it was proper to look to that law for the principles of decision in questions not regulated by statute; and we may suppose that the court, in the case of the Steamboat Elk, intended to adopt the analogous rule that exists in some of the admiralty courts, which requires libels praying for'warrants of arrest in personam or in rem to. be verified by the affidavit of the libellant, and that when the affidavit is made by an agent he | 1 | 1859–1859 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.