bedrock principle in Colorado

2026See Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001) ("It is a bedrock rule that a party who unsuccessfully objects to the introduction of evidence on one ground cannot switch horses in midstream and raise an entirely new ground of objection on appeal. . . ."); People v. Rogers, 2012 COA 192, ¶ 24 , 317 P.3d 1280,1284 ("An issue is unpreserved for review when an objection or request was made to the trial court, but on different grounds than those raised on appeal."). ¶109 For these reasons, I would conclude that by not advancing in their initial briefing an argument that Lulei was not in cu

2016See People v. Honeysette , 53 P.3d 714, 717 (Colo. App. 2002) (applying the plain error standard of review where the claim of error on appeal was different from the objection at trial); cf. Udemba v. Nicoli , 237 F.3d 8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001) (“It is a bedrock rule that a party who unsuccessfully objects to the introduction of evidence on one ground cannot switch horses in midstream and raise an entirely new ground of objection on appeal without forfeiting the usual standard of review.”). ¶ 12 Plain error is error that is obvious, substantial, and “so undermine[s] the fundamental fairness of t

2016See In Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO 72 , ¶ 20, 363 P.3d 193 , 201 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)).

2016See In Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO 72 , ¶ 20, 363 P.3d 193 , 201 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).

2016See In Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO 72 , ¶ 20, 363 P.3d 193 , 201 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)).

2016See In Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO 72 , ¶ 20, 363 P.3d 193 , 201 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).

2016See In Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO 72 , ¶ 20, 363 P.3d 193 , 201 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)).

2016See In Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO 72 , ¶ 20, 363 P.3d 193 , 201 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).

2026See Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001) ("It is a bedrock rule that a party who unsuccessfully objects to the introduction of evidence on one ground cannot switch horses in midstream and raise an entirely new ground of objection on appeal. . . ."); People v. Rogers, 2012 COA 192, ¶ 24 , 317 P.3d 1280,1284 ("An issue is unpreserved for review when an objection or request was made to the trial court, but on different grounds than those raised on appeal."). ¶109 For these reasons, I would conclude that by not advancing in their initial briefing an argument that Lulei was not in cu

2026See Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001) ("It is a bedrock rule that a party who unsuccessfully objects to the introduction of evidence on one ground cannot switch horses in midstream and raise an entirely new ground of objection on appeal. . . ."); People v. Rogers, 2012 COA 192, ¶ 24 , 317 P.3d 1280,1284 ("An issue is unpreserved for review when an objection or request was made to the trial court, but on different grounds than those raised on appeal."). ¶109 For these reasons, I would conclude that by not advancing in their initial briefing an argument that Lulei was not in cu

2025Thus, while perhaps repetitious in certain cases, the adoption exclusion is not rendered meaningless by our interpretation of "grandparent" as one who is presently the parent of a child's mother or father. ¶22 Our interpretation accords with "the bedrock principle that the right to parent one's children is a fundamental liberty interest." People in Int. of J.G. , 2016 CO 39, ¶ 20 , 370 P.3d 1151, 1158 ; see also Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (upholding a mother's fundamental right to make decisions about her children in the context of grandparent visitation).

2021Edwa rds , 160 Colo. at 402, 418 P.2d at 177 ; Lybarger , 790 P.2d at 859 ; Shipma n , 20 747 P.2d at 3 ; Saiz , 660 P.2d at 4 .

2021Edwa rds , 160 Colo. at 402, 418 P.2d at 177 ; Lybarger , 790 P.2d at 859 ; Shipma n , 20 747 P.2d at 3 ; Saiz , 660 P.2d at 4 .

2020The Reasonable Doubt Standard ¶ 21 The supreme court in Johnson described the reasonable doubt standard as a bedrock principle of American jurisprudence: In criminal cases, the prosecution is required to “prove every factual element necessary to constitute the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Vega v. People, 893 P.2d 107, 111 (Colo. 1995).

2020This requirement “dates at least from our early years as a Nation” and is nothing short of “indispensable.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 364 , (1970).

2018It is now "a bedrock principle ... that 'searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.' " People v. Brunsting , 2013 CO 55 , ¶ 18, 307 P.3d 1073 , 1078 (quoting King , 563 U.S. at 459 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 ).

2018It is now "a bedrock principle ... that 'searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.' " People v. Brunsting , 2013 CO 55 , ¶ 18, 307 P.3d 1073 , 1078 (quoting King , 563 U.S. at 459 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 ).

2018See id. at 621 ("[A]ny fact that 'expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict' ... must be submitted to a jury." (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 494 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ) ).

2018See id. at 621 ("[A]ny fact that 'expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict' ... must be submitted to a jury." (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 494 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ) ).

2016A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 28 (citation omitted).

2016Such evidence is generally ‘linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.’”) (citations omitted). ¶ 16 Although several cases address res gestae evidence in terms of its contemporaneity to the charged events, see People v. Lehnert , 131 P.3d 1104 (Colo. App. 2005), rev’d , 163 P.3d 1111 (Colo. 2007); People v. Rollins , 892 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1995), res gestae evidence “includes not just evidence of other acts that were substantially simultaneous in time an

2016See People v. Honeysette , 53 P.3d 714, 717 (Colo. App. 2002) (applying the plain error standard of review where the claim of error on appeal was different from the objection at trial); cf. Udemba v. Nicoli , 237 F.3d 8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001) (“It is a bedrock rule that a party who unsuccessfully objects to the introduction of evidence on one ground cannot switch horses in midstream and raise an entirely new ground of objection on appeal without forfeiting the usual standard of review.”). ¶ 12 Plain error is error that is obvious, substantial, and “so undermine[s] the fundamental fairness of t

2016Such evidence is generally ‘linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.’”) (citations omitted). ¶ 16 Although several cases address res gestae evidence in terms of its contemporaneity to the charged events, see People v. Lehnert , 131 P.3d 1104 (Colo. App. 2005), rev’d , 163 P.3d 1111 (Colo. 2007); People v. Rollins , 892 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1995), res gestae evidence “includes not just evidence of other acts that were substantially simultaneous in time an

2016See People v. Honeysette , 53 P.3d 714, 717 (Colo. App. 2002) (applying the plain error standard of review where the claim of error on appeal was different from the objection at trial); cf. Udemba v. Nicoli , 237 F.3d 8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001) (“It is a bedrock rule that a party who unsuccessfully objects to the introduction of evidence on one ground cannot switch horses in midstream and raise an entirely new ground of objection on appeal without forfeiting the usual standard of review.”). ¶ 12 Plain error is error that is obvious, substantial, and “so undermine[s] the fundamental fairness of t

2016See People v. Honeysette , 53 P.3d 714, 717 (Colo. App. 2002) (applying the plain error standard of review where the claim of error on appeal was different from the objection at trial); cf. Udemba v. Nicoli , 237 F.3d 8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001) (“It is a bedrock rule that a party who unsuccessfully objects to the introduction of evidence on one ground cannot switch horses in midstream and raise an entirely new ground of objection on appeal without forfeiting the usual standard of review.”). ¶ 12 Plain error is error that is obvious, substantial, and “so undermine[s] the fundamental fairness of t

2016Such evidence is generally ‘linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.’”) (citations omitted). ¶ 16 Although several cases address res gestae evidence in terms of its contemporaneity to the charged events, see People v. Lehnert , 131 P.3d 1104 (Colo. App. 2005), rev’d , 163 P.3d 1111 (Colo. 2007); People v. Rollins , 892 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1995), res gestae evidence “includes not just evidence of other acts that were substantially simultaneous in time an

2016Such evidence is generally ‘linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.’”) (citations omitted). ¶ 16 Although several cases address res gestae evidence in terms of its contemporaneity to the charged events, see People v. Lehnert , 131 P.3d 1104 (Colo. App. 2005), rev’d , 163 P.3d 1111 (Colo. 2007); People v. Rollins , 892 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1995), res gestae evidence “includes not just evidence of other acts that were substantially simultaneous in time an

2016See People v. Honeysette , 53 P.3d 714, 717 (Colo. App. 2002) (applying the plain error standard of review where the claim of error on appeal was different from the objection at trial); cf. Udemba v. Nicoli , 237 F.3d 8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001) (“It is a bedrock rule that a party who unsuccessfully objects to the introduction of evidence on one ground cannot switch horses in midstream and raise an entirely new ground of objection on appeal without forfeiting the usual standard of review.”). ¶ 12 Plain error is error that is obvious, substantial, and “so undermine[s] the fundamental fairness of t

2016See People v. Honeysette , 53 P.3d 714, 717 (Colo. App. 2002) (applying the plain error standard of review where the claim of error on appeal was different from the objection at trial); cf. Udemba v. Nicoli , 237 F.3d 8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2001) (“It is a bedrock rule that a party who unsuccessfully objects to the introduction of evidence on one ground cannot switch horses in midstream and raise an entirely new ground of objection on appeal without forfeiting the usual standard of review.”). ¶ 12 Plain error is error that is obvious, substantial, and “so undermine[s] the fundamental fairness of t