bedrock rule in Iowa

2018This prohibition "embraces a bedrock rule of law that punishment should fit the crime." Lyle , 854 N.W.2d at 384 (quoting State v. Bruegger , 773 N.W.2d 862 , 872 (Iowa 2009) ); accord Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551 , 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 1190, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.").

2018This prohibition "embraces a bedrock rule of law that punishment should fit the crime." Lyle , 854 N.W.2d at 384 (quoting State v. Bruegger , 773 N.W.2d 862 , 872 (Iowa 2009) ); accord Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551 , 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 1190, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.").

2017The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause “embraces a bedrock rule of law that punishment should fit the crime.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 872 ; see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 , 30 S.Ct. 544, 549 , 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910) (“[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”).

2017The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause “embraces a bedrock rule of law that punishment should fit the crime.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 872 ; see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 , 30 S.Ct. 544, 549 , 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910) (“[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”).

2014Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution “embraces a bedrock rule of law that punishment should fit the crime.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 872 ; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 , 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1190 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1, 16 (2005) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 , 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2246 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335, 344 (2002) (“ ‘[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ” (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 34

2014Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution “embraces a bedrock rule of law that punishment should fit the crime.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 872 ; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 , 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1190 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1, 16 (2005) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 , 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2246 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335, 344 (2002) (“ ‘[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ” (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 34

2018This prohibition "embraces a bedrock rule of law that punishment should fit the crime." Bruegger , 773 N.W.2d at 872 .

2018This prohibition "embraces a bedrock rule of law that punishment should fit the crime." Lyle , 854 N.W.2d at 384 (quoting State v. Bruegger , 773 N.W.2d 862 , 872 (Iowa 2009) ); accord Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551 , 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 1190, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.").

2024See, e.g., State v. Baker, 688 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2004) (holding that a penal statute must define criminal offenses “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” (quoting State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc))); see also State v. Opperman, 826 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (“It is a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system that, almost without exception

2024See, e.g., State v. Baker, 688 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2004) (holding that a penal stat- ute must define criminal offenses “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary peo- ple can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” (quoting State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robin- son, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc))); see also State v. Opperman, 826 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (“It is a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system that, almost without exc

2024See, e.g., State v. Baker, 688 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2004) (holding that a penal statute must define criminal offenses “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” (quoting State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc))); see also State v. Opperman, 826 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (“It is a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system that, almost without exception

2024See, e.g., State v. Baker, 688 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2004) (holding that a penal stat- ute must define criminal offenses “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary peo- ple can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” (quoting State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robin- son, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc))); see also State v. Opperman, 826 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (“It is a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system that, almost without exc

2024See, e.g., State v. Baker, 688 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2004) (holding that a penal statute must define criminal offenses “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” (quoting State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc))); see also State v. Opperman, 826 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (“It is a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system that, almost without exception

2024See, e.g., State v. Baker, 688 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2004) (holding that a penal stat- ute must define criminal offenses “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary peo- ple can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” (quoting State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robin- son, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc))); see also State v. Opperman, 826 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (“It is a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system that, almost without exc

2024See, e.g., State v. Baker, 688 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2004) (holding that a penal statute must define criminal offenses “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” (quoting State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc))); see also State v. Opperman, 826 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (“It is a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system that, almost without exception

2024See, e.g., State v. Baker, 688 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2004) (holding that a penal stat- ute must define criminal offenses “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary peo- ple can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” (quoting State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robin- son, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc))); see also State v. Opperman, 826 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (“It is a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system that, almost without exc

2026Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).

2024See Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 223 (2017) (“Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).

2024See Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 223 (2017) (“Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).

2024Even where the speech actually offends a listener, punishing such speech “would be inconsistent with ‘[the Supreme Court’s] longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.’ ” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (second alteration in original) (quoting Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).

2024Even where the speech actually offends a listener, punishing such speech “would be inconsistent with ‘[the Supreme Court’s] longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.’ ” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (second alteration in original) (quoting Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).

2018Applying this bedrock principle, we believe "punishing an actually innocent person is disproportionate to the crime (or lack of crime) committed and violates the cruel and inhuman treatment clause." Cole , 765 N.Y.S.2d at 485 ; accord Herrera , 506 U.S. at 431 , 113 S.Ct. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting punishment "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime" is unconstitutional and excessive (quoting Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S. 584 , 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion) ) ).

2018Applying this bedrock principle, we believe "punishing an actually innocent person is disproportionate to the crime (or lack of crime) committed and violates the cruel and inhuman treatment clause." Cole , 765 N.Y.S.2d at 485 ; accord Herrera , 506 U.S. at 431 , 113 S.Ct. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting punishment "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime" is unconstitutional and excessive (quoting Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S. 584 , 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion) ) ).

2018Furthermore, we agree with Justice Blackmun's dissent in Herrera that "it is crystal clear that the execution of an innocent person is 'at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency.' " 506 U.S. at 431 , 113 S.Ct. at 876 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida , 468 U.S. 447 , 465, 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 3165, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hurst v. Florida , 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) ).

2018Furthermore, we agree with Justice Blackmun's dissent in Herrera that "it is crystal clear that the execution of an innocent person is 'at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency.' " 506 U.S. at 431 , 113 S.Ct. at 876 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida , 468 U.S. 447 , 465, 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 3165, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hurst v. Florida , 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) ).

2018Applying this bedrock principle, we believe "punishing an actually innocent person is disproportionate to the crime (or lack of crime) committed and violates the cruel and inhuman treatment clause." Cole , 765 N.Y.S.2d at 485 ; accord Herrera , 506 U.S. at 431 , 113 S.Ct. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting punishment "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime" is unconstitutional and excessive (quoting Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S. 584 , 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion) ) ).

2018Applying this bedrock principle, we believe "punishing an actually innocent person is disproportionate to the crime (or lack of crime) committed and violates the cruel and inhuman treatment clause." Cole , 765 N.Y.S.2d at 485 ; accord Herrera , 506 U.S. at 431 , 113 S.Ct. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting punishment "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime" is unconstitutional and excessive (quoting Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S. 584 , 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion) ) ).

2018Furthermore, we agree with Justice Blackmun's dissent in Herrera that "it is crystal clear that the execution of an innocent person is 'at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency.' " 506 U.S. at 431 , 113 S.Ct. at 876 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida , 468 U.S. 447 , 465, 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 3165, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hurst v. Florida , 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) ).

2018Furthermore, we agree with Justice Blackmun's dissent in Herrera that "it is crystal clear that the execution of an innocent person is 'at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency.' " 506 U.S. at 431 , 113 S.Ct. at 876 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida , 468 U.S. 447 , 465, 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 3165, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hurst v. Florida , 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) ).

2014While “strict proportionality” is neither required nor, frankly, possible, Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 , 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2705 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 869 (1991), Bruegger re-veals our scrutiny of the proportionality between the crime and the sentence is not “ ‘toothless,’ ” 773 N.W.2d at 883 (quoting Racing Ass’n of Cent.

2014While “strict proportionality” is neither required nor, frankly, possible, Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 , 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2705 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 869 (1991), Bruegger re-veals our scrutiny of the proportionality between the crime and the sentence is not “ ‘toothless,’ ” 773 N.W.2d at 883 (quoting Racing Ass’n of Cent.