bedrock principle in New Mexico

2025See State v. Rowell, 15 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 10 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (“Any warrantless search 16 analysis must start with the bedrock principle of both federal and state constitutional 17 jurisprudence that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 18 approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable, subject only to well- 19 delineated exceptions.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2025See State v. Rowell, 15 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 10 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (“Any warrantless search 16 analysis must start with the bedrock principle of both federal and state constitutional 17 jurisprudence that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 18 approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable, subject only to well- 19 delineated exceptions.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2025See State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9, 4 126 N.M. 742, 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that 5 appellate courts do not decide the facts in a case.

2025See State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9, 4 126 N.M. 742, 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that 5 appellate courts do not decide the facts in a case.

2025See State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9, 4 126 N.M. 742, 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that 5 appellate courts do not decide the facts in a case.

2025See State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9 , 4 126 N.M. 742 , 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that 5 appellate courts do not decide the facts in a case.

2013Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).

2013Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the 2 We note that this list is not exhaustive. 14 First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). {45} The GAL argues that we can conclude that the internet publication constituted defamation based upon evidence the GAL presented in the district court, the findings the court made in its Internet Order, and the findings it made in a second order regarding the GAL’s attorney fees.

2023DISCUSSION 17 {6} Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, 18 Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution protect against unreasonable searches. 19 “Any warrantless search analysis must start with the bedrock principle of both 20 federal and state constitutional jurisprudence that ‘searches conducted outside the 21 judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 22 unreasonable,’ subject only to well-delineated exceptions.” State v. Rowell, 2008- 4 1 NMSC-041, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 2 U.S

2023“Any warrantless search analysis must start with the bedrock principle of both federal and state constitutional jurisprudence that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable,’ subject only to well-delineated exceptions.” State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041 , ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991)).

2022See State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9 , 126 8 N.M. 742 , 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that appellate 9 courts do not decide the facts in a case”); see also Duke City Lumber Co. v. Terrel, 10 1975-NMSC-041 , ¶ 5, 88 N.M. 299 , 540 P.2d 229 (“[I]t is for the finder of the facts, 11 and not the appellate courts, to weigh conflicting evidence and decide where the 12 truth lies.”). 13 CONCLUSION 14 {32} For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s orders regarding Kammann’s 15 parentage are reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consist

2022See State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9 , 126 8 N.M. 742 , 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that appellate 9 courts do not decide the facts in a case”); see also Duke City Lumber Co. v. Terrel, 10 1975-NMSC-041 , ¶ 5, 88 N.M. 299 , 540 P.2d 229 (“[I]t is for the finder of the facts, 11 and not the appellate courts, to weigh conflicting evidence and decide where the 12 truth lies.”). 13 CONCLUSION 14 {32} For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s orders regarding Kammann’s 15 parentage are reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consist

2017"Any warrantless search analysis must start with the bedrock principle of both federal and state constitutional jurisprudence that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable, subject only to well-delineated exceptions." Rowell , 2008-NMSC-041 , ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); accord Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1558, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that a warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized excepti

2017"Any warrantless search analysis must start with the bedrock principle of both federal and state constitutional jurisprudence that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable, subject only to well-delineated exceptions." Rowell , 2008-NMSC-041 , ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); accord Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1558, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that a warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized excepti

2016See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 48-49 .

2016See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 48-49 .

2012Time-Place-Manner Zoning {24} Our First Amendment analysis recognizes the bedrock principle of the right to free speech articulated by the framers of both the state and federal constitutions. ‘“At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.’” United States v. Strandlof 667 F.3d 1146, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). “[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its messa

2012Time-Place-Manner Zoning {24} Our First Amendment analysis recognizes the bedrock principle of the right to free speech articulated by the framers of both the state and federal constitutions. “‘At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.’” United States v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). “[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its mess

2012Time-Place-Manner Zoning {24} Our First Amendment analysis recognizes the bedrock principle of the right to free speech articulated by the framers of both the state and federal constitutions. ‘“At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.’” United States v. Strandlof 667 F.3d 1146, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). “[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its messa

2012Time-Place-Manner Zoning {24} Our First Amendment analysis recognizes the bedrock principle of the right to free speech articulated by the framers of both the state and federal constitutions. “‘At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.’” United States v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). “[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its mess

2012Time-Place-Manner Zoning {24} Our First Amendment analysis recognizes the bedrock principle of the right to free speech articulated by the framers of both the state and federal constitutions. ‘“At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.’” United States v. Strandlof 667 F.3d 1146, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). “[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its messa

2012Time-Place-Manner Zoning {24} Our First Amendment analysis recognizes the bedrock principle of the right to free speech articulated by the framers of both the state and federal constitutions. “‘At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.’” United States v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). “[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its mess

1995The purpose of the economic-loss rule, however, is "to preserve the bedrock principle that contract damages be limited to those `within the contemplation and control of the parties in framing their agreement.'" City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 446 (4th Cir.1990) (quoting Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 224 Va. 699 , 299 S.E.2d 514, 517 (1983)).

1995The purpose of the economic-loss rule, however, is “to preserve the bedrock principle that contract damages be limited to those “within the contemplation and control of the parties in framing their agreement.’ ” City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 446 (4th Cir.1990) (quoting Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 224 Va. 699 , 299 S.E.2d 514, 517 (1983)).

1995The purpose of the economic-loss rule, however, is "to preserve the bedrock principle that contract damages be limited to those `within the contemplation and control of the parties in framing their agreement.'" City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 446 (4th Cir.1990) (quoting Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 224 Va. 699 , 299 S.E.2d 514, 517 (1983)).

1995The purpose of the economic-loss rule, however, is "to preserve the bedrock principle that contract damages be limited to those `within the contemplation and control of the parties in framing their agreement.'" City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 446 (4th Cir.1990) (quoting Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 224 Va. 699 , 299 S.E.2d 514, 517 (1983)).

2023“Any warrantless search analysis must start with the bedrock principle of both federal and state constitutional jurisprudence that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable,’ subject only to well-delineated exceptions.” State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041 , ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991)).

2008Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

2025See State v. Bond, 2011-NMCA-036, ¶ 11 , 150 N.M. 451 , 261 P.3d 599 (“Any warrantless search analysis must start with the bedrock principle of both federal and state constitutional jurisprudence that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable, subject only to well-delineated exceptions. . . .

2025See State v. Bond, 2011-NMCA-036, ¶ 11 , 150 N.M. 451 , 261 P.3d 599 (“Any warrantless search analysis must start with the bedrock principle of both federal and state constitutional jurisprudence that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable, subject only to well-delineated exceptions. . . .

2024While we acknowledged that Section 36-2-27 seemingly carves out a magistrate-court exception to the unauthorized practice of law, we nevertheless emphasized the bedrock principle that “the ultimate authority ‘to regulate all pleading, practice and procedure’ resides in the judicial branch of government, and specifically in the Supreme Court.” Rivera, 2012-NMSC-003, ¶ 7 (citation omitted).

2024See Eldridge v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 1987-NMCA-042 , ¶ 7, 105 N.M. 660 , 735 P.2d 1166 (stating that “it is the appellant’s responsibility to provide this court with the record on appeal, and when a record is incomplete, this court assumes that the missing portions would support the trial court’s determination”); State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9 , 126 N.M. 742 , 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that appellate courts do not decide the facts in a case.

2024See Eldridge v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 1987-NMCA-042 , ¶ 7, 105 N.M. 660 , 735 P.2d 1166 (stating that “it is the appellant’s responsibility to provide this court with the record on appeal, and when a record is incomplete, this court assumes that the missing portions would support the trial court’s determination”); State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9 , 126 N.M. 742 , 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that appellate courts do not decide the facts in a case.

2024See Rule 11-104(A) NMRA (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether . . . a privilege exists.”); Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 38 , 267 P.3d 806 (“A petitioner asserting the attorney-client privilege bears the burden of demonstrating that the privilege applies.”); Albuquerque J., 2019-NMCA-012, ¶ 21 (“Failure to adequately support a claim of privilege thwarts both the adversarial process and meaningful independent judicial review and justifies denial of the claim of privilege.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); See Santa Fe Pac.

2020See Dalton, 2016-NMSC-035, ¶ 21 (“Gross unfairness is a bedrock principle of our unconscionability analysis.”); Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 32 (concluding an arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because it was unreasonably and unfairly one-sided).

2020See Dalton, 2016-NMSC-035, ¶ 21 (“Gross unfairness is a bedrock principle of our unconscionability analysis.”); Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 32 (concluding an arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because it was unreasonably and unfairly one-sided).

2020See, e.g., Dalton, 2016-NMSC-035, ¶ 21 (“Gross unfairness is a bedrock principle of our unconscionability analysis.”); State ex rel.

2016See State v. Hernandez, 1999-NMCA-105 , 17 ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 769 , 987 P.2d 1156 (noting that the trial court has broad discretion in 18 determining whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance); Martinez, 1982- 19 NMCA-137, ¶ 14 (“Determination of the admissibility of statements as excited 8 1 utterances is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be 2 overturned in the absence of clear abuse.”); see also State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA- 3 027, ¶ 9, 126 N.M. 742 , 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice 4 that appellate courts do not deci

2016See State v. Hernandez, 1999-NMCA-105 , 17 ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 769 , 987 P.2d 1156 (noting that the trial court has broad discretion in 18 determining whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance); Martinez, 1982- 19 NMCA-137, ¶ 14 (“Determination of the admissibility of statements as excited 8 1 utterances is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be 2 overturned in the absence of clear abuse.”); see also State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA- 3 027, ¶ 9, 126 N.M. 742 , 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice 4 that appellate courts do not deci

2015See State v. Vigil, 1975-NMSC-013 , ¶ 16, 87 N.M. 345 , 533 P.2d 578 6 (holding that it is for the factfinder to determine the credibility of the witnesses and 7 the weight to be given to their testimony, and the factfinder may reject a defendant's 8 version of an incident); see also State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9 , 126 N.M. 9 742 , 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that appellate courts 10 do not decide the facts in a case.”).

2015See State v. Vigil, 1975-NMSC-013 , ¶ 16, 87 N.M. 345 , 533 P.2d 578 6 (holding that it is for the factfinder to determine the credibility of the witnesses and 7 the weight to be given to their testimony, and the factfinder may reject a defendant's 8 version of an incident); see also State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9 , 126 N.M. 9 742 , 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that appellate courts 10 do not decide the facts in a case.”).

2015See State v. Vigil, 1975-NMSC-013 , ¶ 16, 87 N.M. 345 , 533 P.2d 578 6 (holding that it is for the factfinder to determine the credibility of the witnesses and 7 the weight to be given to their testimony, and the factfinder may reject a defendant's 8 version of an incident); see also State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶ 9 , 126 N.M. 9 742 , 975 P.2d 355 (“It is a bedrock principle of appellate practice that appellate courts 10 do not decide the facts in a case.”).