bedrock principle in California

2025The Legislature amended sections 188 and 189, which substantially narrowed the liability of accomplices to murder: “It is a bedrock principle of the law and of equity that a person should be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level of individual culpability.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (d).) “With this purpose in mind, [the Legislature] ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent

2025The Legislature amended sections 188 and 189, which substantially narrowed the liability of accomplices to murder: “It is a bedrock principle of the law and of equity that a person should be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level of individual culpability.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (d).) “With this purpose in mind, [the Legislature] ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent

2024“As a rule, all sentence enhancements ‘shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading and either admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 953 (Anderson).) The bedrock of this rule is due process. “‘“No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal.” [C

2024(See Jimenez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 396–397 [satisfying statutory pleading requirement, where applicable, is necessary but not sufficient to support application of alternative sentencing scheme under One Strike law; due process must also be satisfied]; cf. Anderson II, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 953 [“Beneath . . . statutory pleading requirements lies a bedrock principle of due process.”].)6 The Attorney General argues that due process does not require the prosecution to notify the defendant of the specific One Strike sentence it is seeking.

2016“It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves.” (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 ; accord, Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [ 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 ].) “A witness may assert the privilege who has ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.’ [Citations.] However, ‘the witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate himself—his say-so

2016“It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves.” (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 ; accord, Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [ 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 ].) “A witness may assert the privilege who has ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.’ [Citations.] However, ‘the witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate himself—his say-so

2026Applicable law Under the Sixth Amendment, criminal defendants have the right “‘to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’” (In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 29 .) But this right does “not entitle the defendant to compel a witness to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege” against self- 11 incrimination (the privilege).3 (People v. Woods (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 929, 938 .) “‘It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law . . . that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves. [T]his privilege “must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the righ

2016“It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves.” (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 ; accord, Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [ 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 ].) “A witness may assert the privilege who has ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.’ [Citations.] However, ‘the witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate himself—his say-so

1967In Thornhill v. Alabama (1939) 310 U.S. 88, 102 [ 84 L.Ed. 1093 , 60 S.Ct. 736 ], the United States Supreme Court, in striking down a blanket ban upon all picketing, declared that ‘. . . the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. ’ “Although the court subsequently qualified its broad ruling in Thornhill by adopting a test permitting states to enjoin peaceful picketing for a purpose antithetical to some valid state policy, the bedrock principle of Thornhill , that picket

1967In Thornhill v. Alabama (1939) 310 U.S. 88, 102 [ 84 L.Ed. 1093 , 60 S.Ct. 736 ], the United States Supreme Court, in striking down a blanket ban upon all picketing, declared that ‘. . . the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. ’ “Although the court subsequently qualified its broad ruling in Thornhill by adopting a test permitting states to enjoin peaceful picketing for a purpose antithetical to some valid state policy, the bedrock principle of Thornhill , that picket

2016“It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves.” (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 ; accord, Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [ 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 ].) “A witness may assert the privilege who has ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.’ [Citations.] However, ‘the witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate himself—his say-so

2016“It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves.” (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 ; accord, Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [ 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 ].) “A witness may assert the privilege who has ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.’ [Citations.] However, ‘the witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate himself—his say-so

2020Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740, 746 (Clancy).) "Indeed, it is a bedrock principle that a government attorney prosecuting a public action on behalf of the government must not be motivated solely by a desire to win a case, but instead owes a duty to the public to ensure that justice will be done." (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 35, 57 .) "A fair prosecution and outcome in a proceeding brought in the name of the public is a matter of vital concern both for defendants and for the public, whose interests are represented by the government and to whom a duty

2020Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740, 746 (Clancy).) "Indeed, it is a bedrock principle that a government attorney prosecuting a public action on behalf of the government must not be motivated solely by a desire to win a case, but instead owes a duty to the public to ensure that justice will be done." (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 35, 57 .) "A fair prosecution and outcome in a proceeding brought in the name of the public is a matter of vital concern both for defendants and for the public, whose interests are represented by the government and to whom a duty

2016“It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves.” (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 ; accord, Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [ 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 ].) “A witness may assert the privilege who has ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.’ [Citations.] However, ‘the witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate himself—his say-so

2016“It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves.” (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 ; accord, Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [ 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 ].) “A witness may assert the privilege who has ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.’ [Citations.] However, ‘the witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate himself—his say-so

1967This court has frequently acknowledged and applied the Thornhill principle.” “ A union may use the various forms of concerted action, such as strike, picketing, or boycott, to enforce an objective that is reasonably related to any legitimate interest of organized labor.” (James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 728 [ 155 P.2d 329 , 160 A.L.R. 900 ] ; Hughes v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.2d 850, 854 .) The maintenance of the union standards as to days, hours and prices was a legitimate objective of the barbers’ union and it was entitled to attempt to persuade plaintiff to adopt these standa

1964Thus in Hughes v. Superior Court (1948) 32 Cal.2d 850, 854 [ 198 P.2d 885 ], we said that "It is now established as the law that `the right to picket peacefully and truthfully is one of organized labor's lawful means of advertising its grievances to the public, and as such is guaranteed by the Constitution as an incident of freedom of speech.'" (See McKay v. Retail Auto Salesmen's Local Union 1067 (1942) 16 Cal.2d 311, 319 [ 106 P.2d 373 ]; Magill Bros. v. Building Service etc. Union (1942) 20 Cal.2d 506, 511-512 [ 127 P.2d 542 ]; Rees v. City of Palm Springs (1961) 188 Cal. App.2d 339, 346 [

2023By insisting that Mudpie always supplies the bedrock rule despite the breadth of the particular insuring agreement we are dealing with, Sentinel’s interpretation violates “two related principles applicable to all insurance contracts: first, that ‘the policy or its endorsements cannot be so interpreted as to become meaningless, or to withhold coverage which the [layperson] would normally expect from it . . . ,’ and second, that ‘ “. . . [t]he courts will not sanction a construction of the 30 insurer’s language that will defeat the very purpose or object of the insurance.” ’ ” (Howell v. State F

2022By insisting that Mudpie always supplies the bedrock rule despite the breadth of the particular insuring agreement we are dealing with, Sentinel’s interpretation violates “two related principles applicable to all insurance contracts: first, that ‘the policy or its endorsements cannot be so interpreted as to become meaningless, or to withhold coverage which the [layperson] would normally expect from it . . . ,’ and second, that ‘ “. . . [t]he courts will not sanction a construction of the 30 insurer’s language that will defeat the very purpose or object of the insurance.” ’ ” (Howell v. State F

2023By insisting that Mudpie always supplies the bedrock rule despite the breadth of the particular insuring agreement we are dealing with, Sentinel’s interpretation violates “two related principles applicable to all insurance contracts: first, that ‘the policy or its endorsements cannot be so interpreted as to become meaningless, or to withhold coverage which the [layperson] would normally expect from it . . . ,’ and second, that ‘ “. . . [t]he courts will not sanction a construction of the 30 insurer’s language that will defeat the very purpose or object of the insurance.” ’ ” (Howell v. State F

2022By insisting that Mudpie always supplies the bedrock rule despite the breadth of the particular insuring agreement we are dealing with, Sentinel’s interpretation violates “two related principles applicable to all insurance contracts: first, that ‘the policy or its endorsements cannot be so interpreted as to become meaningless, or to withhold coverage which the [layperson] would normally expect from it . . . ,’ and second, that ‘ “. . . [t]he courts will not sanction a construction of the 30 insurer’s language that will defeat the very purpose or object of the insurance.” ’ ” (Howell v. State F

2023(See, e.g., Cayuga Nation v. Tanner (2d Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 321, 327 (Cayuga Nation) [“federal courts lack authority to resolve internal disputes about tribal law” as “[i]t is ‘a bedrock principle of federal Indian law that every tribe is capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself’ ”]; In re Sac & Fox Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa/Meskwaki Casino Litigation (8th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3d 749 , 763 8 In his opposition to the Burley faction’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Corrales stated that “resolution of who is presently the valid Tribal representative or w

2023(See, e.g., Cayuga Nation v. Tanner (2d Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 321, 327 (Cayuga Nation) [“federal courts lack authority to resolve internal disputes about tribal law” as “[i]t is ‘a bedrock principle of federal Indian law that every tribe is capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself’ ”]; In re Sac & Fox Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa/Meskwaki Casino Litigation (8th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3d 749 , 763 8 In his opposition to the Burley faction’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Corrales stated that “resolution of who is presently the valid Tribal representative or w

2022A taxpayer may not go into court and obtain adjudication of the validity of a tax which is due but not yet paid.” (O’Hara, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 638; accord Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1101 (Loeffler).) Article XIII, section 32 has been “a bedrock principle of tax law for over a century because the public policy it effectuates is fundamental to the continued operation of our state.” (Cal. Dept. of Tax & Fee Admin. v. Superior Court (Kintner) (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 922 , 931 (Kintner).) “[T]he policy behind the provision is to ensure that the state may continue to collect t

2022A taxpayer may not go into court and obtain adjudication of the validity of a tax which is due but not yet paid.” (O’Hara, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 638; accord Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1101 (Loeffler).) Article XIII, section 32 has been “a bedrock principle of tax law for over a century because the public policy it effectuates is fundamental to the continued operation of our state.” (Cal. Dept. of Tax & Fee Admin. v. Superior Court (Kintner) (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 922 , 931 (Kintner).) “[T]he policy behind the provision is to ensure that the state may continue to collect t

2014(Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691 ; see In re Collie (1952) 38 Cal.2d 396, 398 [one Legislature cannot diminish the legislative power of a subsequent Legislature].) Interpreting Assembly Bills 2877 and 430 solely as amendments of a repealed statute forecloses the Legislature’s power to legislate; but interpreting the two bills as new enactments, when legitimate to do so (as here), accords with the Legislature’s plenary power to legislate (and, we add, does so here while furthering legislative intent).

2014(Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691 ; see In re Collie (1952) 38 Cal.2d 396, 398 [one Legislature cannot diminish the legislative power of a subsequent Legislature].) Interpreting Assembly Bills 2877 and 430 solely as amendments of a repealed statute forecloses the Legislature’s power to legislate; but interpreting the two bills as new enactments, when legitimate to do so (as here), accords with the Legislature’s plenary power to legislate (and, we add, does so here while furthering legislative intent).

2014Legal Analysis “It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves.” (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 .) This privilege “must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure.” (Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 .) A witness may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege who has “reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.” (Ibid.; accord Ohio v. Reiner (2001) 532 U.S. 17, 21 .)

2005In an oft-cited case, the high court stated that this privilege “must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure.” (Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [ 95 L.Ed. 1118 , 71 S.Ct. 814 ].) A witness may assert the privilege who has “reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.” (Ibid.; accord, Ohio v. Reiner (2001) 532 U.S. 17, 21 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 158 , 121 S.Ct. 1252 ].) However, “The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself—his say-so does not of itself establ

2023Due process requires that a defendant be given “fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be invoked to increase punishment for his crimes.” (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 747 (Mancebo).) This bedrock rule is reflected in various statutes.

2020Beneath all three statutory pleading requirements lies a bedrock principle of due process. “ ‘No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal.’ [Citations.] ‘A criminal defendant must be given fair notice of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity properly to prepare a defense and avoid unfair surprise at tri

2023“A bedrock principle of contract law in California has always been that competent parties should have ‘ “ ‘the utmost liberty of contract’ ” ’ to arrange their affairs according to their own judgment so long as they do not contravene positive law or public policy.” (Series AGI West Linn of Appian Group Investors DE, LLC v. Eves (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 156, 164 ; see South- Western Pub.

2023(See Series AGI West Linn of Appian Group Investors DE, LLC v. Eves (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 156, 164 [“A bedrock principle of contract law in California has always been that competent parties should have ‘ “ ‘the utmost liberty of contract’ ” ’ to arrange their affairs according to their own judgment so long as they do not contravene positive law or public policy”].) Instead, Castaic merely zeroes in on Wonderland’s misguided discussion about choice of law provisions, which Castaic argues are “wholly inapplicable” because such provisions concern “forum selection,” not at issue here.

2022A taxpayer may not go into court and obtain adjudication of the validity of a tax which is due but not yet paid.” (O’Hara, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 638; accord Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1101 (Loeffler).) Article XIII, section 32 has been “a bedrock principle of tax law for over a century because the public policy it effectuates is fundamental to the continued operation of our state.” (Cal. Dept. of Tax & Fee Admin. v. Superior Court (Kintner) (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 922 , 931 (Kintner).) “[T]he policy behind the provision is to ensure that the state may continue to collect t

2022A taxpayer may not go into court and obtain adjudication of the validity of a tax which is due but not yet paid.” (O’Hara, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 638; accord Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1101 (Loeffler).) Article XIII, section 32 has been “a bedrock principle of tax law for over a century because the public policy it effectuates is fundamental to the continued operation of our state.” (Cal. Dept. of Tax & Fee Admin. v. Superior Court (Kintner) (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 922 , 931 (Kintner).) “[T]he policy behind the provision is to ensure that the state may continue to collect t

2019(See, e.g., National Socialist Party v. Skokie (1977) 432 U.S. 43 , 97 S.Ct. 2205 , 53 L.Ed.2d 96 (per curiam); see also, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 562 U.S. 443 , 458, 131 S.Ct. 1207 , 179 L.Ed.2d 172 [" 'If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.' [Citation.] Indeed, 'the point of all speech protection ... is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's **620 eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.' "].) Defendant argue

2019(See, e.g., National Socialist Party v. Skokie (1977) 432 U.S. 43 , 97 S.Ct. 2205 , 53 L.Ed.2d 96 (per curiam); see also, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 562 U.S. 443 , 458, 131 S.Ct. 1207 , 179 L.Ed.2d 172 [" 'If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.' [Citation.] Indeed, 'the point of all speech protection ... is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's **620 eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.' "].) Defendant argue