57 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Insurancegreen2 sentences2025However: This approach, where judges divine the parties’ reasonable expectations and then rewrite the contract accordingly, is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy. [Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 51 ; 664 NW2d 776 (2003).] Trial courts lack the authority to modify the unambiguous terms of the contract or balance the equities between the parties. 2025However: This approach, where judges divine the parties’ reasonable expectations and then rewrite the contract accordingly, is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy. [Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 51 ; 664 NW2d 776 (2003).] Trial courts lack the authority to modify the unambiguous terms of the contract or balance the equities between the parties. | 3 | 10 |
Rita Kendzierski v. County of MacOmbgreen2 sentences2020Permitting a court to make its own determination of reasonableness and to rewrite a contract accordingly, even when it is unambiguous “is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy.” Kendzierski, 503 Mich at 312 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2020Thus, permitting a court to make its own determination of reasonableness and to rewrite a contract accordingly when a contract is unambiguous “is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy.” Kendzierski, 503 Mich at 312 (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Mayor of Lansing v. Public Service Commissiongreen2 sentences2019“This approach, where judges divine the parties’ reasonable expectations 9 See Mayor of the City of Lansing v Pub Serv Comm, 470 Mich 154, 166 ; 680 NW2d 840 (2004) (“[A] provision of the law is ambiguous only if it irreconcilably conflicts with another provision or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning.”) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). 11 and then rewrite the contract accordingly, is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written abse 2019“This approach, where judges divine the parties’ reasonable expectations 9 See Mayor of the City of Lansing v Pub Serv Comm, 470 Mich 154, 166 ; 680 NW2d 840 (2004) (“[A] provision of the law is ambiguous only if it irreconcilably conflicts with another provision or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning.”) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). 11 and then rewrite the contract accordingly, is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written abse | 2 | 2 |
Robinson v. City of Detroitgreen2 sentences2004The doctrine itself is "a form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to the bedrock principle of American constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power is reposed in the people as reflected in the work of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional violation, the courts have no legitimacy in overruling or nullifying the people's representatives." Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 467 , 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000). 2004The doctrine itself is "a form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to the bedrock principle of American constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power is reposed in the people as reflected in the work of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional violation, the courts have no legitimacy in overruling or nullifying the people's representatives." Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 467 , 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000). | 1 | 6 |
McInerney v. Detroit Trust Co.green2 sentences2024See, e.g., McInerney v Detroit Trust Co, 279 Mich 42, 48 ; 271 NW 545 (1937). 2 The binding nature of the contract notwithstanding, the fact remains that plaintiff’s recoupment under the contract is limited to the methods and restrictions established by the no-fault act.3 In sum, plaintiff is entitled to pursue defendant for reimbursement of her rehabilitative care. 2024See, e.g., McInerney v Detroit Trust Co, 279 Mich 42, 48 ; 271 NW 545 (1937). 2 The binding nature of the contract notwithstanding, the fact remains that plaintiff’s recoupment under the contract is limited to the methods and restrictions established by the no-fault act.3 In sum, plaintiff is entitled to pursue defendant for reimbursement of her rehabilitative care. | 1 | 1 |
People Of The State Of New York v. Operation Rescue Nationalgreen1 sentence2024See also Operation Rescue, 273 F3d at 196 (“It is worth reinforcing that we must tolerate even views that upset our most heartfelt and deeply held convictions.”) A law that restricts or proscribes speech or conduct on the basis of the message or idea it conveys is considered content-based. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Richardsgreen1 sentence2020See Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 US 365, 375 ; 106 S Ct 2574 ; 91 L Ed 2d 305 (1986).27 although ex ante restrictions are not required, such restrictions on searches of digital data “are sometimes acceptable mechanisms for ensuring the particularity of a search”). “[G]iven the unique problem encountered in computer searches, and the practical difficulties inherent in implementing universal search methodologies, the majority of federal courts have eschewed the use of a specific search protocol and, instead, have employed the Fourth Amendment’s bedrock principle of reasonableness on a case-by-case | 1 | 1 |
Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2020See Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 US 365, 375 ; 106 S Ct 2574 ; 91 L Ed 2d 305 (1986).27 although ex ante restrictions are not required, such restrictions on searches of digital data “are sometimes acceptable mechanisms for ensuring the particularity of a search”). “[G]iven the unique problem encountered in computer searches, and the practical difficulties inherent in implementing universal search methodologies, the majority of federal courts have eschewed the use of a specific search protocol and, instead, have employed the Fourth Amendment’s bedrock principle of reasonableness on a case-by-case 2020See Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 US 365, 375 ; 106 S Ct 2574 ; 91 L Ed 2d 305 (1986).27 although ex ante restrictions are not required, such restrictions on searches of digital data “are sometimes acceptable mechanisms for ensuring the particularity of a search”). “[G]iven the unique problem encountered in computer searches, and the practical difficulties inherent in implementing universal search methodologies, the majority of federal courts have eschewed the use of a specific search protocol and, instead, have employed the Fourth Amendment’s bedrock principle of reasonableness on a case-by-case | 1 | 1 |
Pohutski v. City of Allen Parkgreen1 sentence2019Moreover, not only does such a compromising by a court of the citizen’s ability to rely on a statute have no constitutional warrant, it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts repeat the error. [Id. at 467-468; accord Pohutski, 465 Mich at 694 - 695.] In the criminal law context, reliance interests often will carry little weight in determining whether to overrule an incorrectly decided precedent. | 1 | 1 |
Byram v. Gordongreen1 sentence2018Our Supreme Court first acknowledged it in 1863: “And when no time is specified for the performance of such act or contract in the agreement itself, the law steps in and requires it to be performed within a reasonable time.” Byram v Gordon, 11 Mich 531, 534-535 (1863). | 1 | 1 |
McCAHAN v. BRENNANgreen1 sentence2018Moreover, not only does such a compromising by a court of the citizen’s ability to rely on a statute have no constitutional warrant, it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts repeat the error. [Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 467-468 (2000).] In such cases, where the result of a decision effectively “usurp[s]” or “nullif[ies]” the “legislative function,” this Court is obligated to correct that decision, regardless 17 Kelly-Stehney, 254 Mich App at 615-616 , quoting Crown Technology Park v D & N Bank, FSB, 242 Mich App 538 , 548 n 4, (2000), citing Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Fed | 1 | 1 |
| Bayati v. Bayatigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Singer v. American States Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Trentadue v. Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Halloran v. Bhangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Aarongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States Ex Rel. International Contracting Co. v. Lamontgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McIntosh v. Groomesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mills v. Spencergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Detroit Trust Co. v. Agozziniogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Burkhardt v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2026The judiciary may not rewrite contracts on the basis of discerned reasonable expectations of the parties because to do so is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy. [Burkhardt v Bailey, 260 Mich App 636, 656-657 ; 680 NW2d 453 (2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] “When a court abrogates unambiguous contractual provisions based on its own independent assessment of 2026The judiciary may not rewrite contracts on the basis of discerned reasonable expectations of the parties because to do so is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy. [Burkhardt v Bailey, 260 Mich App 636, 656-657 ; 680 NW2d 453 (2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] “When a court abrogates unambiguous contractual provisions based on its own independent assessment of | 6 | 2010–2026 |
Terrien v. Zwit
green
2 sentences2016This Court has recently discussed, and reinforced, its fidelity to this understanding of contract law in Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich 56, 71 , 648 NW2d 602 (2002). 2016This Court has recently discussed, and reinforced, its fidelity to this understanding of contract law in Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich 56, 71 , 648 NW2d 602 (2002). | 5 | 2003–2016 |
Coleman v. Gurwin
green
2 sentences2004A bedrock principle of statutory construction is that “a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65 ; 503 NW2d 435 (1993). 2004A bedrock principle of statutory construction is that “a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65 ; 503 NW2d 435 (1993). | 4 | 2003–2004 |
Texas v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2024“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 414 ; 109 S Ct 2533 ; 105 L Ed 2d 342 (1989). 2024“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 414 ; 109 S Ct 2533 ; 105 L Ed 2d 342 (1989). | 2 | 2021–2024 |
Shay v. Aldrich
green
2 sentences2020Finally, “if a contract is ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine the actual intent of the parties.” Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648, 667 ; 790 NW2d 629 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he term ‘fixture’ necessarily implies something having a possible existence apart from realty, but which may, by annexation, be assimilated into realty.” Wayne Co v William G Britton & Virginia M Britton Trust, 454 Mich 608, 614-615 ; 563 NW2d 674 (1997). 2020Finally, “if a contract is ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine the actual intent of the parties.” Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648, 667 ; 790 NW2d 629 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he term ‘fixture’ necessarily implies something having a possible existence apart from realty, but which may, by annexation, be assimilated into realty.” Wayne Co v William G Britton & Virginia M Britton Trust, 454 Mich 608, 614-615 ; 563 NW2d 674 (1997). | 2 | 2020–2020 |
O’connor v. Resort Custom Builders, Inc
green
2 sentences2019O’Connor v Resort Custom Builders, Inc, 459 Mich 335, 343 ; 591 NW2d 216 (1999). 2019O’Connor v Resort Custom Builders, Inc, 459 Mich 335, 343 ; 591 NW2d 216 (1999). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Corwin v. DaimlerChrysler Insurance
green
2 sentences2018“It is a bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent . . . a contract in violation of law or public policy.” Corwin v DaimlerChrysler Ins Co, 296 Mich App 242, 256 ; 819 NW2d 68 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -3- and because the no-fault act does not have its own fraud exclusion, the defendant could not avoid paying any remaining PIP benefits. 2018“It is a bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent . . . a contract in violation of law or public policy.” Corwin v DaimlerChrysler Ins Co, 296 Mich App 242, 256 ; 819 NW2d 68 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -3- and because the no-fault act does not have its own fraud exclusion, the defendant could not avoid paying any remaining PIP benefits. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Rakestraw v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc
green
2 sentences2004“A bedrock principle of statutory construction is that a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” Id., quoting Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65 ; 503 NW2d 435 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2004When the statutory language is unambiguous, the proper role of the judiciary is to simply apply the terms of the statute to the facts of a particular case.” Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics Land Systems, Inc, 469 Mich 220, 224 ; 666 NW2d 199 (2003) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Rory v. Continental Insurance
green
2 sentences2026The judiciary may not rewrite contracts on the basis of discerned reasonable expectations of the parties because to do so is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy. [Burkhardt v Bailey, 260 Mich App 636, 656-657 ; 680 NW2d 453 (2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] “When a court abrogates unambiguous contractual provisions based on its own independent assessment of 2026The judiciary may not rewrite contracts on the basis of discerned reasonable expectations of the parties because to do so is contrary to the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy. [Burkhardt v Bailey, 260 Mich App 636, 656-657 ; 680 NW2d 453 (2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] “When a court abrogates unambiguous contractual provisions based on its own independent assessment of | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Quality Products and Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025Rather, “unless otherwise agreed by the Parties” merely permitted the parties to amend the contract at a future date, reflecting the bedrock principle that “parties possess, and never cease to possess, the freedom to contract even after the original contract has been executed.” Quality Prod & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 372 ; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). 2025Rather, “unless otherwise agreed by the Parties” merely permitted the parties to amend the contract at a future date, reflecting the bedrock principle that “parties possess, and never cease to possess, the freedom to contract even after the original contract has been executed.” Quality Prod & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 372 ; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Peter v. NantKwest, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025“This Court’s basic point of reference when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the American Rule: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” Peter v Nantkwest, Inc, 589 US 23, 28 ; 140 S Ct 365 ; 205 L Ed 2d 304 (2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 2025“This Court’s basic point of reference when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the American Rule: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” Peter v Nantkwest, Inc, 589 US 23, 28 ; 140 S Ct 365 ; 205 L Ed 2d 304 (2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. McFarlin
green
2 sentences2023And it transfers such judicial discretion to the executive branch because by determining what charges to file and what plea bargain to offer, the prosecutor controls sentencing. -1- As I stated in my partial concurrence in People v Hall, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 4, 2014 (Docket No. 313795): A defendant’s “sentence should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and the offender in an effort to balance both society’s need for protection and its interest in maximizing the offender's rehabilitative potential.” People v McFarlin, 389 M 2023And it transfers such judicial discretion to the executive branch because by determining what charges to file and what plea bargain to offer, the prosecutor controls sentencing. -1- As I stated in my partial concurrence in People v Hall, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 4, 2014 (Docket No. 313795): A defendant’s “sentence should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and the offender in an effort to balance both society’s need for protection and its interest in maximizing the offender's rehabilitative potential.” People v McFarlin, 389 M | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Virginia v. Black
green
1 sentence2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Budzyn
green
2 sentences2021People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 88 ; 566 NW2d 229 (1997). 2021People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 88 ; 566 NW2d 229 (1997). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Watts v. United States
green
2 sentences2021Therefore, statutes that criminalize speech “must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.” Watts v United States, 394 US 705, 707 ; 89 S Ct 1399 ; 22 L Ed 2d 664 (1969). 2021Therefore, statutes that criminalize speech “must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.” Watts v United States, 394 US 705, 707 ; 89 S Ct 1399 ; 22 L Ed 2d 664 (1969). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2020We need not decide here whether the warrant was overly broad because “putting aside for the moment the question what limitations the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement should or should not impose on the government ex ante, the Amendment’s protection against ‘unreasonable’ searches surely allows courts to assess the propriety of the government’s search methods . . . ex post in light of the specific circumstances of each case.” Christie, 717 F3d at 1166 , citing Ramirez, 523 US at 71 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Christie
green
1 sentence2020We need not decide here whether the warrant was overly broad because “putting aside for the moment the question what limitations the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement should or should not impose on the government ex ante, the Amendment’s protection against ‘unreasonable’ searches surely allows courts to assess the propriety of the government’s search methods . . . ex post in light of the specific circumstances of each case.” Christie, 717 F3d at 1166 , citing Ramirez, 523 US at 71 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Wayne County v. Britton Trust
green
2 sentences2020Finally, “if a contract is ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine the actual intent of the parties.” Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648, 667 ; 790 NW2d 629 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he term ‘fixture’ necessarily implies something having a possible existence apart from realty, but which may, by annexation, be assimilated into realty.” Wayne Co v William G Britton & Virginia M Britton Trust, 454 Mich 608, 614-615 ; 563 NW2d 674 (1997). 2020Finally, “if a contract is ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine the actual intent of the parties.” Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648, 667 ; 790 NW2d 629 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he term ‘fixture’ necessarily implies something having a possible existence apart from realty, but which may, by annexation, be assimilated into realty.” Wayne Co v William G Britton & Virginia M Britton Trust, 454 Mich 608, 614-615 ; 563 NW2d 674 (1997). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Crown Technology Park v. D&N Bank, FSB
green
1 sentence2018Moreover, not only does such a compromising by a court of the citizen’s ability to rely on a statute have no constitutional warrant, it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts repeat the error. [Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 467-468 (2000).] In such cases, where the result of a decision effectively “usurp[s]” or “nullif[ies]” the “legislative function,” this Court is obligated to correct that decision, regardless 17 Kelly-Stehney, 254 Mich App at 615-616 , quoting Crown Technology Park v D & N Bank, FSB, 242 Mich App 538 , 548 n 4, (2000), citing Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Fed | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| KELLY-STEHNEY & ASSOCIATES, INC v. MacDONALD’S INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, INC green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Rose green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Charles E. Austin, Inc. v. Secretary of State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Stachnik v. Winkel green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Rose v. National Auction Group green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In Re EGBERT R SMITH TRUST green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Robertson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| United States v. Knox green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Michigan Chandelier Co. v. Morse green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Nikkel green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Morley v. Automobile Club of Michigan green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Pasha green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Cruz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Leland v. Ford green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| McJunkin v. Cellasto Plastic Corp. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.