bedrock principle in Oregon

2022State v. Link, 367 Or 625, 640-42 , 482 P3d 28 (2021). 156 Klein v. BOLI cake to a same-sex couple.

2022State v. Link, 367 Or 625, 640-42 , 482 P3d 28 (2021). 156 Klein v. BOLI cake to a same-sex couple.

2023The doctrine of transferred intent is a common-law doctrine that has been applied in murder cases and that the Supreme Court described in State v. Johnson, 7 Or 210 (1879), as an “elementary principle of criminal law.” In State v. Wesley, 254 Or App 697, 703 , 295 P3d 1147 , rev den, 354 Or 62 (2013), we explained: “The common-law doctrine of transferred intent is a bedrock principle of English common law: ‘[I]f one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this is murder; because Cite as 324 Or App 489 (2023) 493 of the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other.’

2023The doctrine of transferred intent is a common-law doctrine that has been applied in murder cases and that the Supreme Court described in State v. Johnson, 7 Or 210 (1879), as an “elementary principle of criminal law.” In State v. Wesley, 254 Or App 697, 703 , 295 P3d 1147 , rev den, 354 Or 62 (2013), we explained: “The common-law doctrine of transferred intent is a bedrock principle of English common law: ‘[I]f one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this is murder; because Cite as 324 Or App 489 (2023) 493 of the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other.’

2023The doctrine of transferred intent is a common-law doctrine that has been applied in murder cases and that the Supreme Court described in State v. Johnson, 7 Or 210 (1879), as an “elementary principle of criminal law.” In State v. Wesley, 254 Or App 697, 703 , 295 P3d 1147 , rev den, 354 Or 62 (2013), we explained: “The common-law doctrine of transferred intent is a bedrock principle of English common law: ‘[I]f one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this is murder; because Cite as 324 Or App 489 (2023) 493 of the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other.’

2023The doctrine of transferred intent is a common-law doctrine that has been applied in murder cases and that the Supreme Court described in State v. Johnson, 7 Or 210 (1879), as an “elementary principle of criminal law.” In State v. Wesley, 254 Or App 697, 703 , 295 P3d 1147 , rev den, 354 Or 62 (2013), we explained: “The common-law doctrine of transferred intent is a bedrock principle of English common law: ‘[I]f one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this is murder; because Cite as 324 Or App 489 (2023) 493 of the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other.’

2019See Johnson v. Premo , 355 Or. 866 , 872, 333 P.3d 288 (2014) (remarking that "an individual litigant generally has the right to represent himself or herself in court" and, as "the United States Supreme Court has described, the right of self-representation is a bedrock principle of American jurisprudence dating back to the founding of our country" (citing Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 828-30, 830 n. 39, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) )); Reed v. Roberts , 304 Or. 649 , 655, 748 P.2d 542 (1988) ( ORS 9.320 provides that "[i]ndividuals may appear in their own behalf" in court.).

2019See Johnson v. Premo , 355 Or. 866 , 872, 333 P.3d 288 (2014) (remarking that "an individual litigant generally has the right to represent himself or herself in court" and, as "the United States Supreme Court has described, the right of self-representation is a bedrock principle of American jurisprudence dating back to the founding of our country" (citing Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 828-30, 830 n. 39, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) )); Reed v. Roberts , 304 Or. 649 , 655, 748 P.2d 542 (1988) ( ORS 9.320 provides that "[i]ndividuals may appear in their own behalf" in court.).

2013The doctrine has been described more colloquially in some American jurisdictions as “the intention follows the bullet.” Gladden v. State, 273 Md 383, 397, 330 A2d 176 (1974) (citing cases).

2006Based on those findings, and over defendant’s objection, the court declared, “consecutive sentences are appropriate.” The parties focus their arguments on the question whether the constitutional rules announced in Apprendi and Blakely (and refined in United States v. Booker, 543 US 220 , 125 S Ct 738 , 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005)) impose limitations on a judge’s authority to impose consecutive sentences based on a fact that was neither found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant. 2 According to defendant, the bedrock principle underlying those cases is this: Imposing punishment that is harsher than

2006Based on those findings, and over defendant’s objection, the court declared, “consecutive sentences are appropriate.” The parties focus their arguments on the question whether the constitutional rules announced in Apprendi and Blakely (and refined in United States v. Booker, 543 US 220 , 125 S Ct 738 , 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005)) impose limitations on a judge’s authority to impose consecutive sentences based on a fact that was neither found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant. 2 According to defendant, the bedrock principle underlying those cases is this: Imposing punishment that is harsher than

2002Sanders, 247 F.3d at 150 ; Moss, 252 F.3d at 1000 . • Although Gideon announced a new bedrock principle by holding that the right to counsel is fundamental to any felony criminal trial, Apprendi "merely clarified and extended the scope of a preexisting right—the right to have all convictions supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___ [ 123 S.Ct. 388 , 154 L.Ed.2d 315 ] (2002).

2002Sanders, 247 F3d at 150 ; Moss, 252 F3d at 1000 . • Although Gideon announced a new bedrock principle by holding that the right to counsel is fundamental to any felony criminal trial, Apprendi “merely clarified and extended the scope of a preexisting right — the right to have all convictions supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Mora, 293 F3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir), cert den, _ US _ , 123 S Ct 388 (2002).

2002Sanders, 247 F.3d at 150 ; Moss, 252 F.3d at 1000 . • Although Gideon announced a new bedrock principle by holding that the right to counsel is fundamental to any felony criminal trial, Apprendi "merely clarified and extended the scope of a preexisting right—the right to have all convictions supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___ [ 123 S.Ct. 388 , 154 L.Ed.2d 315 ] (2002).

2002Sanders, 247 F3d at 150 ; Moss, 252 F3d at 1000 . • Although Gideon announced a new bedrock principle by holding that the right to counsel is fundamental to any felony criminal trial, Apprendi “merely clarified and extended the scope of a preexisting right — the right to have all convictions supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Mora, 293 F3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir), cert den, _ US _ , 123 S Ct 388 (2002).

2002Sanders, 247 F.3d at 150 ; Moss, 252 F.3d at 1000 . • Although Gideon announced a new bedrock principle by holding that the right to counsel is fundamental to any felony criminal trial, Apprendi "merely clarified and extended the scope of a preexisting right—the right to have all convictions supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___ [ 123 S.Ct. 388 , 154 L.Ed.2d 315 ] (2002).

2002Sanders, 247 F3d at 150 ; Moss, 252 F3d at 1000 . • Although Gideon announced a new bedrock principle by holding that the right to counsel is fundamental to any felony criminal trial, Apprendi “merely clarified and extended the scope of a preexisting right — the right to have all convictions supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Mora, 293 F3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir), cert den, _ US _ , 123 S Ct 388 (2002).

2002Sanders, 247 F.3d at 150 ; Moss, 252 F.3d at 1000 . • Although Gideon announced a new bedrock principle by holding that the right to counsel is fundamental to any felony criminal trial, Apprendi "merely clarified and extended the scope of a preexisting right—the right to have all convictions supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___ [ 123 S.Ct. 388 , 154 L.Ed.2d 315 ] (2002).

2002Tidyman, 306 Or at 185-86 .

2002The bedrock principle of Tidyman is that lawmakers cannot ban particular expressions based on the presumption that the expressions cause harm (so-called “secondary effects,”Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 US 41, 47 , 106 S Ct 925 , 89 L Ed 2d 29 (1986)), even if those presumptions are stated in legislative findings and the harm is of the type ordinarily subject to regulation. 3 Instead, lawmakers must specify the harm and may ban the expression only when it causes that harm or is imminently likely to do so.

2002The bedrock principle of Tidyman is that lawmakers cannot ban particular expressions based on the presumption that the expressions cause harm (so-called “secondary effects,”Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 US 41, 47 , 106 S Ct 925 , 89 L Ed 2d 29 (1986)), even if those presumptions are stated in legislative findings and the harm is of the type ordinarily subject to regulation. 3 Instead, lawmakers must specify the harm and may ban the expression only when it causes that harm or is imminently likely to do so.