bedrock principle in Washington

2007Circuit described the core feature of a sale, for purposes of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as mutual assent by the parties to the transaction: "A bedrock requirement for the formation of any contract or bargain . . . constituting a purchase or sale, is that the putative purchaser and seller come to a meeting of the minds." Northland Capital, 735 F.2d at 1427 . ¶ 14 Our examination does not end there.

2007The District of Columbia Circuit described the core feature of a sale, for purposes of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as mutual assent by the parties to the transaction: “A bedrock requirement for the formation of any contract or bargain . . . constituting a purchase or sale, is that the putative purchaser and seller come to a meeting of the minds.” Northland Capital, 735 F.2d at 1427 . ¶14 Our examination does not end there.

2015In re Det. of Paschke, 121 Wn.

2007As Division One noted in one of the cases that prompted the RCW 71.09.090 amendment, "`[c]urrent dangerousness is a bedrock principle underlying the [sexually violent predator] commitment statute.'" In re Det. of Ward, 125 Wash.App. 381, 386 , 104 P.3d 747 (quoting In re Det. of Paschke v. State, 121 Wash.App. 614, 622 , 90 P.3d 74 (2004)), review denied, 155 Wash.2d 1025 , 126 P.3d 820 (2005). ¶ 77 RCW 71.09.090 prevents an SVP from using certain evidence to make a prima facie case that he is no longer dangerous.

2018The State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is "the bedrock principle of the presumption ofinnocence, the foundation of our criminal justice system." State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 27 , 195 P.3d 940 (2008)(prosecutor's argument was improper because it undermined the presumption ofinnocence).

2018Warren, 165 Wash.2d 17 , 27, 195 P.3d 940 (2008) (prosecutor's argument was improper because it undermined the presumption of innocence). ¶ 24 The omission alone may not be enough to show manifest constitutional error.

2018The State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is "the bedrock principle of the presumption ofinnocence, the foundation of our criminal justice system." State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 27 , 195 P.3d 940 (2008)(prosecutor's argument was improper because it undermined the presumption ofinnocence).

2018Warren, 165 Wash.2d 17 , 27, 195 P.3d 940 (2008) (prosecutor's argument was improper because it undermined the presumption of innocence). ¶ 24 The omission alone may not be enough to show manifest constitutional error.

2009I believe the legislature assumed that this court would apply the well-accepted rules of statutory construction to its construction of RCW 9A.08.020(5), including the bedrock rule that “statutes should be construed to effect their purpose and unlikely, absurd or strained consequences should be avoided.” State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wn.2d 828, 835 , 791 P.2d 897 (1990) (emphasis added).

2009I believe the legislature assumed that this court would apply the well-accepted rules of statutory construction to its construction of RCW 9A.08.020(5), including the bedrock rule that “statutes should be construed to effect their purpose and unlikely, absurd or strained consequences should be avoided.” State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wn.2d 828, 835 , 791 P.2d 897 (1990) (emphasis added).

2007Any government regulation proposing speech restrictions must be clear: “[precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 , 83 S. Ct. 328 , 9 L.

2007Any government regulation proposing speech restrictions must be clear: “[precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 , 83 S. Ct. 328 , 9 L.

2007As Division One noted in one of the cases that prompted the RCW 71.09.090 amendment, "`[c]urrent dangerousness is a bedrock principle underlying the [sexually violent predator] commitment statute.'" In re Det. of Ward, 125 Wash.App. 381, 386 , 104 P.3d 747 (quoting In re Det. of Paschke v. State, 121 Wash.App. 614, 622 , 90 P.3d 74 (2004)), review denied, 155 Wash.2d 1025 , 126 P.3d 820 (2005). ¶ 77 RCW 71.09.090 prevents an SVP from using certain evidence to make a prima facie case that he is no longer dangerous.

2007App. 381, 386 , 104 P.3d 747 (quoting In re Det. of Paschke, 121 Wn.

2007As Division One noted in one of the cases that prompted the RCW 71.09.090 amendment, "`[c]urrent dangerousness is a bedrock principle underlying the [sexually violent predator] commitment statute.'" In re Det. of Ward, 125 Wash.App. 381, 386 , 104 P.3d 747 (quoting In re Det. of Paschke v. State, 121 Wash.App. 614, 622 , 90 P.3d 74 (2004)), review denied, 155 Wash.2d 1025 , 126 P.3d 820 (2005). ¶ 77 RCW 71.09.090 prevents an SVP from using certain evidence to make a prima facie case that he is no longer dangerous.

2007As Division One noted in one of the cases that prompted the RCW 71.09.090 amendment, “ ‘[c]urrent dangerousness is a bedrock principle underlying the [SVP] commitment statute.’ ” In re Det. of Ward, 125 Wn.

2021The rule also reflects the bedrock principle of separation of powers—specifically that “because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.” Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 ; see also Hopkins, 137 Wn.2d at 901 (describing the rule of lenity as “a basic and required limitation on a court’s power of statutory interpretation whenever the meaning of a criminal statute is not plain”).

2018"Thus, the alacrity by which we process and make decisions based on visual information conflicts with a bedrock principle of our legal system—that reasoned deliberation is necessary for a fair justice system." Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d at 709 , quoting Jewel, at 293. 13 .

2012Moreover, the notion that potentially unconstitutional government conduct must be redressed through the legislature is frankly astonishing given the bedrock principle that it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 , 2 L.

2012Moreover, the notion that potentially unconstitutional government conduct must be redressed through the legislature is frankly astonishing given the bedrock principle that it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 , 2 L.

2012Our Supreme Court discussed Hale and Stewart in Lummi Indian Nation v. State, 170 Wn.2d 247 , 241 P.3d 1220 (2010), and again did not overrule Stewart, reaffirmed its holding in Hale, and found that a legislative amendment did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

2012Our Supreme Court discussed Hale and Stewart in Lummi Indian Nation v. State, 170 Wn.2d 247 , 241 P.3d 1220 (2010), and again did not overrule Stewart, reaffirmed its holding in Hale, and found that a legislative amendment did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

2012Hale, 165 Wn.2d at 510 . ¶10 Notably, the Hale decision did not overrule Stewart, nor could it, as Stewart rested on the bedrock principle that the legislature cannot contravene an existing judicial construction of a statute.

2011Hollingbery v. Dunn, 68 Wash.2d 75, 80-81 , 411 P.2d 431 (1966).

2011Hollingbery v. Dunn, 68 Wash.2d 75, 80-81 , 411 P.2d 431 (1966).

2007As Division One noted in one of the cases that prompted the RCW 71.09.090 amendment, "`[c]urrent dangerousness is a bedrock principle underlying the [sexually violent predator] commitment statute.'" In re Det. of Ward, 125 Wash.App. 381, 386 , 104 P.3d 747 (quoting In re Det. of Paschke v. State, 121 Wash.App. 614, 622 , 90 P.3d 74 (2004)), review denied, 155 Wash.2d 1025 , 126 P.3d 820 (2005). ¶ 77 RCW 71.09.090 prevents an SVP from using certain evidence to make a prima facie case that he is no longer dangerous.

2007As Division One noted in one of the cases that prompted the RCW 71.09.090 amendment, "`[c]urrent dangerousness is a bedrock principle underlying the [sexually violent predator] commitment statute.'" In re Det. of Ward, 125 Wash.App. 381, 386 , 104 P.3d 747 (quoting In re Det. of Paschke v. State, 121 Wash.App. 614, 622 , 90 P.3d 74 (2004)), review denied, 155 Wash.2d 1025 , 126 P.3d 820 (2005). ¶ 77 RCW 71.09.090 prevents an SVP from using certain evidence to make a prima facie case that he is no longer dangerous.

2007As Division One noted in one of the cases that prompted the RCW 71.09.090 amendment, "`[c]urrent dangerousness is a bedrock principle underlying the [sexually violent predator] commitment statute.'" In re Det. of Ward, 125 Wash.App. 381, 386 , 104 P.3d 747 (quoting In re Det. of Paschke v. State, 121 Wash.App. 614, 622 , 90 P.3d 74 (2004)), review denied, 155 Wash.2d 1025 , 126 P.3d 820 (2005). ¶ 77 RCW 71.09.090 prevents an SVP from using certain evidence to make a prima facie case that he is no longer dangerous.

1993State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 270-71 , 814 P.2d 652 (1991).

1993State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 270-71 , 814 P.2d 652 (1991).

1979Although the Supreme Court has cautioned that the figures in past cases are not precise guides for determining the result in future cases, see Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 , 17 L.

1979Although the Supreme Court has cautioned that the figures in past cases are not precise guides for determining the result in future cases, see Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 , 17 L.