bedrock principle in Connecticut

2012The principle is rooted in considerations of fairness as well as judicial economy.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Elson, 125 Conn. App. 328, 340-41 , 9 A.3d 731 (2010) (en banc), cert. granted on *402 other grounds, 300 Conn. 904 , 12 A.3d 572 (2011); see also Adamo v. Adamo, 123 Conn. App. 38, 45-46 , 1 A.3d 221 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 916 , 4 A.3d 830 (2010); Noonan v. Noonan, 122 Conn. App. 184, 190 , 988 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 928 , 5 A.3d 490 (2010).

2012The principle is rooted in considerations of fairness as well as judicial economy.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Elson, 125 Conn. App. 328, 340-41 , 9 A.3d 731 (2010) (en banc), cert. granted on *402 other grounds, 300 Conn. 904 , 12 A.3d 572 (2011); see also Adamo v. Adamo, 123 Conn. App. 38, 45-46 , 1 A.3d 221 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 916 , 4 A.3d 830 (2010); Noonan v. Noonan, 122 Conn. App. 184, 190 , 988 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 928 , 5 A.3d 490 (2010).

2012The principle is rooted in considerations of fairness as well as judicial economy.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Elson, 125 Conn. App. 328, 340-41 , 9 A.3d 731 (2010) (en banc), cert. granted on *402 other grounds, 300 Conn. 904 , 12 A.3d 572 (2011); see also Adamo v. Adamo, 123 Conn. App. 38, 45-46 , 1 A.3d 221 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 916 , 4 A.3d 830 (2010); Noonan v. Noonan, 122 Conn. App. 184, 190 , 988 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 928 , 5 A.3d 490 (2010).

2012The principle is rooted in considerations of fairness as well as judicial economy.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Elson, 125 Conn. App. 328, 340-41 , 9 A.3d 731 (2010) (en banc), cert. granted on *402 other grounds, 300 Conn. 904 , 12 A.3d 572 (2011); see also Adamo v. Adamo, 123 Conn. App. 38, 45-46 , 1 A.3d 221 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 916 , 4 A.3d 830 (2010); Noonan v. Noonan, 122 Conn. App. 184, 190 , 988 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 928 , 5 A.3d 490 (2010).

2017"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the [f]irst [a]mendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson , 491 U.S. 397 , 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533 , 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989).

2017"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the [f]irst [a]mendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson , 491 U.S. 397 , 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533 , 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989).

2022See State v. Correa, 340 Conn. 619, 691 , 264 A.3d 894 (2021) (appellate tribunal ‘‘lacks the authority to find facts’’); Otto v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 161 Conn. App. 210 , 223, 136 A.3d 14 (2015) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that, as an appellate court, we do not reevaluate the credibility of testimony’’), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 904 , 138 A.3d 281 (2016).

2022See State v. Correa, 340 Conn. 619, 691 , 264 A.3d 894 (2021) (appellate tribunal ‘‘lacks the authority to find facts’’); Otto v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 161 Conn. App. 210 , 223, 136 A.3d 14 (2015) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that, as an appellate court, we do not reevaluate the credibility of testimony’’), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 904 , 138 A.3d 281 (2016).

2021Ed. 2d 342 (1989) (‘‘[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the [f]irst [a]mendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable’’); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 , 91 S. Ct. 1780 , 29 L.

2021Ed. 2d 342 (1989) (‘‘[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the [f]irst [a]mendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable’’); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 , 91 S. Ct. 1780 , 29 L.

2019Angersola v. Radiologic Associates of Middletown, P.C., supra, 330 Conn. 265–66 (statutory time limitation that is jurisdictional may not be waived); Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 337 , 819 A.2d 803 (2003) (‘‘[a]lthough both parties agree that this court has juris- diction, a subject matter jurisdictional defect may not be waived . . . [or] conferred by the parties, explicitly or implicitly’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Man- ning v. Feltman, 149 Conn. App. 224, 236 , 91 A.3d 466 (2014) (‘‘subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver or consent’’).

2019Angersola v. Radiologic Associates of Middletown, P.C., supra, 330 Conn. 265–66 (statutory time limitation that is jurisdictional may not be waived); Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 337 , 819 A.2d 803 (2003) (‘‘[a]lthough both parties agree that this court has juris- diction, a subject matter jurisdictional defect may not be waived . . . [or] conferred by the parties, explicitly or implicitly’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Man- ning v. Feltman, 149 Conn. App. 224, 236 , 91 A.3d 466 (2014) (‘‘subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver or consent’’).

2019Angersola v. Radiologic Associates of Middletown, P.C., supra, 330 Conn. 265–66 (statutory time limitation that is jurisdictional may not be waived); Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 337 , 819 A.2d 803 (2003) (‘‘[a]lthough both parties agree that this court has juris- diction, a subject matter jurisdictional defect may not be waived . . . [or] conferred by the parties, explicitly or implicitly’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Man- ning v. Feltman, 149 Conn. App. 224, 236 , 91 A.3d 466 (2014) (‘‘subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver or consent’’).

2019Angersola v. Radiologic Associates of Middletown, P.C., supra, 330 Conn. 265–66 (statutory time limitation that is jurisdictional may not be waived); Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 337 , 819 A.2d 803 (2003) (‘‘[a]lthough both parties agree that this court has juris- diction, a subject matter jurisdictional defect may not be waived . . . [or] conferred by the parties, explicitly or implicitly’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Man- ning v. Feltman, 149 Conn. App. 224, 236 , 91 A.3d 466 (2014) (‘‘subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver or consent’’).

2018If there is a bedrock principle underlying the [f]irst [a]mendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baccala , supra, 326 Conn. at 234 , 163 A.3d 1 .

2018If there is a bedrock principle underlying the [f]irst [a]mendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baccala , supra, 326 Conn. at 234 , 163 A.3d 1 .

2018Our statutory construction is also consistent with the bedrock principle that "[t]he trial court possesses inherent discretionary powers to control pleadings, exclude evidence, and prevent occurrences that might unnecessarily prejudice the right of any party to a fair trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Downs v. Trias , 306 Conn. 81 , 102, 49 A.3d 180 (2012) ; see also Practice Book § 23-29 (3) ("[t]he judicial authority may, at any time ... [determine] that ... the petition presents the same ground as a prior petition previously denied and fails to state new facts or proffer new evide

2018Our statutory construction is also consistent with the bedrock principle that "[t]he trial court possesses inherent discretionary powers to control pleadings, exclude evidence, and prevent occurrences that might unnecessarily prejudice the right of any party to a fair trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Downs v. Trias , 306 Conn. 81 , 102, 49 A.3d 180 (2012) ; see also Practice Book § 23-29 (3) ("[t]he judicial authority may, at any time ... [determine] that ... the petition presents the same ground as a prior petition previously denied and fails to state new facts or proffer new evide

2018Cir. 2013) ("a bedrock principle of preclusion law has been that a reversed judgment cannot support preclusion ... indeed, a second judgment based upon the preclusive effects of the first judgment should not stand if the first judgment is reversed" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp. , 527 F.2d 1162 , 1163 (4th Cir. 1975) (vacating orders of District Court that were based on prior judgment that was ultimately reversed); Michigan Surety Co. v. Service Machinery Corp. , 277 F.2d 531 , 533 (5th Cir. 1960) (federa

2018Cir. 2013) ("a bedrock principle of preclusion law has been that a reversed judgment cannot support preclusion ... indeed, a second judgment based upon the preclusive effects of the first judgment should not stand if the first judgment is reversed" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp. , 527 F.2d 1162 , 1163 (4th Cir. 1975) (vacating orders of District Court that were based on prior judgment that was ultimately reversed); Michigan Surety Co. v. Service Machinery Corp. , 277 F.2d 531 , 533 (5th Cir. 1960) (federa

2018Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 849 , 81 S.Ct. 94 , 5 L.Ed. 2d 73 (1960) ; E.I.

2018Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 849 , 81 S.Ct. 94 , 5 L.Ed. 2d 73 (1960) ; E.I.

2018Cir. 2013) ("a bedrock principle of preclusion law has been that a reversed judgment cannot support preclusion ... indeed, a second judgment based upon the preclusive effects of the first judgment should not stand if the first judgment is reversed" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp. , 527 F.2d 1162 , 1163 (4th Cir. 1975) (vacating orders of District Court that were based on prior judgment that was ultimately reversed); Michigan Surety Co. v. Service Machinery Corp. , 277 F.2d 531 , 533 (5th Cir. 1960) (federa

2017Only certain types of narrowly defined speech are not afforded the full protections of the first amendment, including "fighting words," i.e., those words that "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , 315 U.S. 568 , 573, 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942).

2017Only certain types of narrowly defined speech are not afforded the full protections of the first amendment, including "fighting words," i.e., those words that "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , 315 U.S. 568 , 573, 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942).

2017See, e.g., State v. Fernando A ., 294 Conn. 1 , 101, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) ( Palmer , J. , dissenting in part) ("[a] review of other criminal procedure statutes demonstrates that, when the legislature has desired to impose specific requirements on the conduct of a pretrial hearing, it has said so explicitly" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 278 Conn. 751 , 771 n.17, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (legislature knows how to enact legislation consistent with its intent).

2017See, e.g., State v. Fernando A ., 294 Conn. 1 , 101, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) ( Palmer , J. , dissenting in part) ("[a] review of other criminal procedure statutes demonstrates that, when the legislature has desired to impose specific requirements on the conduct of a pretrial hearing, it has said so explicitly" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 278 Conn. 751 , 771 n.17, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (legislature knows how to enact legislation consistent with its intent).

2016Additional principles guide our analysis of the state’s claim, chief among them the bedrock principle that ‘‘[p]rivacy expectations are . . . highest and are accorded the strongest constitutional protection in the case of a private home and the area immediately sur- rounding it.’’ State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348 , 356–57, 503 A.2d 566 (1986); see also Bozrah v. Chmurynski, 303 Conn. 676, 690 , 36 A.3d 210 (2012) (‘‘[n]owhere are expectations of privacy greater than in the home’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2016Additional principles guide our analysis of the state’s claim, chief among them the bedrock principle that ‘‘[p]rivacy expectations are . . . highest and are accorded the strongest constitutional protection in the case of a private home and the area immediately sur- rounding it.’’ State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348 , 356–57, 503 A.2d 566 (1986); see also Bozrah v. Chmurynski, 303 Conn. 676, 690 , 36 A.3d 210 (2012) (‘‘[n]owhere are expectations of privacy greater than in the home’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2013We do not guess or speculate as to the existence of a factual predicate.” Holmes v. Holmes, 32 Conn. App. 317, 319 , 629 A.2d 1137 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 902 , 634 A.2d 295 (1993).

2013We do not guess or speculate as to the existence of a factual predicate.” Holmes v. Holmes, 32 Conn. App. 317, 319 , 629 A.2d 1137 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 902 , 634 A.2d 295 (1993).

2013Appellate review ... is limited both as a practical matter and as a matter of the fundamental difference between the role of the trial court and an appellate court.” Kaplan v. Kaplan, 186 Conn. 387, 391 , 441 A.2d 629 (1982).

2013Appellate review ... is limited both as a practical matter and as a matter of the fundamental difference between the role of the trial court and an appellate court.” Kaplan v. Kaplan, 186 Conn. 387, 391 , 441 A.2d 629 (1982).

2013We do not guess or speculate as to the existence of a factual predicate.” Holmes v. Holmes, 32 Conn. App. 317, 319 , 629 A.2d 1137 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 902 , 634 A.2d 295 (1993).

2013We do not guess or speculate as to the existence of a factual predicate.” Holmes v. Holmes, 32 Conn. App. 317, 319 , 629 A.2d 1137 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 902 , 634 A.2d 295 (1993).

2012The principle is rooted in considerations of fairness as well as judicial economy.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Elson, 125 Conn. App. 328, 340-41 , 9 A.3d 731 (2010) (en banc), cert. granted on *402 other grounds, 300 Conn. 904 , 12 A.3d 572 (2011); see also Adamo v. Adamo, 123 Conn. App. 38, 45-46 , 1 A.3d 221 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 916 , 4 A.3d 830 (2010); Noonan v. Noonan, 122 Conn. App. 184, 190 , 988 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 928 , 5 A.3d 490 (2010).