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6 West Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
W.Va. Department of Transportation, Div. of Highways v. Douglas R. Veachgreen2 sentences2024Va. 1, 8 , 799 S.E.2d 78, 85 (2017), this Court noted that “attorneys are authorized to enter into stipulations on behalf of their clients and a party is ordinarily bound by a stipulation made by its attorney.” Veach recognized a bedrock principle: a stipulation is an enforceable contract, and, like a contract, relief from a stipulation “is usually available only in cases of fraud, mistake, improvidence or material change in circumstances, where in equity and good conscience the stipulation ought not to stand.” Id. (quoting 4 Williston on Contracts § 8.50 (4th ed. 2016)). 2024Va. 1, 8 , 799 S.E.2d 78, 85 (2017), this Court noted that “attorneys are authorized to enter into stipulations on behalf of their clients and a party is ordinarily bound by a stipulation made by its attorney.” Veach recognized a bedrock principle: a stipulation is an enforceable contract, and, like a contract, relief from a stipulation “is usually available only in cases of fraud, mistake, improvidence or material change in circumstances, where in equity and good conscience the stipulation ought not to stand.” Id. (quoting 4 Williston on Contracts § 8.50 (4th ed. 2016)). | 2 | 2 |
Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial Gardens, Inc.green2 sentences2020Pt. 1, Sanders v. Roselawn Mem’l Gardens, Inc., 152 W. 1984See also, Syllabus Point 8, Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial Gardens, 152 W.Va. 91 , 159 S.E.2d 784 (1969). | 1 | 2 |
Pearson v. Pearsongreen2 sentences2021We need not resolve these factual disputes because it is a bedrock principle of appellate jurisprudence that “representations in an appellate brief do not constitute a part of the record on appeal.” Pearson v. Pearson, 200 W. 2021Va. 139, 152 , 488 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1997) (Workman, J., dissenting) (citing Wilkinson v. Bowser, 199 W.Va. 92 , 483 S.E.2d 92 (1996)). | 1 | 1 |
Kennewig Co. v. Mooregreen2 sentences2021As ABDC’s complaint is cast, it asks the circuit court for a judgment regarding whether those sixteen policies provide coverage for 15 Ace American contends that the circuit court’s injunction violated the bedrock principle that “equity never does a useless thing.” Kennewig Co. v. Moore, 49 W. 2021Va. 323, 325 , 38 S.E. 558, 558 (1901). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wilkinson v. Bowser
green
2 sentences2021Va. 139, 152 , 488 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1997) (Workman, J., dissenting) (citing Wilkinson v. Bowser, 199 W.Va. 92 , 483 S.E.2d 92 (1996)). 2021Va. 139, 152 , 488 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1997) (Workman, J., dissenting) (citing Wilkinson v. Bowser, 199 W.Va. 92 , 483 S.E.2d 92 (1996)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Mahoney v. Walter
green
2 sentences1984Syllabus Point 3, Munday v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128 , 267 S.E.2d 454 (1980), succinctly states this bedrock principle of appellate review as follows: “The findings of fact of a trial court are entitled to peculiar weight upon appeal and will not be reversed unless they are plainly wrong.” Mahoney v. Walter, 157 W.Va. 882 , 205 S.E.2d 692 (1974), Syllabus Point 6. 1984Syllabus Point 3, Munday v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128 , 267 S.E.2d 454 (1980), succinctly states this bedrock principle of appellate review as follows: “The findings of fact of a trial court are entitled to peculiar weight upon appeal and will not be reversed unless they are plainly wrong.” Mahoney v. Walter, 157 W.Va. 882 , 205 S.E.2d 692 (1974), Syllabus Point 6. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Mundy v. Arcuri
green
2 sentences1984Syllabus Point 3, Munday v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128 , 267 S.E.2d 454 (1980), succinctly states this bedrock principle of appellate review as follows: “The findings of fact of a trial court are entitled to peculiar weight upon appeal and will not be reversed unless they are plainly wrong.” Mahoney v. Walter, 157 W.Va. 882 , 205 S.E.2d 692 (1974), Syllabus Point 6. 1984Syllabus Point 3, Munday v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128 , 267 S.E.2d 454 (1980), succinctly states this bedrock principle of appellate review as follows: “The findings of fact of a trial court are entitled to peculiar weight upon appeal and will not be reversed unless they are plainly wrong.” Mahoney v. Walter, 157 W.Va. 882 , 205 S.E.2d 692 (1974), Syllabus Point 6. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.