9 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Argelis Pichardo v. Julie Stevensgreen1 sentence2016Pichardo v. Stevens, 55 A.3d 762, 765 (R.I.2012). | 1 | 1 |
Medeiros v. Sitringreen1 sentence2015It is a bedrock principle of tort law that “[t]o maintain a cause of action for -5- negligence, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) a legally cognizable duty owed by [the] defendant to [the] plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) that the conduct proximately caused the injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.” Medeiros v. Sitrin, 984 A.2d 620, 625 (R.I. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Santilli v. Morelligreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Griffin v. Zapata, 570 A.2d 659, 661-62 (R.I.1990) (stating that the equitable remedy of specific performance is appropriate where adequate compensation cannot be achieved through money damages, as for example, where land is involved); Santilli 102 R.I. at 338 , 230 A.2d at 863 (noting that it is only in “exceptional cases where the substantial rights of the landowner may be properly safeguarded without recourse to an injunction”). 2014See, e.g., Griffin v. Zapata, 570 A.2d 659, 661-62 (R.I.1990) (stating that the equitable remedy of specific performance is appropriate where adequate compensation cannot be achieved through money damages, as for example, where land is involved); Santilli 102 R.I. at 338 , 230 A.2d at 863 (noting that it is only in “exceptional cases where the substantial rights of the landowner may be properly safeguarded without recourse to an injunction”). | 1 | 1 |
Griffin v. Zapatagreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Griffin v. Zapata, 570 A.2d 659, 661-62 (R.I.1990) (stating that the equitable remedy of specific performance is appropriate where adequate compensation cannot be achieved through money damages, as for example, where land is involved); Santilli 102 R.I. at 338 , 230 A.2d at 863 (noting that it is only in “exceptional cases where the substantial rights of the landowner may be properly safeguarded without recourse to an injunction”). | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. at 2595 -96 n. 21, 69 L.Ed.2d at 351 n. 21 (holding that the “routine detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant” was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause for arrest); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 617 (1975) (holding that a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle by a border patrol officer was reasonable in the absence of probable cause when the officer’s action was supported by a reasona 2002See, e.g., Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. at 2595 -96 n. 21, 69 L.Ed.2d at 351 n. 21 (holding that the “routine detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant” was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause for arrest); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 617 (1975) (holding that a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle by a border patrol officer was reasonable in the absence of probable cause when the officer’s action was supported by a reasona | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Brignoni-Poncegreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. at 2595 -96 n. 21, 69 L.Ed.2d at 351 n. 21 (holding that the “routine detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant” was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause for arrest); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 617 (1975) (holding that a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle by a border patrol officer was reasonable in the absence of probable cause when the officer’s action was supported by a reasona 2002See, e.g., Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. at 2595 -96 n. 21, 69 L.Ed.2d at 351 n. 21 (holding that the “routine detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant” was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause for arrest); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 617 (1975) (holding that a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle by a border patrol officer was reasonable in the absence of probable cause when the officer’s action was supported by a reasona | 1 | 1 |
Sentner v. Board of Trustees of Regional Community Collegesgreen2 sentences2002“In a constitutional democracy sovereign immunity must relax its bar when suits against the government complain of unconstitutional acts.” Sentner v. Board of Trustees of Regional Community Colleges, 184 Conn. 339 , 439 A.2d 1033, 1036 (1981). 2002“In a constitutional democracy sovereign immunity must relax its bar when suits against the government complain of unconstitutional acts.” Sentner v. Board of Trustees of Regional Community Colleges, 184 Conn. 339 , 439 A.2d 1033, 1036 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Summersgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. at 2595 -96 n. 21, 69 L.Ed.2d at 351 n. 21 (holding that the “routine detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant” was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause for arrest); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 617 (1975) (holding that a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle by a border patrol officer was reasonable in the absence of probable cause when the officer’s action was supported by a reasona 2002See, e.g., Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. at 2595 -96 n. 21, 69 L.Ed.2d at 351 n. 21 (holding that the “routine detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant” was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause for arrest); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 617 (1975) (holding that a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle by a border patrol officer was reasonable in the absence of probable cause when the officer’s action was supported by a reasona | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rose Nulman Park Foundation, by its Trustees, Carol B. Nulman and Joel S. Nulman v. Four Twenty Corp.
green
2 sentences2017Rather, plaintiffs assert that the trial justice should have granted that relief because defendants acted in bad faith and/or recklessly in placing the encroachments on plaintiffs’ property, and, therefore, it was inappropriate to balance the equities. *515 When real property is involved, “[i]t is a bedrock principle of our property jurisprudence that land is not fungible; and, accordingly, equitable remedies are normally used when it comes to injuries and intrusions to it.” Rose Nulman, 93 A.3d at 29 . 2017Furthermore, this Court has “generally held that the appropriate remedy for a continuing trespass is injunctive relief.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Martinez v. Ryan
green
2 sentences2016As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system” and “the foundation for our adversary system.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 . 2016As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system” and “the foundation for our adversary system.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1317 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
White v. Ewing
green
1 sentence2005White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36 , 39 (1895); Vitterito v. Sportsman's Lodge Restaurant, Inc., 102 R.I. 72 , 80 , 228 A.2d 119 , 124-25 (1967) (generally, a receiver succeeds only to the debtor's rights and takes the debtor's property subject to claims, liens and equities which would affect the debtor if he himself were asserting his interest in the property); 2 Clark on Receivers, § 362. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Vitterito v. Sportsman's Lodge & Restaurant, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36 , 39 (1895); Vitterito v. Sportsman's Lodge Restaurant, Inc., 102 R.I. 72 , 80 , 228 A.2d 119 , 124-25 (1967) (generally, a receiver succeeds only to the debtor's rights and takes the debtor's property subject to claims, liens and equities which would affect the debtor if he himself were asserting his interest in the property); 2 Clark on Receivers, § 362. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Vitterito v. SPORTSMAN'S LODGE & RESTAURANT, ETC.
green
1 sentence2005White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36 , 39 (1895); Vitterito v. Sportsman's Lodge Restaurant, Inc., 102 R.I. 72 , 80 , 228 A.2d 119 , 124-25 (1967) (generally, a receiver succeeds only to the debtor's rights and takes the debtor's property subject to claims, liens and equities which would affect the debtor if he himself were asserting his interest in the property); 2 Clark on Receivers, § 362. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Lee v. Life Insurance Co. of North America
green
2 sentences1998The Court further stated in Lee, "[i]t is now a bedrock principle that to prove an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent or purpose." Lee , 829 F. Supp. at 541 . 1998Furthermore, "`discriminatory purpose'. . . implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action because of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256 , 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296 , 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney
green
2 sentences1998Furthermore, "`discriminatory purpose'. . . implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action because of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256 , 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296 , 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)). 1998Furthermore, "`discriminatory purpose'. . . implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action because of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256 , 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296 , 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.