bedrock principle in Arizona

2021Hays, 205 Ariz. at 102-03, ¶ 18 (defining the issue as “whether the various contempt sanctions imposed by the superior court unnecessarily interfered with its duty to consider the child’s best interests in determining custody”).

2021Johnson v. Johnson, 64 Ariz. 368, 370 (1946). ¶19 This bedrock requirement necessarily limits the superior court’s otherwise broad authority to impose evidentiary sanctions.

2018See, e.g. , Prince v. Massachusetts , 321 U.S. 158 , 166, 64 S.Ct. 438 , 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents...."); Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality) ("[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children [ ] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."); Stanley v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 645 , 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (listing cases).

2018See, e.g. , Prince v. Massachusetts , 321 U.S. 158 , 166, 64 S.Ct. 438 , 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents...."); Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality) ("[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children [ ] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."); Stanley v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 645 , 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (listing cases).

2016If [Mother] and [Father] have a child(ren) the years shorten by three (3) years of each five (5) year increment, so end of five years becomes end of two years, etc. end of ten (10) years becomes end seven (7) years and so on. ¶11 “It is a bedrock principle of contract law that an individual who signs a contract is presumed to have read the contract and is bound by its contents.” 84 Lumber Co. v. Smith, 356 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Tenn. 2011) (citation omitted).

2013As long as police do not convey in the encounter that the individual must speak with them and is not free to go, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated and police are entitled to interact with the public — to exchange “pleasantries or mutually useful information.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 , 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1552 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). ¶ 29 The Fourth Amendment is implicated, however, when police seize an

2013As long as police do not convey in the encounter that the individual must speak with them and is not free to go, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated and police are entitled to interact with the public — to exchange “pleasantries or mutually useful information.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 , 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1552 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). ¶ 29 The Fourth Amendment is implicated, however, when police seize an

2007See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, ¶ 12 , 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998) (“Our reason for deference is clear. ‘The judge sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.’ ”), quoting Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 163 , 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978); Anderson v. Nissei ASB Mach.

2007See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, ¶ 12 , 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998) (“Our reason for deference is clear. ‘The judge sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.’ ”), quoting Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 163 , 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978); Anderson v. Nissei ASB Mach.

2007See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, ¶ 12 , 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998) (“Our reason for deference is clear. ‘The judge sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.’ ”), quoting Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 163 , 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978); Anderson v. Nissei ASB Mach.

2007See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, ¶ 12 , 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998) (“Our reason for deference is clear. ‘The judge sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.’ ”), quoting Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 163 , 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978); Anderson v. Nissei ASB Mach.

2003Polius, 802 F.2d at 81 (emphasis added).