harsh rule in Washington

2009Rather, the court reasoned that in some cases the Chevron Oil factors, “particularly the factor or subfactor of the parties’ reliance on the old rule — will argue so strongly for nonretroactivity that the factor ... of similar treatment of similarly situated parties will simply be outweighed.” Id. ¶48 Significantly, and in marked contrast to the majority’s harsh analysis here, the New Mexico court “decline [d] to follow the Supreme Court’s lead” and pointedly concluded that it could apply a rule prospectively “even though (as in this case) the decision announcing the new rule has already been

2009Rather, the court reasoned that in some cases the Chevron Oil factors, “particularly the factor or subfactor of the parties’ reliance on the old rule — will argue so strongly for nonretroactivity that the factor ... of similar treatment of similarly situated parties will simply be outweighed.” Id. ¶48 Significantly, and in marked contrast to the majority’s harsh analysis here, the New Mexico court “decline [d] to follow the Supreme Court’s lead” and pointedly concluded that it could apply a rule prospectively “even though (as in this case) the decision announcing the new rule has already been

1975The old standard of wanton and willful misconduct must be abandoned as to licensees, yet we do not choose to adopt the exception enunciated in Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., supra. In Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325 , 428 P.2d 716 (1967), we were confronted with a “condition of the premises” case, and avoided the harsh standard of wanton misconduct by classifying the plaintiff as a business-invitee.

1975The old standard of wanton and willful misconduct must be abandoned as to licensees, yet we do not choose to adopt the exception enunciated in Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., supra. In Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325 , 428 P.2d 716 (1967), we were confronted with a “condition of the premises” case, and avoided the harsh standard of wanton misconduct by classifying the plaintiff as a business-invitee.

1966The modem statutory trend has changed this harsh rule.” Cissna v. Beaton, 2 Wn.2d 491, 493 , 98 P.2d 651 (1940). 2.

1966The modem statutory trend has changed this harsh rule.” Cissna v. Beaton, 2 Wn.2d 491, 493 , 98 P.2d 651 (1940). 2.

1966By In re Hudson, 13 Wn.2d 673, 693 , 126 P.2d 765 (1942), we said that parents are under obligation to *755 provide their minor children with necessities of life as a “principle of natural law.” 3.

1966By In re Hudson, 13 Wn.2d 673, 693 , 126 P.2d 765 (1942), we said that parents are under obligation to *755 provide their minor children with necessities of life as a “principle of natural law.” 3.

1963Ed. (2d) 550, 79 S. Ct. 406 . *52 In Pope & Talbot, Inc., supra, the court stated (p. 408): “(a) The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory negligence wholly barred an injured person from recovery is completely incompatible with modern admiralty policy and practice.

1955S.) adopted a more liberal rule to “soften the harsh rule that had subjected newspapers to damages for publishing certain matters [about public officials]” but that the liberal rule relating to newspapers “does not apply to the publication of an article not true which would subject a public official to removal from office.” Although the supreme court of Nevada has never passed upon the relative merits of the strict and liberal rules, the U. S. District Court for the district of Nevada, in Reynolds v. Arentz, 119 F. Supp. 82 , decided February 12, 1954, held that the liberal rule should be appl

1955The court said that the state had by statute (Art. 5432 R.C.S.) adopted a more liberal rule to "soften the harsh rule that had subjected newspapers to damages for publishing certain matters [about public officials]" but that the liberal rule relating to newspapers "does not apply to the publication of an article not true which would subject a public official to removal from office." Although the supreme court of Nevada has never passed upon the relative merits of the strict and liberal rules, the U.S. District Court for the district of Nevada, in Reynolds v. Arentz, 119 F. Supp. 82 , decided F

1939The manifest intention of the plaintiff was to release only White, but to retain the judgment against the other defendants, and there is no reason why that intent should not be given effect.” The court cited the early case of Booth v. Campbell, 15 Md. 569 , in which the court had followed the older and stricter rule that the discharge of one of several joint judgment debtors operated to discharge them all. *448 In the case of Smith v. State, 46 Md. 617 , the court of appeals of Maryland, reviewing a ruling of the circuit court overruling a motion to quash an execution and “strike out” a judgme

1939The manifest intention of the plaintiff was to release only White, but to retain the judgment against the other defendants, and there is no reason why that intent should not be given effect.” The court cited the early case of Booth v. Campbell, 15 Md. 569 , in which the court had followed the older and stricter rule that the discharge of one of several joint judgment debtors operated to discharge them all. *448 In the case of Smith v. State, 46 Md. 617 , the court of appeals of Maryland, reviewing a ruling of the circuit court overruling a motion to quash an execution and “strike out” a judgme

1924This want has been supplied in this state by statute, and the harsh rule of the-common law which forbade an illegitimate child inheriting from its mother or she from it has been thereby abrogated.” Dickason Coal Co. v. Liddil, 49 Ind. App. 40 , 94 N. E. 411 .

1924This want has been supplied in this state by statute, and the harsh rule of the-common law which forbade an illegitimate child inheriting from its mother or she from it has been thereby abrogated.” Dickason Coal Co. v. Liddil, 49 Ind. App. 40 , 94 N. E. 411 .

1923The question was presented in Oliver v. Hawley, 5 Neb. 439 .

1909In that case the court said: “It would be a harsh rule, however, to require those engaged in these enterprises to construct an actual ditch along the whole route through which the waters were carried, and to refuse them the economy that nature occasionally afforded in the shape of a dry ravine, gulch, or canyon.” This rule was extended in the case of Butte Canal Ditch & Co. v. Vaughn, 11 Cal. 143 , wherein Mr. Justice Field, who has so ably and clearly differentiated the law of appropriation from the rules of the common law, said: “It does not necessarily follow that the water introduced by th

1907The case relied upon by the respondent, viz: Hathaway v. Yakima etc. Power Co., 14 Wash. 469 , 44 Pac. 896 , 53 Am.

1907The case relied upon by the respondent, viz: Hathaway v. Yakima etc. Power Co., 14 Wash. 469 , 44 Pac. 896 , 53 Am.

1905But the instructions are in accord, it seems to us, with the cases of Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 , 30 Pac. 648 ; Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764 , 31 Pac. 30 ; Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; and Blake v. Shriver, 21 Wash. 593 , 68 Pac. 330 .

1905But the instructions are in accord, it seems to us, with the cases of Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 , 30 Pac. 648 ; Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764 , 31 Pac. 30 ; Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; and Blake v. Shriver, 21 Wash. 593 , 68 Pac. 330 .

1905But the instructions are in accord, it seems to us, with the cases of Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 , 30 Pac. 648 ; Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764 , 31 Pac. 30 ; Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; and Blake v. Shriver, 21 Wash. 593 , 68 Pac. 330 .

1905But the instructions are in accord, it seems to us, with the cases of Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 , 30 Pac. 648 ; Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764 , 31 Pac. 30 ; Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; and Blake v. Shriver, 21 Wash. 593 , 68 Pac. 330 .

1905But the instructions are in accord, it seems to us, with the cases of Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 , 30 Pac. 648 ; Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764 , 31 Pac. 30 ; Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; and Blake v. Shriver, 21 Wash. 593 , 68 Pac. 330 .

1905But the instructions are in accord, it seems to us, with the cases of Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 , 30 Pac. 648 ; Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764 , 31 Pac. 30 ; Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; and Blake v. Shriver, 21 Wash. 593 , 68 Pac. 330 .

1905But the instructions are in accord, it seems to us, with the cases of Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 , 30 Pac. 648 ; Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764 , 31 Pac. 30 ; Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; and Blake v. Shriver, 21 Wash. 593 , 68 Pac. 330 .

1901It is not the policy of the law to take snap judgment on litigants, and it seems to us that great injustice might be clone by precluding an investigation of the point actually adjudicated when the judgment is consistent with an adjudication of one or all of the matters in issue. ■ In Smith v. Auld, 31 Kan. 262 ( 1 Pac. 626 ), in an opinion rendered by Justice Brewer of the supreme court of the United States, who was then a member of the supreme court of Kansas, it is said: “The whole philosophy of the doctrine of res adjudicata is summed up in the simple statement that a matter once decided is