harsh rule in New Jersey

2001N.J.S.A. 40A:14-23 (firefighters); N.J.S.A. 40A:14-151 (police officers). “[T]he legislative purpose sought to be achieved by these enactments was to change the harsh rule of the common law which had denied recovery to blameless municipal officials who had been improperly suspended or dismissed from office.” Township of Springfield v. Pedersen, 73 N.J. 1, 7 , 372 A.2d 286 (1977) (emphasis added); accord Note, The Right of New Jersey’s Governmental Officers and Employees to Recover for Back Pay When Illegally Dismissed or Suspended, 15 Rutgers L.Rev. 516 (1961) [hereinafter Governmental Officer

2001N.J.S.A. 40A:14-23 (firefighters); N.J.S.A. 40A:14-151 (police officers). “[T]he legislative purpose sought to be achieved by these enactments was to change the harsh rule of the common law which had denied recovery to blameless municipal officials who had been improperly suspended or dismissed from office.” Township of Springfield v. Pedersen, 73 N.J. 1, 7 , 372 A.2d 286 (1977) (emphasis added); accord Note, The Right of New Jersey’s Governmental Officers and Employees to Recover for Back Pay When Illegally Dismissed or Suspended, 15 Rutgers L.Rev. 516 (1961) [hereinafter Governmental Officer

2004In Manning Engineering, plaintiff received a county contract for engineering services because of its principal's "role as a conduit for illegal `kickbacks.'" 74 N.J. at 119 , 376 A. 2d at 1197 .

2004In Manning Engineering, plaintiff received a county contract for engineering services because of its principal's "role as a conduit for illegal `kickbacks.'" 74 N.J. at 119 , 376 A. 2d at 1197 .

2004The court explained that "[t]he reason for this harsh rule, which works a complete forfeiture of the vendor's interest, is to deter violation of the bidding statutes." Ibid.

2002Rather than imposing such a harsh standard of impossibility, “[alll that is required for the rule to apply is that the underlying writings be ‘voluminous’ and that incourt examination not be convenient.” Id.

1994There, we reassessed our holding in Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 46 N.J. 582 , 218 A.2d 630 (1966), in light of the Legislature’s decision to supplant the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence with comparative negligence.

1994There, we reassessed our holding in Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 46 N.J. 582 , 218 A.2d 630 (1966), in light of the Legislature’s decision to supplant the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence with comparative negligence.

1978School Trustees of Trenton v. Bennett, supra ; John McShain, Inc. v. United States, supra ; Edwards v. Leopoild, 20 N.J.

1953In Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824 , 161 So. 836 , 104 A.L.R. 1 (1935), the Supreme Court said: "In divorce matters modern civilization strongly condemns the harsh doctrine of ab initio sentences of nullity.

1953In Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824 , 161 So. 836 , 104 A.L.R. 1 (1935), the Supreme Court said: "In divorce matters modern civilization strongly condemns the harsh doctrine of ab initio sentences of nullity.

1953Commonwealth v. New, 142 Pa. Super. 358 , 16 A. 2 d 437 (1940) is considered in Commonwealth v. Gordon , below, as virtually abandoning the harsh test of Regina v. Hicklin .

1950Co. v. Underwood, supra, wherein the court used the following-cogent language: “* * * That the consignee cannot accept delivery without incurring liability for the carrier’s charges, known or unknown, supposed to be prepaid or otherwise, and no matter what the consignee’s actual relation to the shipper is, appears a harsh rule, but is seemingly established by authority.