9 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Medicare Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Servicesgreen2 sentences2004The test for judicial estoppel in North Carolina is stated as "a harsh doctrine and requires at a minimum that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted [ (1) ] intentionally have [ (2) ] changed its position in order to gain an advantage." Medicare Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Services, 119 N.C.App. 767, 771 , 460 S.E.2d 361, 364 , disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 415 , 467 S.E.2d 700 (1995) (emphasis added). 2004The test for judicial estoppel in North Carolina is stated as "a harsh doctrine and requires at a minimum that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted [ (1) ] intentionally have [ (2) ] changed its position in order to gain an advantage." Medicare Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Services, 119 N.C.App. 767, 771 , 460 S.E.2d 361, 364 , disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 415 , 467 S.E.2d 700 (1995) (emphasis added). | 1 | 4 |
Harry F. Chaveriat, Jr. v. Williams Pipe Line Companygreen1 sentence1995Allen, 667 F.2d at 1167 ; see Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1428 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Judicial estoppel is strong medicine, and this has led courts and commentators to characterize the grounds for its invocation in terms redolent of intentional wrongdoing.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rose v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co.
neutral
2 sentences2004The test for judicial estoppel in North Carolina is stated as "a harsh doctrine and requires at a minimum that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted [ (1) ] intentionally have [ (2) ] changed its position in order to gain an advantage." Medicare Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Services, 119 N.C.App. 767, 771 , 460 S.E.2d 361, 364 , disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 415 , 467 S.E.2d 700 (1995) (emphasis added). 2004App. 767, 771 , 460 S.E.2d 361, 364 , disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 415 , 467 S.E.2d 700 (1995) (emphasis added). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Medicare Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Services
neutral
2 sentences2004The test for judicial estoppel in North Carolina is stated as "a harsh doctrine and requires at a minimum that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted [ (1) ] intentionally have [ (2) ] changed its position in order to gain an advantage." Medicare Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Services, 119 N.C.App. 767, 771 , 460 S.E.2d 361, 364 , disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 415 , 467 S.E.2d 700 (1995) (emphasis added). 2004App. 767, 771 , 460 S.E.2d 361, 364 , disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 415 , 467 S.E.2d 700 (1995) (emphasis added). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Grady Allen v. Zurich Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1995Allen, 667 F.2d at 1167 ; see Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1428 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Judicial estoppel is strong medicine, and this has led courts and commentators to characterize the grounds for its invocation in terms redolent of intentional wrongdoing.”). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ray Ex Rel. Gudger v. Ray
green
2 sentences1981Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217 , 13 S.E. 2d 224 (1941). 1981Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217 , 13 S.E. 2d 224 (1941). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Raftery v. Wm. C. Vick Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1979Raftery v. Vick Construction Co., 291 N.C. 180 , 230 S.E. 2d 405 (1976). 1979Raftery v. Vick Construction Co., 291 N.C. 180 , 230 S.E. 2d 405 (1976). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Berwer v. Union Central Life Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1937Co., supra. Nor is this a harsh rule. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Dunlop v. . James
green
1 sentence1911Tbis doctrine is well settled in Dunlop v. James, 174 N. Y., 411 , as follows: “In modern times courts of law bave dealt witb subrogation as they would witb assignments, and, wben tbe right of action to which tbe plaintiff asks to be subrogated is a legal right of action, a court of law may treat a plaintiff who is entitled in equity to subrogation as an as-signee, and allow him to maintain an action of a legal nature upon tbe right to which he claims to be subrogated.” In Bledsoe v. Nixon, 68 N. C., 521 (cited in the opinion of the Court), Judge Rodman strongly intimates that the harsh rule b | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Bledsoe v. . Nixon
neutral
1 sentence1911Tbis doctrine is well settled in Dunlop v. James, 174 N. Y., 411 , as follows: “In modern times courts of law bave dealt witb subrogation as they would witb assignments, and, wben tbe right of action to which tbe plaintiff asks to be subrogated is a legal right of action, a court of law may treat a plaintiff who is entitled in equity to subrogation as an as-signee, and allow him to maintain an action of a legal nature upon tbe right to which he claims to be subrogated.” In Bledsoe v. Nixon, 68 N. C., 521 (cited in the opinion of the Court), Judge Rodman strongly intimates that the harsh rule b | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.