58 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1889–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pelham v. Stategreen2 sentences1992In that case, the chemist had testified that it was thought that the cocaine was no “more than %8,ooo of an ounce and maybe as little as l/w,m of an ounce.” Appreciating the extremely small quantity that was involved, the Court of Criminal Appeals referred to the decision of Pelham v. State, and wrote that “it would be a harsh rule, indeed, that would charge appellant with knowing possessing that which it required a microscope to identify.” Id. at 835 . 1987A similar holding was made in Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), where the amount of cocaine found was “no more than 5/28,ooo of an ounce and maybe as little as y28,ooo of an ounce.” Coleman cited Pelham v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 226 , 298 S.W.2d 171 (1957), in which the court held that the amount of marihuana found in scrapings from the defendant’s pocket was insufficient to support a conviction because it was not a usable amount, and added: “It would be a harsh rule, indeed, that would charge appellant with knowingly possessing that which it required a microscope to ide | 2 | 7 |
Coleman v. Stategreen2 sentences2006As he points out, in Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated unambiguously, and quite reasonably, “It would be a harsh rule, indeed, that would charge appellant with knowingly possessing that which it required a microscope to identify.” However, that court has also held there is no requirement that a controlled substance must be visible and measurable to support a conviction for possession of contraband. 1987A similar holding was made in Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), where the amount of cocaine found was “no more than 5/28,ooo of an ounce and maybe as little as y28,ooo of an ounce.” Coleman cited Pelham v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 226 , 298 S.W.2d 171 (1957), in which the court held that the amount of marihuana found in scrapings from the defendant’s pocket was insufficient to support a conviction because it was not a usable amount, and added: “It would be a harsh rule, indeed, that would charge appellant with knowingly possessing that which it required a microscope to ide | 2 | 4 |
Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLCred2 sentences2015Sec., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012) (″The least harsh instruction permits (but does not require) a jury to presume that the lost evidence is both relevant and favorable to the innocent party.″). 2014Sec., 685 F.Supp.2d 456, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.2012) ("The least harsh instruction permits (but does not require) a jury to presume that the lost evidence is both relevant and favorable to the innocent party.”). . | 2 | 2 |
King v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See King v. State , 895 S.W.2d 701, 702-04 (Tex. Crim. 2006See King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 702-04 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); 1 see also Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (finding it error to require controlled substance to be visible to naked eye to support conviction; visibility not an element of possession of controlled substance); Hyett v. State, 58 S.W.3d 826, 831 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet ref'd). | 2 | 2 |
Lowe v. Texas Tech Universitygreen2 sentences2003See Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976). 2003See Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976). | 2 | 2 |
Gilbert v. Fireside Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences1984In Gilbert v. Fireside Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 869, 879-80 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, no writ), we noted that res judicata is a harsh doctrine, which should be applied narrowly and with caution. 1984In Gilbert v. Fireside Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 869, 879-80 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1980, no writ), we noted that res judicata is a harsh doctrine, which should be applied narrowly and with caution. | 2 | 2 |
Chin v. Port Authority of New York & New Jerseygreen2 sentences2015Sec., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012) (″The least harsh instruction permits (but does not require) a jury to presume that the lost evidence is both relevant and favorable to the innocent party.″). 2014Sec., 685 F.Supp.2d 456, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.2012) ("The least harsh instruction permits (but does not require) a jury to presume that the lost evidence is both relevant and favorable to the innocent party.”). . | 1 | 2 |
Tran v. MacHagreen1 sentence2018Because adverse possession is a harsh doctrine, the law requires that a party’s intention to appropriate property via adverse possession be “very clear.” Tran v. Macha, 213 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Tex. 2006). “[T]he mere grazing of land incidentally enclosed as a result of the construction of fences built for another purpose does not constitute possession that will ripen into title by limitation. | 1 | 1 |
Hyett v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 702-04 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); 1 see also Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (finding it error to require controlled substance to be visible to naked eye to support conviction; visibility not an element of possession of controlled substance); Hyett v. State, 58 S.W.3d 826, 831 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
Joseph v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 702-04 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); 1 see also Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (finding it error to require controlled substance to be visible to naked eye to support conviction; visibility not an element of possession of controlled substance); Hyett v. State, 58 S.W.3d 826, 831 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
Fax Telecommunicaciones v. AT & Tgreen1 sentence1999See Fax Telecommunicaciones, 952 F.Supp. at 952 . | 1 | 1 |
Van Byrd v. Stategreen1 sentence1995To have an opportunity to place the motion in writing and have it sworn to would sometimes require a delay of the trial until that matter could be completed, and the trial could often be expedited by allowing this motion to be oral and recorded by a court reporter. [6] Since Whitmore, the Court of Criminal Appeals has emphasized that a defendant is not entitled to a new trial merely because a co-defendant's testimony is "newly available." See Van Byrd v. State, 605 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Todd v. State, 601 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Eddlemon v. State, 591 S.W.2d 847, 849 ( | 1 | 1 |
Todd v. Stategreen1 sentence1995To have an opportunity to place the motion in writing and have it sworn to would sometimes require a delay of the trial until that matter could be completed, and the trial could often be expedited by allowing this motion to be oral and recorded by a court reporter. [6] Since Whitmore, the Court of Criminal Appeals has emphasized that a defendant is not entitled to a new trial merely because a co-defendant's testimony is "newly available." See Van Byrd v. State, 605 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Todd v. State, 601 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Eddlemon v. State, 591 S.W.2d 847, 849 ( | 1 | 1 |
Bodde v. Stategreen1 sentence1995The Court in McGlothlin recognized criticism of the DeGarmo doctrine as being “a harsh rule of law,” but explained the doctrine’s rationale as follows: The DeGarmo doctrine had been described as a “common-sense rule of procedure,” Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), because “the function of trial is to sift out the truth from a mass of contradictory evidence_” In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 , 66 S.Ct. 78, 80 , 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945). | 1 | 1 |
Eddlemon v. Stategreen1 sentence1995To have an opportunity to place the motion in writing and have it sworn to would sometimes require a delay of the trial until that matter could be completed, and the trial could often be expedited by allowing this motion to be oral and recorded by a court reporter. [6] Since Whitmore, the Court of Criminal Appeals has emphasized that a defendant is not entitled to a new trial merely because a co-defendant's testimony is "newly available." See Van Byrd v. State, 605 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Todd v. State, 601 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Eddlemon v. State, 591 S.W.2d 847, 849 ( | 1 | 1 |
Jeanes v. Hambygreen1 sentence1988Jeanes v. Hamby, 685 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r. e.). | 1 | 1 |
| Westinghouse Credit Corporation v. Kownslargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Toni v. Kingan & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Spencer v. Texas Factors, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ellis v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc.red | 1 | 1 |
| Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Bullardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hejl v. Wirth
green
2 sentences2009French v. Olive, 67 Tex. 400 , 3 S.W. 568 (1887); Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413 , 73 S.W.2d 490 (1934), Hejl v. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609 , 343 S.W.2d 226 (1961). 2009French v. Olive, 67 Tex. 400 , 3 S.W. 568 (1887); Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413 , 73 S.W.2d 490 (1934), Hejl v. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609 , 343 S.W.2d 226 (1961). | 3 | 2009–2009 |
Permian Oil Co. v. Smith
green
2 sentences2009French v. Olive, 67 Tex. 400 , 3 S.W. 568 (1887); Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413 , 73 S.W.2d 490 (1934), Hejl v. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609 , 343 S.W.2d 226 (1961). 2009French v. Olive, 67 Tex. 400 , 3 S.W. 568 (1887); Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413 , 73 S.W.2d 490 (1934), Hejl v. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609 , 343 S.W.2d 226 (1961). | 3 | 2009–2009 |
French v. Olive
green
2 sentences2009French v. Olive, 67 Tex. 400 , 3 S.W. 568 (1887); Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413 , 73 S.W.2d 490 (1934), Hejl v. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609 , 343 S.W.2d 226 (1961). 2009French v. Olive, 67 Tex. 400 , 3 S.W. 568 (1887); Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413 , 73 S.W.2d 490 (1934), Hejl v. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609 , 343 S.W.2d 226 (1961). | 3 | 2009–2009 |
Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998“It would be a harsh rule indeed if an employer were held liable for any criminal act committed by an employee against a person who just happened to be a customer, client, or fellow employee of the employer.” Doe, 868 S.W.2d at 950 . 1998"It would be a harsh rule indeed if an employer were held liable for any criminal act committed by an employee against a person who just happened to be a customer, client, or fellow employee of the employer." Doe , 868 S.W.2d at 950 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Morse v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1893Indeed, it'would be a harsh rule if every change for the better was to be considered as evidence showing former negligence.’ 4 Texas Law Rev., 54, 56; Morse v. Railway, 30 Minn., 465 .” The point raised in the second assignment of error is, that “ The court erred in permitting plaintiff to prove by himself and his witnesses Jeff Haskell, T. 1889Indeed it would be a harsh rule if every change for the better is to he considered as evidence showing former negligence.” 4 Texas Law Rev., 54, 56; Morse v. Railway Co., 30 Minn., 465 . | 2 | 1889–1893 |
McDonnold v. Weinacht
green
1 sentence2018The adverse claimant who relies upon grazing only as evidence of his adverse use and enjoyment must show as part of his case that the land in dispute was designedly enclosed.” McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136 , 141–42 (Tex. 1971). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. v. Jerry Aldridge
green
2 sentences2015Michele Chimene Page 26 of 28 438 S.W.3d 9, *36 ; 2014 Tex. LEXIS 562 , **72 must find both intentional destruction10 and prejudice to the nonspoliating party. 2015Michele Chimene Page 26 of 28 438 S.W.3d 9, *36 ; 2014 Tex. LEXIS 562 , **72 must find both intentional destruction10 and prejudice to the nonspoliating party. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Michael
green
2 sentences1995The Court in McGlothlin recognized criticism of the DeGarmo doctrine as being “a harsh rule of law,” but explained the doctrine’s rationale as follows: The DeGarmo doctrine had been described as a “common-sense rule of procedure,” Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), because “the function of trial is to sift out the truth from a mass of contradictory evidence_” In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 , 66 S.Ct. 78, 80 , 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945). 1995The Court in McGlothlin recognized criticism of the DeGarmo doctrine as being “a harsh rule of law,” but explained the doctrine’s rationale as follows: The DeGarmo doctrine had been described as a “common-sense rule of procedure,” Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), because “the function of trial is to sift out the truth from a mass of contradictory evidence_” In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 , 66 S.Ct. 78, 80 , 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Tehan v. United States Ex Rel. Shott
green
2 sentences1995Stated another way, “The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth.” Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 , 86 S.Ct. 459 , 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966). [citations omitted] When the defendant testifies and judicially confesses to the charged offense, the purpose of the trial process has been served— the truth has been determined and the purpose of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial has been satisfied. 1995Stated another way, “The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth.” Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 , 86 S.Ct. 459 , 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966). [citations omitted] When the defendant testifies and judicially confesses to the charged offense, the purpose of the trial process has been served— the truth has been determined and the purpose of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial has been satisfied. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Madden v. State
green
1 sentence1993As we recognized in Madden , “[a] challenge to the trial judge’s ruling on a motion for an instructed verdict is in actuality a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.” Madden, 799 S.W.2d at 686 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Reed v. State
green
1 sentence1992Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Farley v. MM Cattle Company
green
2 sentences1992Further, we recognized that "[a] plaintiff's burden to negate his own knowledge and appreciation ... overlaps and duplicates the voluntary assumption of risk doctrine," which this court abolished in Farley v. M M Cattle Company, 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.1975). 1992Further, we recognized that “[a] plaintiff’s burden to negate his own knowledge and appreciation ... overlaps and duplicates the voluntary assumption of risk doctrine,” which this court abolished in Farley v. M M Cattle Company, 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.1975). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Parker v. Highland Park, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992It is a harsh doctrine and imports a distrust of juries." Id. at 519 . 1992It is a harsh doctrine and imports a distrust of juries.” Id. at 519 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn
green
2 sentences1990The Supreme Court held that the harsh rule of contributory negligence that wholly barred recovery was completely incompatible with admiralty law which allows such consideration of contributory negligence only in mitigation of damages. 346 U.S. at 408-10 , 74 S.Ct. at 202 , 98 L.Ed. at 150-51 . 1990The Supreme Court held that the harsh rule of contributory negligence that wholly barred recovery was completely incompatible with admiralty law which allows such consideration of contributory negligence only in mitigation of damages. 346 U.S. at 408-10 , 74 S.Ct. at 202 , 98 L.Ed. at 150-51 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| American Savings & Loan Ass'n of Houston v. Musick green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Tomlin v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Western & Atlantic R. v. Underwood neutral | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Hyder green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Rodriguez v. State green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Fawcett v. State green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Henger v. Sale neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| McCormick v. Cornell Wardlaw neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| In Re King's Estate green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| James v. James green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Alvis v. McDonald neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Hutchins v. Birdsong green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rea neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Armstrong v. State neutral | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Commercial Credit Co. v. American Mfg. Co. green | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Dublin Nat. Bank v. Chastain green | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers neutral | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Motor Investment Co. v. City of Hamlin green | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Burmarsal Co. v. Lake neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Early-Foster Co. v. Mid-Tex Oil Mills green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Galbraith v. Bishop neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Sibley v. Continental Supply Co. neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Clark v. Shamrock Compress & Warehouse Co. neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| City of Dallas v. Springer green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Phelps neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Streight v. State green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.