harsh rule in Kansas

1964In Iron Works Co. v. Green, 79 Kan. 588, 594 , 100 Pac. 482 , it was said: “ ‘ “At the first glance this seems to be a harsh rule, but since men have the right to accept employment in which both parties know the employee will be exposed to danger, and the employee has a right to accept greater compensation by reason thereof, neither the courts nor legal writers have been able to evolve a more equitable rule.” (See, also, S. K.

1964In Iron Works Co. v. Green, 79 Kan. 588, 594 , 100 Pac. 482 , it was said: “ ‘ “At the first glance this seems to be a harsh rule, but since men have the right to accept employment in which both parties know the employee will be exposed to danger, and the employee has a right to accept greater compensation by reason thereof, neither the courts nor legal writers have been able to evolve a more equitable rule.” (See, also, S. K.

2022See City of Topeka v. Gage, 44 Kan. 87, 89 , 24 P. 82 (1890) (finding a prior 30-day statute "may be a harsh rule, but that fact does not furnish a reason why we should not construe the statute as it is, though it may furnish a reason why the legislature should modify it."); Wahlgren v. City of Kansas City, 42 Kan. 243, 246 , 21 P. 1068 (1889) (rejecting claim that 30 days is an unconstitutionally short statute of limitations).

2022In Schenk v. Kansas City, 134 Kan. 181, 184 , 5 P.2d 842 (1931), the court explained the legislative intent for short limitations in a similar statute which read: "'No suit to set aside the said assessments shall be brought after the expiration of thirty days from the publication of the ordinance fixing said assessments.' Rev.

2022In Schenk v. Kansas City, 134 Kan. 181, 184 , 5 P.2d 842 (1931), the court explained the legislative intent for short limitations in a similar statute which read: "'No suit to set aside the said assessments shall be brought after the expiration of thirty days from the publication of the ordinance fixing said assessments.' Rev.

2020State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, 909-12 , 281 P.3d 153 (2012).

2020State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, 909-12 , 281 P.3d 153 (2012).

2001Gray does point in his brief to the observation from Popp v. Motor Vehicle Department, 211 Kan. 763, 767 , 508 P.2d 991 (1973), that “the chemical tests provided for in 8-1001 eliminate mistakes which may arise from objective observation alone.” This is undoubtedly true.

2001Gray does point in his brief to the observation from Popp v. Motor Vehicle Department, 211 Kan. 763, 767 , 508 P.2d 991 (1973), that “the chemical tests provided for in 8-1001 eliminate mistakes which may arise from objective observation alone.” This is undoubtedly true.

1997In Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 303 , 156 A.2d 123 (1959), the New Hampshire court explained the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as follows: "It is well established that our courts will not countenance fraudulent conduct. [Citations omitted.] We *828 refuse to presume that the Legislature intended to give a wrongdoer the advantage and benefit of his fraudulent concealment of a cause of action until the statute of limitations has run." (Emphasis added.) We agree with the comments above.

1997In Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 303 , 156 A.2d 123 (1959), the New Hampshire court explained the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as follows: "It is well established that our courts will not countenance fraudulent conduct. [Citations omitted.] We *828 refuse to presume that the Legislature intended to give a wrongdoer the advantage and benefit of his fraudulent concealment of a cause of action until the statute of limitations has run." (Emphasis added.) We agree with the comments above.

1997In Florida, it was held that the defendant’s fraud had tolled the statute of limitations: “The statute of limitations is tolled when it can be shown that fraud has been perpetrated upon an injured party sufficient to place him in ignorance of his right to a cause of action or to prevent him from discovering the injury. [Citation omitted.] The fraudulent concealment of facts showing negligence will toll the statute of limitations until the fraudulent concealment can be discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence. [Citation omitted.] To hold otherwise would be a harsh rule and preven

1997In Florida, it was held that the defendant's fraud had tolled the statute of limitations: "The statute of limitations is tolled when it can be shown that fraud has been perpetrated upon an injured party sufficient to place him in ignorance of his right to a cause of action or to prevent him from discovering the injury. [Citation omitted.] The fraudulent concealment of facts showing negligence will toll the statute of limitations until the fraudulent concealment can be discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence. [Citation omitted.] To hold otherwise would be a harsh rule and preven

1992The efforts of diligent counsel and our research have revealed only one Kansas workers compensation case, Gardner v. Ark Warehouse Co., 148 Kan. 190 , 80 P.2d 1066 (1938), where a suicide was claimed to be compensable.

1992The efforts of diligent counsel and our research have revealed only one Kansas workers compensation case, Gardner v. Ark Warehouse Co., 148 Kan. 190 , 80 P.2d 1066 (1938), where a suicide was claimed to be compensable.

1971We have also stated in Hudson, Administrator v. Tucker, 188 Kan. 202 , 361 P. 2d 878 , at page 212 as follows: “. . .

1971We have also stated in Hudson, Administrator v. Tucker, 188 Kan. 202 , 361 P. 2d 878 , at page 212 as follows: “. . .

1965In my judgment, there is a vast difference between a negligent act, on one hand, and a willful, planned act, on the other, and this distinction has been recognized by other courts. ( Ennis v. Truhitte, (Mo.) 306 S.W.2d 549 ; Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242 , 287 P.2d 585 .) Under what I believe to be modern concepts of justice, it is a harsh rule indeed which refuses to extend the law's protection to a wife who has been the victim of a willful assault by her estranged mate.

1965(Ennis v. Truhitte, (Mo.) 306 S. W. 2d 549 ; Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242 , 287 P. 2d 585 .) Under what I believe to be modern concepts of justice, it is a harsh rule indeed which refuses to extend the law’s protection to a wife who has been the victim of a willful assault by her estranged mate.

1965In my judgment, there is a vast difference between a negligent act, on one hand, and a willful, planned act, on the other, and this distinction has been recognized by other courts. ( Ennis v. Truhitte, (Mo.) 306 S.W.2d 549 ; Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242 , 287 P.2d 585 .) Under what I believe to be modern concepts of justice, it is a harsh rule indeed which refuses to extend the law's protection to a wife who has been the victim of a willful assault by her estranged mate.

1965In my judgment, there is a vast difference between a negligent act, on one hand, and a willful, planned act, on the other, and this distinction has been recognized by other courts. ( Ennis v. Truhitte, (Mo.) 306 S.W.2d 549 ; Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242 , 287 P.2d 585 .) Under what I believe to be modern concepts of justice, it is a harsh rule indeed which refuses to extend the law's protection to a wife who has been the victim of a willful assault by her estranged mate.

1951It appears to me to be a harsh rule of law which denies the innocent victim of tender years or the mentally disabled redress against the negligent wrongdoer. ( Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407 , 31 N.E.2d 670 ; Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396 , 216 P.2d 262 .) It is my opinion that application of the guest statute should not be extended beyond correction of the evils which it may be assumed were the motivating reasons for its enactment.

1951It appears to me to be a harsh rule of law which denies the innocent victim of tender years or the mentally disabled redress against the negligent wrongdoer. ( Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407 , 31 N.E.2d 670 ; Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396 , 216 P.2d 262 .) It is my opinion that application of the guest statute should not be extended beyond correction of the evils which it may be assumed were the motivating reasons for its enactment.

1951It appears to me to be a harsh rule of law which denies the innocent victim of tender years or the mentally disabled redress against the negligent wrongdoer. ( Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407 , 31 N.E.2d 670 ; Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396 , 216 P.2d 262 .) It is my opinion that application of the guest statute should not be extended beyond correction of the evils which it may be assumed were the motivating reasons for its enactment.

1951It appears to me to be a harsh rule of law which denies the innocent victim of tender years or the mentally disabled redress against the negligent wrongdoer. ( Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407 , 31 N.E.2d 670 ; Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396 , 216 P.2d 262 .) It is my opinion that application of the guest statute should not be extended beyond correction of the evils which it may be assumed were the motivating reasons for its enactment.

1925The plaintiff argues that the courts of Missouri recognize that the statute invoked by the defendant is highly penal; that a defense made thereunder is a harsh defense; that it should not be allowed unless “the facts are such as to lead to no other conclusion.” In Engine & Manufacturing Co. v. Apartment Co., 154 Mo. App. 139 , a case involving the interstate sale of machinery and the furnishing of men to install and start it, it was said: “The evidence is overwhelming to the effect that the Chuse Engine and Manufacturing Company manufactured this machinery and put it on its cars in Mattoon, se

1919(Robinson v. Railway Co., 96 Kan. 137, 144 , 150 Pac. 636 ; Danciger v. Cooley, 98 Kan. 38 , 157 Pac. 453 .) (Filed June 7, 1919.) Inasmuch as none of the defendants is entitled to recover any part of the reward, we think it would be a harsh- rule to say that the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming it because of the admissions in their petition.

1919(Robinson v. Railway Co., 96 Kan. 137, 144 , 150 Pac. 636 ; Danciger v. Cooley, 98 Kan. 38 , 157 Pac. 453 .) (Filed June 7, 1919.) Inasmuch as none of the defendants is entitled to recover any part of the reward, we think it would be a harsh- rule to say that the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming it because of the admissions in their petition.

1919(Robinson v. Railway Co., 96 Kan. 137, 144 , 150 Pac. 636 ; Danciger v. Cooley, 98 Kan. 38 , 157 Pac. 453 .) (Filed June 7, 1919.) Inasmuch as none of the defendants is entitled to recover any part of the reward, we think it would be a harsh- rule to say that the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming it because of the admissions in their petition.

1919(Robinson v. Railway Co., 96 Kan. 137, 144 , 150 Pac. 636 ; Danciger v. Cooley, 98 Kan. 38 , 157 Pac. 453 .) (Filed June 7, 1919.) Inasmuch as none of the defendants is entitled to recover any part of the reward, we think it would be a harsh- rule to say that the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming it because of the admissions in their petition.

1917But in view of our own decisions, from Nelson v. Mather, supra, decided in 1869, down to Garrett v. Beers, supra, decided a year ago, it can not be admitted that such a harsh doctrine is any part of Kansas law.

1910(Forbes v. Railway Co., 135 Iowa, 679 .) It would be a harsh rule that would hold every person a trespasser who remains upon a train after it reaches the place designated in his ticket.

1906When parties have acted innocently and fairly in making or obtaining a division which does not cover all their estate, there is no reason why the law should not aid them when they ask for a. division of the remainder.” (Barnes v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479, 480 , 32 N. E. 670 .) (See, also, Adams v. Hopkins, 144 Cal. 19 , 77 Pac. 712 ; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Idaho, 151 , 77 Pac. 972 .) Likewise, if parties have acted innocently and fairly, and a portion of the estate described in the petition and ordered to, be partitioned has been omitted from the report of the commissioners under a mistake as

1906When parties have acted innocently and fairly in making or obtaining a division which does not cover all their estate, there is no reason why the law should not aid them when they ask for a. division of the remainder.” (Barnes v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479, 480 , 32 N. E. 670 .) (See, also, Adams v. Hopkins, 144 Cal. 19 , 77 Pac. 712 ; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Idaho, 151 , 77 Pac. 972 .) Likewise, if parties have acted innocently and fairly, and a portion of the estate described in the petition and ordered to, be partitioned has been omitted from the report of the commissioners under a mistake as

1906When parties have acted innocently and fairly in making or obtaining a division which does not cover all their estate, there is no reason why the law should not aid them when they ask for a. division of the remainder.” (Barnes v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479, 480 , 32 N. E. 670 .) (See, also, Adams v. Hopkins, 144 Cal. 19 , 77 Pac. 712 ; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Idaho, 151 , 77 Pac. 972 .) Likewise, if parties have acted innocently and fairly, and a portion of the estate described in the petition and ordered to, be partitioned has been omitted from the report of the commissioners under a mistake as

1906When parties have acted innocently and fairly in making or obtaining a division which does not cover all their estate, there is no reason why the law should not aid them when they ask for a. division of the remainder.” (Barnes v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479, 480 , 32 N. E. 670 .) (See, also, Adams v. Hopkins, 144 Cal. 19 , 77 Pac. 712 ; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Idaho, 151 , 77 Pac. 972 .) Likewise, if parties have acted innocently and fairly, and a portion of the estate described in the petition and ordered to, be partitioned has been omitted from the report of the commissioners under a mistake as

1906When parties have acted innocently and fairly in making or obtaining a division which does not cover all their estate, there is no reason why the law should not aid them when they ask for a. division of the remainder.” (Barnes v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479, 480 , 32 N. E. 670 .) (See, also, Adams v. Hopkins, 144 Cal. 19 , 77 Pac. 712 ; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Idaho, 151 , 77 Pac. 972 .) Likewise, if parties have acted innocently and fairly, and a portion of the estate described in the petition and ordered to, be partitioned has been omitted from the report of the commissioners under a mistake as

1906When parties have acted innocently and fairly in making or obtaining a division which does not cover all their estate, there is no reason why the law should not aid them when they ask for a. division of the remainder.” (Barnes v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479, 480 , 32 N. E. 670 .) (See, also, Adams v. Hopkins, 144 Cal. 19 , 77 Pac. 712 ; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Idaho, 151 , 77 Pac. 972 .) Likewise, if parties have acted innocently and fairly, and a portion of the estate described in the petition and ordered to, be partitioned has been omitted from the report of the commissioners under a mistake as

1906When parties have acted innocently and fairly in making or obtaining a division which does not cover all their estate, there is no reason why the law should not aid them when they ask for a. division of the remainder.” (Barnes v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479, 480 , 32 N. E. 670 .) (See, also, Adams v. Hopkins, 144 Cal. 19 , 77 Pac. 712 ; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Idaho, 151 , 77 Pac. 972 .) Likewise, if parties have acted innocently and fairly, and a portion of the estate described in the petition and ordered to, be partitioned has been omitted from the report of the commissioners under a mistake as

1906When parties have acted innocently and fairly in making or obtaining a division which does not cover all their estate, there is no reason why the law should not aid them when they ask for a. division of the remainder.” (Barnes v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479, 480 , 32 N. E. 670 .) (See, also, Adams v. Hopkins, 144 Cal. 19 , 77 Pac. 712 ; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Idaho, 151 , 77 Pac. 972 .) Likewise, if parties have acted innocently and fairly, and a portion of the estate described in the petition and ordered to, be partitioned has been omitted from the report of the commissioners under a mistake as

1906When parties have acted innocently and fairly in making or obtaining a division which does not cover all their estate, there is no reason why the law should not aid them when they ask for a. division of the remainder.” (Barnes v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479, 480 , 32 N. E. 670 .) (See, also, Adams v. Hopkins, 144 Cal. 19 , 77 Pac. 712 ; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Idaho, 151 , 77 Pac. 972 .) Likewise, if parties have acted innocently and fairly, and a portion of the estate described in the petition and ordered to, be partitioned has been omitted from the report of the commissioners under a mistake as