harsh rule in Missouri

2016Because the adverse inference is “a harsh rule of evidence, prior to applying it in any given case it should be the burden of the party seeking its benefit to make a prima facie showing that the opponent destroyed the missing records under circumstances manifesting fraud, deceit or bad faith.” Moore, 558 S.W.2d at 736 .

2015Because the adverse inference is “a harsh rule of evidence, prior to applying it in any given case it should be the burden of the party seeking its benefit to make a prima facie showing that the opponent destroyed the missing records under circumstances manifesting fraud, deceit or bad faith.” Moore, 558 S.W.2d at 736 .

1977Brissette v. Mil-ner Chevrolet Company, supra. Not only should destruction of the records be proved, but there should also be such proof as is available under the circumstances that the records destroyed contained evidence which would aid the party seeking imposition of the rule in proving the elements of his case.

1977Brissette v. Milner Chevrolet Company, supra. Not only should destruction of the records be proved, but there should also be such proof as is available under the circumstances that the records destroyed contained evidence which would aid the party seeking imposition of the rule in proving the elements of his case.

1974McQueen v. State, 475 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. banc 1971); Tucker v. State, 481 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.1972); Jones v. State, 491 S.W.2d 233 (Mo.1973); Thebeau v. State, 491 S.W.2d 275, 277 [1] (Mo.1973).

1974McQueen v. State, 475 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. banc 1971); Tucker v. State, 481 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.1972); Jones v. State, 491 S.W.2d 233 (Mo.1973); Thebeau v. State, 491 S.W.2d 275, 277 [1] (Mo.1973).

1974McQueen v. State, 475 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. banc 1971); Tucker v. State, 481 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.1972); Jones v. State, 491 S.W.2d 233 (Mo.1973); Thebeau v. State, 491 S.W.2d 275, 277 [1] (Mo.1973).

1967Justification for this is stated in a 1922 decision, Rockwell v. Standard Stamping Co., 210 Mo.App. 168 , 241 S.W. 979, 981 , as follows: "Since the advent of the automobile and its almost universal use many accidents occur where the automobile speeds away from the scene. * * * In such cases it would be a harsh rule to require the plaintiff to do more than prove the ownership of the vehicle. * * * It is a just rule and one of necessity, especially since the advent of the automobile.

1967Justification for this is stated in a 1922 decision, Rockwell v. Standard Stamping Co., 210 Mo.App. 168 , 241 S.W. 979, 981 , as follows: "Since the advent of the automobile and its almost universal use many accidents occur where the automobile speeds away from the scene. * * * In such cases it would be a harsh rule to require the plaintiff to do more than prove the ownership of the vehicle. * * * It is a just rule and one of necessity, especially since the advent of the automobile.

1963By the performance of their moral or natural duty, Irene Caen and Loretta Brewster, as next of kin of the deceased, incurred the “legal obligation to pay [the funeral] expenses” of their father, and that unquestionably resulted in “pecuniary loss” which “would necessarily result from the death, to those entitled to recover.” Patison v. Campbell, supra. We conclude that when one or more of the beneficiaries named in paragraph (4) of Section 537.080 incurs a legal liability for funeral expenses to avoid or prevent the burial of the deceased at public expense as a pauper, or to prevent the consig

1943While the judgment is somewhat incomplete, in that it merely dismisses plaintiff ’s petition and decrees title in the defendants, we think the effect of the judgment was the finding that the plaintiff did not have any title to the real estate in question. [Armor v. Frey, 226 Mo. 646, 664 .] At times it may seem like a harsh rule,' but it has been well said, “that the doctrine of res judicata may be said to inhere in the legal systems of all civilized nations as an obvious rule of expediency, justice and public tranquillity.

1932The case of Gibson v. Railroad, 225 Mo. 473 , cannot be distinguished, as plaintiff attempts to do, on the ground that in that case plaintiff "attempted to rely upon the code of Iowa to sustain his cause of action.

1929The last opinion of this court on the question is recorded in Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 1 . c. 639, 185 S. W. 170 , where we said: “Plaintiffs in error are not now in a position to urge as error the action of the court in overruling their motion to make the petition more definite and certain.

1929The last opinion of this court on the question is recorded in Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 1 . c. 639, 185 S. W. 170 , where we said: “Plaintiffs in error are not now in a position to urge as error the action of the court in overruling their motion to make the petition more definite and certain.

1922Such proof on the part of the defendant to the effect that the vehicle was not under his control being established, the effect of the presumption which arises from the proof of ownership is destroyed, and it is then incumbent on the plaintiff to produce some evidence of the fact that the vehicle at the time was under the control of the defendant. [Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 22 , 198 S.W. 854 ; Kilroy v. Crane Agency, 203 Mo. App. 302 , 218 S.W. 425 .] It is said, however, by the defendant that the later cases in the Supreme Court, namely, Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215 , and Hays v. Hogan, 273

1922Such proof on the part of the defendant to the effect that the vehicle was not under his control being established, the effect of the presumption which arises from the proof of ownership is destroyed, and it is then incumbent on the plaintiff to produce some evidence of the fact that the vehicle at the time was under the control of the defendant. [Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 22 , 198 S.W. 854 ; Kilroy v. Crane Agency, 203 Mo. App. 302 , 218 S.W. 425 .] It is said, however, by the defendant that the later cases in the Supreme Court, namely, Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215 , and Hays v. Hogan, 273

1922Such proof on the part of the defendant to the effect that the vehicle was not under his control being established, the effect of the presumption which arises from the proof of ownership is destroyed, and it is then incumbent on the plaintiff to produce some evidence of the fact that the vehicle at the time was under the control of the defendant. [Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 22 , 198 S.W. 854 ; Kilroy v. Crane Agency, 203 Mo. App. 302 , 218 S.W. 425 .] It is said, however, by the defendant that the later cases in the Supreme Court, namely, Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215 , and Hays v. Hogan, 273

1922Such proof on the part of the defendant to the effect that the vehicle was not under his control being established, the effect of the presumption which arises from the proof of ownership is destroyed, and it is then incumbent on the plaintiff to produce some evidence of the fact that the vehicle at the time was under the control of the defendant. [Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 22 , 198 S.W. 854 ; Kilroy v. Crane Agency, 203 Mo. App. 302 , 218 S.W. 425 .] It is said, however, by the defendant that the later cases in the Supreme Court, namely, Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215 , and Hays v. Hogan, 273

1922Such proof on the part of the defendant to the effect that the vehicle was not under his control being established, the effect of the presumption which arises from the proof of ownership is destroyed, and it is then incumbent on the plaintiff to produce some evidence of the fact that the vehicle at the time was under the control of the defendant. [Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 22 , 198 S.W. 854 ; Kilroy v. Crane Agency, 203 Mo. App. 302 , 218 S.W. 425 .] It is said, however, by the defendant that the later cases in the Supreme Court, namely, Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215 , and Hays v. Hogan, 273

1922Such proof on the part of the defendant to the effect that the vehicle was not under his control being established, the effect of the presumption which arises from the proof of ownership is destroyed, and it is then incumbent on the plaintiff to produce some evidence of the fact that the vehicle at the time was under the control of the defendant. [Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 22 , 198 S.W. 854 ; Kilroy v. Crane Agency, 203 Mo. App. 302 , 218 S.W. 425 .] It is said, however, by the defendant that the later cases in the Supreme Court, namely, Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215 , and Hays v. Hogan, 273

1919Louis v. Foster, 52 .Mo. 513, 515.] [See, also, Newcombe v. Kramer, 189 Mo. App. 538, 541 ; Pacific Railroad v. The Governor, 23 Mo. 353, 364 ; City of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1, 8 .] Again the principle of the validity of the acts of a de facto officer should, we think, apply here. [Adams v. Lindell, 6 Mo. App.. 197, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 72 Mo. 198 .] The contention that there can be no de facto officer when there is no office does not apply here since the office, the place or function filled by the one presiding over the deliberations of the body, Avas in existence and was filled

1919Louis v. Foster, 52 .Mo. 513, 515.] [See, also, Newcombe v. Kramer, 189 Mo. App. 538, 541 ; Pacific Railroad v. The Governor, 23 Mo. 353, 364 ; City of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1, 8 .] Again the principle of the validity of the acts of a de facto officer should, we think, apply here. [Adams v. Lindell, 6 Mo. App.. 197, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 72 Mo. 198 .] The contention that there can be no de facto officer when there is no office does not apply here since the office, the place or function filled by the one presiding over the deliberations of the body, Avas in existence and was filled

1919Louis v. Foster, 52 .Mo. 513, 515.] [See, also, Newcombe v. Kramer, 189 Mo. App. 538, 541 ; Pacific Railroad v. The Governor, 23 Mo. 353, 364 ; City of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1, 8 .] Again the principle of the validity of the acts of a de facto officer should, we think, apply here. [Adams v. Lindell, 6 Mo. App.. 197, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 72 Mo. 198 .] The contention that there can be no de facto officer when there is no office does not apply here since the office, the place or function filled by the one presiding over the deliberations of the body, Avas in existence and was filled

1919To hold that the contractqr doing work under an ordinance thus supported and authenticated, must lose his work and the whole thing be declared void, would, we think, he a narrow and harsh rule. [Porter v. Boyd Paving and Construction Co., 214 Mo. 1, 14 .] We do not think the ordinance was rendered void, since the charter does not so provide. [State ex rel. v. Wilder, 211 Mo. 305, 317 ; City of St.

1919To hold that the contractqr doing work under an ordinance thus supported and authenticated, must lose his work and the whole thing be declared void, would, we think, he a narrow and harsh rule. [Porter v. Boyd Paving and Construction Co., 214 Mo. 1, 14 .] We do not think the ordinance was rendered void, since the charter does not so provide. [State ex rel. v. Wilder, 211 Mo. 305, 317 ; City of St.

1919Louis v. Foster, 52 .Mo. 513, 515.] [See, also, Newcombe v. Kramer, 189 Mo. App. 538, 541 ; Pacific Railroad v. The Governor, 23 Mo. 353, 364 ; City of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1, 8 .] Again the principle of the validity of the acts of a de facto officer should, we think, apply here. [Adams v. Lindell, 6 Mo. App.. 197, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 72 Mo. 198 .] The contention that there can be no de facto officer when there is no office does not apply here since the office, the place or function filled by the one presiding over the deliberations of the body, Avas in existence and was filled

1911A substantial compliance with the statute is all that is required. [Payne v. King, 141 Mo. App. 246, 249 ; 124 S. W. 1066 .] And “a copy substantially true, so that the creditors of the mortgagor or subsequent purchasers in good faith may not be misled, to their detriment”, is sufficient. [Bank v. Brecheisen, 65 Kan. 807, 810 .] The purpose of the statute in requiring a copy to be filed is to give notice to creditors and others afterwards dealing with the property, that it is covered by the mortgage, and apprise them of the exact interest of the mortgagee and the extent of the retained title o

1911A substantial compliance with the statute is all that is required. [Payne v. King, 141 Mo. App. 246, 249 ; 124 S. W. 1066 .] And “a copy substantially true, so that the creditors of the mortgagor or subsequent purchasers in good faith may not be misled, to their detriment”, is sufficient. [Bank v. Brecheisen, 65 Kan. 807, 810 .] The purpose of the statute in requiring a copy to be filed is to give notice to creditors and others afterwards dealing with the property, that it is covered by the mortgage, and apprise them of the exact interest of the mortgagee and the extent of the retained title o

1911A substantial compliance with the statute is all that is required. [Payne v. King, 141 Mo. App. 246, 249 ; 124 S. W. 1066 .] And “a copy substantially true, so that the creditors of the mortgagor or subsequent purchasers in good faith may not be misled, to their detriment”, is sufficient. [Bank v. Brecheisen, 65 Kan. 807, 810 .] The purpose of the statute in requiring a copy to be filed is to give notice to creditors and others afterwards dealing with the property, that it is covered by the mortgage, and apprise them of the exact interest of the mortgagee and the extent of the retained title o

1910Our own Supreme Court has adhered to this rule. [Bank v. Bank, 107 Mo. 402 , 17 S. W. 982 .] In all these years no court has ever tried to justify this harsh rule upon any other ground than that of necessity.

1910At common law, originally, any permanent improvements placed upon the land of another by one having no interest or title therein without the owner’s consent prima facie became a part of the realty and belonged to the owner of the fee. [22 Cyc., p. 7; Stump v. Hornback, 109 Mo. 272, 278 , 18 S. W. 37 .] But the harsh rule thus expressed has become considerably modified in timé through the commingling of just principles of equity.