harsh rule in Hawaii

2003Id.; Saranillio, 78 Hawai'i at 9 , 889 P.2d at 693 ; 1941 Haw.

1995It provides that the release of one joint tortfeasor, rather than wiping out the injured party’s claim against other joint tortfeasors, merely reduces that claim by the amount paid for the release or the pro rata share of liability of the releasee, whichever is greater. [7] Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 67 Haw. 157, 163 , 683 P.2d 389, 393 , reconsideration denied 67 Haw. 683 , 744 P.2d 779 (1984) (emphasis added); see also Saranillio v. Silva, 78 Hawai'i, 1, 4, 12-15 , 889 P.2d 685, 688, 696-99 (1995) (Hawaii’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act abrogates common law release ru

1995It provides that the release of one joint tortfeasor, rather than wiping out the injured party’s claim against other joint tortfeasors, merely reduces that claim by the amount paid for the release or the pro rata share of liability of the releasee, whichever is greater. [7] Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 67 Haw. 157, 163 , 683 P.2d 389, 393 , reconsideration denied 67 Haw. 683 , 744 P.2d 779 (1984) (emphasis added); see also Saranillio v. Silva, 78 Hawai'i, 1, 4, 12-15 , 889 P.2d 685, 688, 696-99 (1995) (Hawaii’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act abrogates common law release ru

1982See, e.g., Avco Community Developers v. South Coast Regional Commission, 17 Cal.3d 785 , 553 P.2d 546 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977) (statutory mandate); Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App.2d 255 , 53 Cal. Rptr. 7 , cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966) (valid building permit is threshold requirement for establishing vested right); Steuart Petroleum v. Board of County Commissioners, 276 *339 Md. 435, 443-44, 347 A.2d 854, 860 (1975); Brett v. Building Commissioner, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N.E. 269 (1924) (sustaining revocation of buildin

1982See, e.g., Avco Community Developers v. South Coast Regional Commission, 17 Cal.3d 785 , 553 P.2d 546 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977) (statutory mandate); Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App.2d 255 , 53 Cal. Rptr. 7 , cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966) (valid building permit is threshold requirement for establishing vested right); Steuart Petroleum v. Board of County Commissioners, 276 *339 Md. 435, 443-44, 347 A.2d 854, 860 (1975); Brett v. Building Commissioner, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N.E. 269 (1924) (sustaining revocation of buildin

1982See, e.g., Avco Community Developers v. South Coast Regional Commission, 17 Cal.3d 785 , 553 P.2d 546 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977) (statutory mandate); Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App.2d 255 , 53 Cal. Rptr. 7 , cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966) (valid building permit is threshold requirement for establishing vested right); Steuart Petroleum v. Board of County Commissioners, 276 *339 Md. 435, 443-44, 347 A.2d 854, 860 (1975); Brett v. Building Commissioner, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N.E. 269 (1924) (sustaining revocation of buildin

1982See, e.g., Avco Community Developers v. South Coast Regional Commission, 17 Cal.3d 785 , 553 P.2d 546 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977) (statutory mandate); Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App.2d 255 , 53 Cal. Rptr. 7 , cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966) (valid building permit is threshold requirement for establishing vested right); Steuart Petroleum v. Board of County Commissioners, 276 *339 Md. 435, 443-44, 347 A.2d 854, 860 (1975); Brett v. Building Commissioner, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N.E. 269 (1924) (sustaining revocation of buildin

1982See, e.g., Avco Community Developers v. South Coast Regional Commission, 17 Cal.3d 785 , 553 P.2d 546 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977) (statutory mandate); Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App.2d 255 , 53 Cal. Rptr. 7 , cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966) (valid building permit is threshold requirement for establishing vested right); Steuart Petroleum v. Board of County Commissioners, 276 *339 Md. 435, 443-44, 347 A.2d 854, 860 (1975); Brett v. Building Commissioner, 250 Mass. 73 , 145 N.E. 269 (1924) (sustaining revocation of buildin

1967To hold otherwise, under circumstances of this kind, would indeed be a harsh rule and prevent relief to an injured party who was without notice during the statutory period of any negligent act that might cause injury." I would adopt the rule followed by Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 , wherein it states that a claim for malpractice accrues when the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the acts constituting the alleged malpractice.

1967To hold otherwise, under circumstances of this kind, would indeed be a harsh rule and prevent relief to an injured party who was without notice during the statutory period of any negligent act that might cause injury.” I would adopt the rule followed by Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 , wherein it states that a claim for malpractice accrues when the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the acts constituting the alleged malpractice.

1927In De France v. Johnson, 26 Fed. 891, 894 , referring to annulment of a void marriage and to the fact that the statutes of Minnesota gave no validity to the claim of the wife, although she was in ignorance of a former wife living, the court said that “she is subject to the harsh rule which declares a second marriage ipso facto void, and denies to her any right in Johnson’s” (the husband’s) “estate” and spoke of this as the injustice of “a rule of the common law which subjects the innocent party to the harsh consequences of such a connection.” In Carpenter v. Smith, 24 Ia. 200, 202 , the court

1927In De France v. Johnson, 26 Fed. 891, 894 , referring to annulment of a void marriage and to the fact that the statutes of Minnesota gave no validity to the claim of the wife, although she was in ignorance of a former wife living, the court said that “she is subject to the harsh rule which declares a second marriage ipso facto void, and denies to her any right in Johnson’s” (the husband’s) “estate” and spoke of this as the injustice of “a rule of the common law which subjects the innocent party to the harsh consequences of such a connection.” In Carpenter v. Smith, 24 Ia. 200, 202 , the court

1925The court is, therefore, unanimous in the opinion, that this exception cannot be maintained.” In the case of Ward v. Steam Boat Little Red, 7 Mo. 582, the court said at *442 page 584: “The rule in England, then, is, to say the least, a harsh rule, and adopted for reasons which have no applicability here.

1924The revisors of 1849 proposed to change this harsh rule, and reported a section for that purpose, which has since been enlarged and carried into the section quoted from the present Code.” In Ashby v. Ashby, 46 Atl. 522, 527 , a beneficiary under a will was given the privilege to continue to occupy a mill under a requirement that he keep it in good repair, and the supreme court of New Jersey said: “The terms imposed upon the complainant by his father’s will, under which .he continued to hold the property, and was in possession at the time the work was done, obliged him, as stated, to ‘keep the

1923Otherwise a situation would be presented where nobody could recover it.” To hold, however, that the legal title to the whole of a judgment remains in the original judgment creditor even after he has assigned a part interest therein is not to say that the assignee may not, in a proper case, resort to the courts for aid in the enforcement of his equitable interest when it appears that such interest is being denied, for, notwithstanding the harsh rule enunciated in Burnett v. Crandall, supra, by the weight of authority, an assignee of a part of a judgment may in certain cases enforce his interest

1923See Railway v. Volkert et al., 58 Ohio St. 362, where that court said: “This right is not enforceable in a suit at law at the instance of the assignee against the judgment debtor, only, but may be enforced in equity.” Or as expressed in Grain v. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514 : “An assignment of part only of an entire demand is void at law, unless done with the consent of the debtor; but such an assignment is valid in equity without the consent of the debtor.” In the present case the contention of defendant is that the plaintiff Arnold having assigned a part interest in the judgment to Brown, he should