harsh rule in Connecticut

2010If contributory negligence is relied upon as a defense, it shall be affirmatively pleaded by the defendant or defendants, and the burden of proving such contributory negligence shall rest upon the defendant or defendants.” Practice Book § 10-53 similarly provides: “If contributory negligence is relied upon as a defense, it shall be affirmatively pleaded by the defendant and the defendant shall specify the negligent acts or omissions on which the defendant relies.” Our Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he central purpose of [§ 52-572h] was to replace the harsh rule that contributory neglige

2010If contributory negligence is relied upon as a defense, it shall be affirmatively pleaded by the defendant or defendants, and the burden of proving such contributory negligence shall rest upon the defendant or defendants.” Practice Book § 10-53 similarly provides: “If contributory negligence is relied upon as a defense, it shall be affirmatively pleaded by the defendant and the defendant shall specify the negligent acts or omissions on which the defendant relies.” Our Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he central purpose of [§ 52-572h] was to replace the harsh rule that contributory neglige

1997"Many authorities . . . make the owner an insurer against damage done by a mischievous or vicious domestic animal in the same way as against damage done by an animal ferae naturae. 1 There are expressions in Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121 , which seem to sanction this doctrine, but at least since Baldwin v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 113 , if not always, our law has not adopted CT Page 2038 this harsh doctrine.

1914There are expressions in Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121 , which seem to sanction this doctrine, but at least since Baldwin v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 113 , if not always, our law has not adopted this harsh doctrine.

1997"Many authorities . . . make the owner an insurer against damage done by a mischievous or vicious domestic animal in the same way as against damage done by an animal ferae naturae. 1 There are expressions in Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121 , which seem to sanction this doctrine, but at least since Baldwin v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 113 , if not always, our law has not adopted CT Page 2038 this harsh doctrine.

1914There are expressions in Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121 , which seem to sanction this doctrine, but at least since Baldwin v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 113 , if not always, our law has not adopted this harsh doctrine.

1996Such a harsh rule serves no useful purpose when the putative fiduciary can be clearly identified by name, is appointed within a relatively short time and the appointment is confirmed by amendment filed within thirty days of the return date under General Statutes § 52-128 and Practice Book § 175; Shokite v. Perez , 19 Conn. App. 203 , 205 (1989); California Microwave-Telecom v. State of Connecticut, et al. , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford Docket No. 552196 (September 8, 1995, Corradino J., 15 Conn. L.

1996Such a harsh rule serves no useful purpose when the putative fiduciary can be clearly identified by name, is appointed within a relatively short time and the appointment is confirmed by amendment filed within thirty days of the return date under General Statutes § 52-128 and Practice Book § 175; Shokite v. Perez , 19 Conn. App. 203 , 205 (1989); California Microwave-Telecom v. State of Connecticut, et al. , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford Docket No. 552196 (September 8, 1995, Corradino J., 15 Conn. L.

1995Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., supra, 318 U.S. at 60 .

1994Connecticut has adopted in Sheets and Magnan the doctrine that an action would lie against the employer where the reason for the discharge involves "impropriety derived from some important violation of public policy," 179 Conn. at page 475 .

1994Under our statute on comparative negligence, negligence attributable to the plaintiff is not a complete bar to his recovery if such negligence is not greater than that of the defendant(s). [ Acompora v. Asselin ], 179 Conn. 425 , 426 (1980).

1993This is a determination of reasonable fees under a contract, however, so that this court need not follow the harsh rule first announced in New York Association of Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2nd Cir. 1983) and apparently adopted in Tedesco, supra. The court does, however, exercise its discretion to reduce the requested fees by 25% for the failure of the plaintiff to submit appropriate records.

1993This is a determination of reasonable fees under a contract, however, so that this court need not follow the harsh rule first announced in New York Association of Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2nd Cir. 1983) and apparently adopted in Tedesco, supra. The court does, however, exercise its discretion to reduce the requested fees by 25% for the failure of the plaintiff to submit appropriate records.

1986In addition, the court will specifically, but in a summary manner, rule on each special defense.* 11 A FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSE — SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY The harsh doctrine of sovereign immunity was relaxed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Sentner *402 v. Board of Trustees, 184 Conn. 339 , 439 A.2d 1033 (1981).

1986In addition, the court will specifically, but in a summary manner, rule on each special defense.* 11 A FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSE — SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY The harsh doctrine of sovereign immunity was relaxed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Sentner *402 v. Board of Trustees, 184 Conn. 339 , 439 A.2d 1033 (1981).

1968National Transportation Co. v. Toquet, 123 Conn. 468, 479 ; 25 Am.

1955While the doctrine of the leading case, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 , has been followed in a number of jurisdictions, it is a harsh doctrine and has brought unfortunate results.