harsh rule in California

2020Under the discovery rule, accrual of a qualifying cause of action is postponed “until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action, until, that is, [the plaintiff] at least suspects, or has reason to suspect, a factual basis for its elements.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 389 .) Or, put another way, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until “the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110 .) “‘The policy

2017"Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at 'the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.' [Citations.] An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the 'discovery rule,' which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action." ( Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797 , 806-807, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d 914 ( Fox ).) " 'The policy reason behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire bef

2017"Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at 'the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.' [Citations.] An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the 'discovery rule,' which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action." ( Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797 , 806-807, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d 914 ( Fox ).) " 'The policy reason behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire bef

2017"Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at 'the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.' [Citations.] An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the 'discovery rule,' which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action." ( Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797 , 806-807, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d 914 ( Fox ).) " 'The policy reason behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire bef

2017"Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at 'the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.' [Citations.] An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the 'discovery rule,' which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action." ( Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797 , 806-807, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d 914 ( Fox ).) " 'The policy reason behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire bef

2017"Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at 'the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.' [Citations.] An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the 'discovery rule,' which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action." ( Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797 , 806-807, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d 914 ( Fox ).) " 'The policy reason behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire bef

2024Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 90, 101 ; see also Glendale Fed., supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 138 [“Election of remedies is a harsh doctrine and is currently looked upon with disfavor by courts and commentators.”].) 21 his claim for damages to the exclusion of his claim for specific performance.

2023Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 101, 137, 138 [“the doctrine of election of remedies, bottomed upon the equitable principle of estoppel, operates only where pursuit of alternative and inconsistent remedies substantially prejudices the defendant”; “[e]lection of remedies is a harsh doctrine and is currently looked upon with disfavor by courts and commentators”].)3 Here, of course, Cooper occasioned no injury to Grady or Reliant and gained no advantage over them in the course of the litigation.

1975Thus the rule of Judson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.2d 11, 13-14 [ 129 P.2d 361 ], that a motion to dismiss under the five-year provision of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure constitutes a general appearance because the motion invokes affirmative action of the court to terminate the litigation, was overruled in Goodwine v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d 481, 484-485 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 407 P.2d 1 ], where the Supreme Court held that a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, coupled with a challenge to its jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, does not constitute

1975Thus the rule of Judson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.2d 11, 13-14 [ 129 P.2d 361 ], that a motion to dismiss under the five-year provision of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure constitutes a general appearance because the motion invokes affirmative action of the court to terminate the litigation, was overruled in Goodwine v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d 481, 484-485 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 407 P.2d 1 ], where the Supreme Court held that a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, coupled with a challenge to its jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, does not constitute

1975Thus the rule of Judson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.2d 11, 13-14 [ 129 P.2d 361 ], that a motion to dismiss under the five-year provision of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure constitutes a general appearance because the motion invokes affirmative action of the court to terminate the litigation, was overruled in Goodwine v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d 481, 484-485 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 407 P.2d 1 ], where the Supreme Court held that a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, coupled with a challenge to its jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, does not constitute

1975Thus the rule of Judson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.2d 11, 13-14 [ 129 P.2d 361 ], that a motion to dismiss under the five-year provision of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure constitutes a general appearance because the motion invokes affirmative action of the court to terminate the litigation, was overruled in Goodwine v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d 481, 484-485 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 407 P.2d 1 ], where the Supreme Court held that a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, coupled with a challenge to its jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, does not constitute

2024Cal. 2010) 733 F.Supp.2d 1134 , 1140– 10 1144.) In contrast, defendants have not cited any case stating the discovery rule does not apply to the CLRA.4 Further, CLRA claims are the type of claim to which the discovery rule is generally applied. “‘The policy reason behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire before a plaintiff has or should have learned of the latent injury and its cause.’” (Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 788 , 797–798.) Thus, it “most frequently applies when it is particularly di

2020Under the discovery rule, accrual of a qualifying cause of action is postponed “until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action, until, that is, [the plaintiff] at least suspects, or has reason to suspect, a factual basis for its elements.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 389 .) Or, put another way, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until “the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110 .) “‘The policy

2017This is done " 'to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire before a plaintiff has or should have learned of the latent injury and its cause.' [Citation.]" ( Pooshs , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 797-798, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 578 , 250 P.3d 181 , quoting Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 520 , 531, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 , 941 P.2d 71 .) For example, courts have implied a discovery rule for the three-year statute of limitations ( Code Civ.

2017This is done " 'to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire before a plaintiff has or should have learned of the latent injury and its cause.' [Citation.]" ( Pooshs , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 797-798, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 578 , 250 P.3d 181 , quoting Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 520 , 531, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 , 941 P.2d 71 .) For example, courts have implied a discovery rule for the three-year statute of limitations ( Code Civ.

2024Cal. 2010) 733 F.Supp.2d 1134 , 1140– 10 1144.) In contrast, defendants have not cited any case stating the discovery rule does not apply to the CLRA.4 Further, CLRA claims are the type of claim to which the discovery rule is generally applied. “‘The policy reason behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire before a plaintiff has or should have learned of the latent injury and its cause.’” (Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 788 , 797–798.) Thus, it “most frequently applies when it is particularly di

2020Under the discovery rule, accrual of a qualifying cause of action is postponed “until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action, until, that is, [the plaintiff] at least suspects, or has reason to suspect, a factual basis for its elements.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 389 .) Or, put another way, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until “the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110 .) “‘The policy

2020Under the discovery rule, accrual of a qualifying cause of action is postponed “until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action, until, that is, [the plaintiff] at least suspects, or has reason to suspect, a factual basis for its elements.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 389 .) Or, put another way, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until “the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110 .) “‘The policy

2011(Id. at p. 398; see also Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110-1111 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 751 P.2d 923 ].) “The policy reason *798 behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire before a plaintiff has or should have learned of the latent injury and its cause.” (Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 520, 531 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 , 941 P.2d 71 ].) Ill Defendants’ core argument is that plaintiff’s 1989-diagnosed COPD, either alone or in combination with the 1990- or 1991-diagnosed period

2006The “no reasonable effort” clause provides a means of mitigating a harsh rule that would allow the court to deny services based only upon the parent’s prior failure to reunify with the child’s sibling “when the parent had in fact, in the meantime, worked toward correcting the underlying problems.” (In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831 , 842 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ].) In Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 ], the Court of Appeal observed the “ ‘reasonable effort to treat’ standard [under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10),] is not synonymous wi

2006The “no reasonable effort” clause provides a means of mitigating a harsh rule that would allow the court to deny services based only upon the parent’s prior failure to reunify with the child’s sibling “when the parent had in fact, in the meantime, worked toward correcting the underlying problems.” (In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831 , 842 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ].) In Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 ], the Court of Appeal observed the “ ‘reasonable effort to treat’ standard [under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10),] is not synonymous wi

1939Quoting with approval from the case of Piitman v. Carstenbrook, 11 Cal. App. 224 [ 104 Pac. 699 ], it is said in the Goss case: “ ‘It would be a very harsh rule to hold that by following the statute the defendant waives a privilege conferred by the statute. ...

1939Quoting with approval from the case of Piitman v. Carstenbrook, 11 Cal. App. 224 [ 104 Pac. 699 ], it is said in the Goss case: “ ‘It would be a very harsh rule to hold that by following the statute the defendant waives a privilege conferred by the statute. ...

2026Since 1981, the statute has specifically provided that “[n]o affidavit or declaration of merits shall be required of the moving party.” (§ 473, subd. (b); see Uriarte v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 780, 789 .) As explained in Uriarte, the addition of this language in 1981 made clear that a movant need not show “ ‘a meritorious case or defense, so that a different result might possibly be reached if the judgment or order was vacated.’ ” (Uriarte, at p. 789.) And in general, “ ‘a hearing on a motion to relieve a defendant from default is not the place or time to ascert

2011(Id. at p. 398; see also Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110-1111 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 751 P.2d 923 ].) “The policy reason *798 behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire before a plaintiff has or should have learned of the latent injury and its cause.” (Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 520, 531 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 , 941 P.2d 71 ].) Ill Defendants’ core argument is that plaintiff’s 1989-diagnosed COPD, either alone or in combination with the 1990- or 1991-diagnosed period