12 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1892–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hyler v. Garnergreen2 sentences2023Evid. 5.408(a)(2), (b); see also Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Iowa 1996) (“Rule [5.]408 requires the exclusion of evidence of settlement negotiations offered solely to prove or disprove liability or damages.”). 2023Evid. 5.408(a)(2), (b); see also Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Iowa 1996) (“Rule [5.]408 requires the exclusion of evidence of settlement negotiations offered solely to prove or disprove liability or damages.”). | 2 | 2 |
Vetter v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See Vetter v. State, No. 16-0208, 2017 WL 2181191, at *10 (Iowa Ct. App. May 17, 2017) (“We need not decide whether the instruction was a proper statement of law because the instruction was inapplicable to the facts of Vetter’s case.”); Butcher v. City of Mason City, No. 13–1622, 2014 WL 6681033 , at *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2014) (affirming rejection of proposed instruction because, among other reasons, the applicable law was stated in other instructions). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Smith, 739 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Iowa 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Component Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2000The stipulation and consent order was therefore “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim,” and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that “the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim” (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc 2000The stipulation and consent order was therefore "motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim," and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that "the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim" (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc | 1 | 1 |
Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., Inc.green2 sentences2000The stipulation and consent order was therefore “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim,” and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that “the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim” (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc 2000The stipulation and consent order was therefore "motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim," and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that "the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim" (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc | 1 | 1 |
cluster 400168green2 sentences2000The stipulation and consent order was therefore “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim,” and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that “the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim” (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc 2000The stipulation and consent order was therefore "motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim," and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that "the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim" (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc | 1 | 1 |
cluster 611572green2 sentences2000The stipulation and consent order was therefore “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim,” and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that “the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim” (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc 2000The stipulation and consent order was therefore "motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim," and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that "the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim" (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc | 1 | 1 |
Pinter v. Dahlgreen2 sentences2000The stipulation and consent order was therefore “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim,” and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that “the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim” (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc 2000The stipulation and consent order was therefore “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim,” and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that “the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim” (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc | 1 | 1 |
Rowe v. Barnesgreen2 sentences1980As we. said in Rowe v. Barnes, 101 Iowa 302, 306 , 70 N.W. 197, 198 (1897) (citations omitted): It is well settled that such a [sufficient] consideration exists when a note is given to compromise or settle a disputed claim, the validity of which is doubtful. 1980As we. said in Rowe v. Barnes, 101 Iowa 302, 306 , 70 N.W. 197, 198 (1897) (citations omitted): It is well settled that such a [sufficient] consideration exists when a note is given to compromise or settle a disputed claim, the validity of which is doubtful. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hallett Construction Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission
green
2 sentences1966Appellant resisted the motion for summary judgment on the ground damages were unliquidated because “it is a disputed claim.” The claim may be disputed but the suit is for a sum certain specified in the agreement as “liquidated damages.” “A claim is liquidated when the amount thereof has been ascertained and agreed upon by the parties or fixed by operation of law.” Hallett Construction Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 258 Iowa 520, 528 , 139 N.W.2d 421, 426 . 1966Appellant resisted the motion for summary judgment on the ground damages were unliquidated because “it is a disputed claim.” The claim may be disputed but the suit is for a sum certain specified in the agreement as “liquidated damages.” “A claim is liquidated when the amount thereof has been ascertained and agreed upon by the parties or fixed by operation of law.” Hallett Construction Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 258 Iowa 520, 528 , 139 N.W.2d 421, 426 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Rounds v. Butler
neutral
2 sentences1937In this view, the comment we made in Rounds v. Butler, 207 Iowa 735 , at page 737, 223 N. W. 487, 488 , fits the present situation: “The claim of the plaintiff is that this note was given as a compromise and settlement of a disputed claim between him and the defendant. 1937In this view, the comment we made in Rounds v. Butler, 207 Iowa 735 , at page 737, 223 N. W. 487, 488 , fits the present situation: “The claim of the plaintiff is that this note was given as a compromise and settlement of a disputed claim between him and the defendant. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Garner v. Fry
green
1 sentence1929Garner v. Fry, 104 Iowa 515 ; Anderson v. Cameron, 122 Iowa 183 . | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Anderson v. Cameron
neutral
1 sentence1929Garner v. Fry, 104 Iowa 515 ; Anderson v. Cameron, 122 Iowa 183 . | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Jackson v. Bruns
neutral
1 sentence1912If such was the intent of the parties, all that was required to accomplish it was the execution, delivery, and acceptance of a simple unconditional conveyance of the second story of the building, and, had this been done, then, under the rule applied in Jackson v. Bruns, supra, the appellee’s position would be impregnable. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Payne v. State Board of Wagon Road Commissioners
neutral
1 sentence1907Payne v. Board of Wagonroad Commissioners, 4 Idaho, 384 ( 39 Pac. 548 ; State v. Merrell, 43 Neb. 575 ( 61 N. W. 754 ) ; State v. Commissioners, 26 Ohio St. 364 . | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Griffiths v. Montandon
neutral
1 sentence1907Payne v. Board of Wagonroad Commissioners, 4 Idaho, 384 ( 39 Pac. 548 ; State v. Merrell, 43 Neb. 575 ( 61 N. W. 754 ) ; State v. Commissioners, 26 Ohio St. 364 . | 1 | 1907–1907 |
State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Merrell
green
2 sentences1907Payne v. Board of Wagonroad Commissioners, 4 Idaho, 384 ( 39 Pac. 548 ; State v. Merrell, 43 Neb. 575 ( 61 N. W. 754 ) ; State v. Commissioners, 26 Ohio St. 364 . 1907Payne v. Board of Wagonroad Commissioners, 4 Idaho, 384 ( 39 Pac. 548 ; State v. Merrell, 43 Neb. 575 ( 61 N. W. 754 ) ; State v. Commissioners, 26 Ohio St. 364 . | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Keefe v. Vogle
green
1 sentence1892Keefe v. Vogle, 36 Iowa, 87 . | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.