disputed claim in Oregon

1983It is well settled that “one who accepts and cashes a check which purports by notation or by the terms upon which it was tendered to be in full satisfaction of a disputed claim between the parties has accepted the payment on those terms.” Edgley v. Jackson, 276 Or 213, 218 , 554 P2d 476 (1976).

1983It is well settled that “one who accepts and cashes a check which purports by notation or by the terms upon which it was tendered to be in full satisfaction of a disputed claim between the parties has accepted the payment on those terms.” Edgley v. Jackson, 276 Or 213, 218 , 554 P2d 476 (1976).

1983This rule applies even when the amount tendered is no greater than the debtor admits he owes, Kilander v. Blickle Co., supra, 280 Or at 427 ; or when the creditor does not intend that his act of cashing the check constitute an acceptance of a lesser amount as full payment, Coover v. G & J Electric, 285 Or 247, 251 , 590 P2d 720 (1979); Schumacher v. Moffit, 71 Or 79, 83 , 142 P 353 (1914), or when the creditor asserts to the debtor that the check is received only in part payment. 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1279 (1962).

1983This rule applies even when the amount tendered is no greater than the debtor admits he owes, Kilander v. Blickle Co., supra, 280 Or at 427 ; or when the creditor does not intend that his act of cashing the check constitute an acceptance of a lesser amount as full payment, Coover v. G & J Electric, 285 Or 247, 251 , 590 P2d 720 (1979); Schumacher v. Moffit, 71 Or 79, 83 , 142 P 353 (1914), or when the creditor asserts to the debtor that the check is received only in part payment. 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1279 (1962).

2025Treating the benefits as “suspended” pending reso- lution of a disputed claim is consistent with our observation 282 Teitelman v. SAIF in Armstrong that an injury is compensable “from the moment of its occurrence, even if the insurer denies that the injury is compensable[.]” 328 Or at 159 .

2025Treating the benefits as “suspended” pending reso- lution of a disputed claim is consistent with our observation 282 Teitelman v. SAIF in Armstrong that an injury is compensable “from the moment of its occurrence, even if the insurer denies that the injury is compensable[.]” 328 Or at 159 .

1989Holder v. Harris et al, 121 Or 432, 441 , 253 P 869 (1927).

1939Holder v. Harris, et al., 121 Or. 432, 441 , 248 P. 145 , 253 P. 869 , 870, and authorities there cited.

1983This rule applies even when the amount tendered is no greater than the debtor admits he owes, Kilander v. Blickle Co., supra, 280 Or at 427 ; or when the creditor does not intend that his act of cashing the check constitute an acceptance of a lesser amount as full payment, Coover v. G & J Electric, 285 Or 247, 251 , 590 P2d 720 (1979); Schumacher v. Moffit, 71 Or 79, 83 , 142 P 353 (1914), or when the creditor asserts to the debtor that the check is received only in part payment. 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1279 (1962).

1979The defense is also made out "when a debtor tenders payment upon condition that it is accepted as discharging a disputed or unliquidated debt, and the creditor accepts the payment upon this condition * * Kilander v. Blickle Co., 280 Or 425, 429 , 571 P2d 503 (1977).

1917In Flagg v. Columbia County, 51 Or. 172 ( 94 Pac. 184 ), it was ruled that a writ of review was the only remedy for the re-examination of a discretionary order of a County Court in fixing reasonable fees not prescribed by law, and that such remedy might he invoked to litigate a disputed claim therefor against a county after its presentation and refusal of payment.

1917In Flagg v. Columbia County, 51 Or. 172 ( 94 Pac. 184 ), it was ruled that a writ of review was the only remedy for the re-examination of a discretionary order of a County Court in fixing reasonable fees not prescribed by law, and that such remedy might he invoked to litigate a disputed claim therefor against a county after its presentation and refusal of payment.

2024Defendant compares this case to State v. Chitwood, 370 Or 305 , 518 P3d 903 (2022), arguing that the disputed error occurred during the prosecutor’s rebut- tal, affording the defense no opportunity to respond.

2024Defendant compares this case to State v. Chitwood, 370 Or 305 , 518 P3d 903 (2022), arguing that the disputed error occurred during the prosecutor’s rebut- tal, affording the defense no opportunity to respond.

2021Id. at 253 .

2019App. 582 , 590, 60 P.3d 1147 (2003) (noting that Oregon appellate courts have generally "equated 'tender' for purposes of ORS 20.080 with 'settlement offer' "), and the dissent fails to explain how an employer could force a former employee to accept payment on a disputed claim.

2013In affirming, we noted that, in addition to giving the disputed instruction, the trial court had instructed the jury on criminal negligence “using language nearly identical to that used in [ORS 161.085(10)].” 49 Or App at 54 .

2012That test required a determination whether the plaintiff had suffered an injury that was “separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders.” Tooley, 845 A2d at 1035 (citing Moran v. Household Int’l.

2009And, as in Poole, “nothing in the record, including the other instructions given, suggests that the jury was not so misled.” 175 Or App at 264 .

2008ORS 305.100 provides, in part: "The Department of Revenue shall: (1) Make such rules and regulations it deems proper to regulate its own procedure and to effectually carry out the purposes for which it is constituted." 4 Article I , section 20 , of the Oregon Constitution provides: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." 5 It should be noted that the Tanner court, while adhering to this distinction, also cautioned that the "case law on that point is not entirely consis

2005Hanson v. Versarail Systems, Inc., 175 Or App 92, 100 , 28 P3d 626 (2001) (respondeat superior permits imposition of liability on innocent employer for wrongdoing of servant).

2005Hanson v. Versarail Systems, Inc., 175 Or App 92, 100 , 28 P3d 626 (2001) (respondeat superior permits imposition of liability on innocent employer for wrongdoing of servant).

2002Herrell v. Johnson, 136 Or App 68, 74 , 899 P2d 759 (1995).

2002Herrell v. Johnson, 136 Or App 68, 74 , 899 P2d 759 (1995).

2002As support for that “matter of law” proposition, defendant invokes State v. Burns, 15 Or App 552, 562 , 516 P2d 748 (1973), rev den (1984) (With respect to self defense, and limitations on the use of self defense, “[t]he threat of deadly force does not constitute the use of deadly physical force.”).

2002As support for that “matter of law” proposition, defendant invokes State v. Burns, 15 Or App 552, 562 , 516 P2d 748 (1973), rev den (1984) (With respect to self defense, and limitations on the use of self defense, “[t]he threat of deadly force does not constitute the use of deadly physical force.”).

1998DiTommaso Realty, Inc. v. Moak Motorcycles, Inc., 309 Or 190, 195 , 785 P2d 343 (1990).

1998DiTommaso Realty, Inc. v. Moak Motorcycles, Inc., 309 Or 190, 195 , 785 P2d 343 (1990).

1992Defendant argues, in essence, that the use of the challenged instruction defining reasonable doubt is prejudicial error because it allowed the jury to base its verdict on moral standards or considerations (or, as the majority states, on "the perceived moral reprehensibility of defendant," 313 Or. at 35 , 828 P.2d at 1016 , rather than on a dispassionate weighing of the evidence to determine whether the state has proved its case. [1] Defendant asserts that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the disputed instruction to permit a finding of guilt on a level of persuasion less than is requir

1992Defendant argues, in essence, that the use of the challenged instruction defining reasonable doubt is prejudicial error because it allowed the jury to base its verdict on moral standards or considerations (or, as the majority states, on "the perceived moral reprehensibility of defendant," 313 Or. at 35 , 828 P.2d at 1016 , rather than on a dispassionate weighing of the evidence to determine whether the state has proved its case. [1] Defendant asserts that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the disputed instruction to permit a finding of guilt on a level of persuasion less than is requir