disputed claim in Massachusetts

2010Sherman v. Sidman, 300 Mass. 102, 105-106 (1938).

2009Sherman v. Sidman, 300 Mass. 102, 106 (1938).

1983In Wong v. Paisner, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 901 (decided June 25, 1982), the Court ruled that “It is settled that acceptance and deposit of a check offered in full payment of a disputed claim (constitutes) an accord and satisfaction and bars an attempt to collect any balance outstanding under a contract.” See also Worcester Color Co. v. Henry Wood’s Sons, 209 Mass. 105, 109 (1911); and Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co. 216 Mass. 204, 206 (1913).

1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber

1983In Wong v. Paisner, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 901 (decided June 25, 1982), the Court ruled that “It is settled that acceptance and deposit of a check offered in full payment of a disputed claim (constitutes) an accord and satisfaction and bars an attempt to collect any balance outstanding under a contract.” See also Worcester Color Co. v. Henry Wood’s Sons, 209 Mass. 105, 109 (1911); and Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co. 216 Mass. 204, 206 (1913).

1982Worcester Color Co. v. Henry Wood’s Sons, 209 Mass. 105, 109 (1911).

1954See Wagstaff v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 322 Mass. 664 .

1954See Wagstaff v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 322 Mass. 664 .

2011Or as stated above, “[ajttomey’s fees under Ch. 231, §6F are not compensation resulting from the injury [or harm] giving rise to the cause of action, but is compensation for the effort of defending against the disputed claim.” Ben, 47 Mass.App.Ct. at 813 .

2010Either way, proceedings on a § 6F motion “may not commence until there has been ‘a finding, verdict, decision, award, order or judgment’ on the disputed claim or defense, presumably in favor of the party against whom it was made.” Ben, supra at 813 , quoting from G.

2025See Wong v. Paisner, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 924 (1982) ("acceptance and deposit of a check offered in full payment of a disputed claim constituted an accord and satisfaction and bar[red] an attempt to collect any balance outstanding").

2025See also Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 222 (1st Cir. 1999) ("accord and satisfaction requires a voluntary, mutually assented to exchange of money for a release").

2020Id.6 Lastly, several United States Courts of Appeals have held that, under the analogous Federal rule, "a dispute need not 'crystalize to the point of threatened litigation' for the . . . exclusion rule to apply." Weems v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 665 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2011), quoting Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 527 (3d Cir. 1995).

2020See Morea v. Cosco, Inc., 422 Mass. 601 , 603- 604 (1996); Marchand v. Murray, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 611, 615 (1989).

2020Id.6 Lastly, several United States Courts of Appeals have held that, under the analogous Federal rule, "a dispute need not 'crystalize to the point of threatened litigation' for the . . . exclusion rule to apply." Weems v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 665 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2011), quoting Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 527 (3d Cir. 1995).

2020See Morea v. Cosco, Inc., 422 Mass. 601 , 603- 604 (1996); Marchand v. Murray, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 611, 615 (1989).

2016Whether there has been an accord and satisfaction of the debt is a question of fact, Champlin v. Jackson, 313 Mass. 487, 489 (1943), on which Emigrant bears the burden of proof.

2009Because we owe deference to the board’s reasonable construction of its own ordinance, see Livoli v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Southborough, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 923 (1997), we conclude that the best course is to vacate the judgment of the Land Court in the enforcement appeal and remand to the board to allow it to construe its ordinance in the first instance.

2005As such, it is “to be given effect, even if the parties _did not have in mind all the wrongs which existed at the time of the release.” Id. at 597-98 (quoting from Schuster v. Baskin, 354 Mass. 137, 140 (1968)).

1984See Wokan v. Alladin Int’l, Inc., 485 F.2d 1232, 1235 (3d Cir. 1973).

1939See Prout v. Pittsfield Fire District, 154 Mass. 450 .

1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber

1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber

1938See Chamberlain v. Barrows, 282 Mass. 295, 299 ; Am.