disputed claim in California

1958The contest, therefore, is between the estate and a stranger to the estate, and the principle that the probate court may not try title applies.” In Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], it was said at page 14: “It is the general rule that the superior court while sitting in probate is without power to decide a disputed claim between an estate and a stranger thereto. ’ ’ In the present case Anne is not a personal representative of the estate, and, with respect to her adverse claim to the alleged joint tenancy property, she is not in privity with the estate but is a stra

1958The contest, therefore, is between the estate and a stranger to the estate, and the principle that the probate court may not try title applies.” In Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10 [ 285 P.2d 906 ], it was said at page 14: “It is the general rule that the superior court while sitting in probate is without power to decide a disputed claim between an estate and a stranger thereto. ’ ’ In the present case Anne is not a personal representative of the estate, and, with respect to her adverse claim to the alleged joint tenancy property, she is not in privity with the estate but is a stra

1964(Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 14 [285 P.2d 906]; Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 372 [ 273 P.2d 897 ]; Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 3, 8-9 [ 314 P.2d 10 ] ; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676 [ 234 P.2d 962 ] ; Estate of Helvey, 146 Cal.App.2d 662, 665 [ 303 P.2d 1076 ].) Accordingly, it is established that when title to property of an estate is claimed by heirs or other beneficiaries of the estate to belong to the estate, and is also claimed by the representative of the estate to belong to him in his individual capacity, the superior court sitting in probate ha

1964(Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 14 [285 P.2d 906]; Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 372 [ 273 P.2d 897 ]; Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 3, 8-9 [ 314 P.2d 10 ] ; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676 [ 234 P.2d 962 ] ; Estate of Helvey, 146 Cal.App.2d 662, 665 [ 303 P.2d 1076 ].) Accordingly, it is established that when title to property of an estate is claimed by heirs or other beneficiaries of the estate to belong to the estate, and is also claimed by the representative of the estate to belong to him in his individual capacity, the superior court sitting in probate ha

1961Thus in Lapp-Gifford Co. v. Muscoy Water Co. (1913), 166 Cal. 25 [ 134 P. 989 ], the Supreme Court said: “The great weight of authority in American courts undoubtedly supports the rule that where *363 the amount due is in dispute, and a check for an amount less than that claimed is sent to the creditor with a statement that it is sent in full satisfaction of the claim, and the tender is accompanied by such acts or declarations as amount to a condition that if the check is accepted at all it is accepted in full satisfaction of the disputed claim, and the creditor so understands, its acceptance

1961Thus in Lapp-Gifford Co. v. Muscoy Water Co. (1913), 166 Cal. 25 [ 134 P. 989 ], the Supreme Court said: “The great weight of authority in American courts undoubtedly supports the rule that where *363 the amount due is in dispute, and a check for an amount less than that claimed is sent to the creditor with a statement that it is sent in full satisfaction of the claim, and the tender is accompanied by such acts or declarations as amount to a condition that if the check is accepted at all it is accepted in full satisfaction of the disputed claim, and the creditor so understands, its acceptance

1964(Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 14 [285 P.2d 906]; Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 372 [ 273 P.2d 897 ]; Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 3, 8-9 [ 314 P.2d 10 ] ; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676 [ 234 P.2d 962 ] ; Estate of Helvey, 146 Cal.App.2d 662, 665 [ 303 P.2d 1076 ].) Accordingly, it is established that when title to property of an estate is claimed by heirs or other beneficiaries of the estate to belong to the estate, and is also claimed by the representative of the estate to belong to him in his individual capacity, the superior court sitting in probate ha

1964(Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 14 [285 P.2d 906]; Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 372 [ 273 P.2d 897 ]; Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 3, 8-9 [ 314 P.2d 10 ] ; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676 [ 234 P.2d 962 ] ; Estate of Helvey, 146 Cal.App.2d 662, 665 [ 303 P.2d 1076 ].) Accordingly, it is established that when title to property of an estate is claimed by heirs or other beneficiaries of the estate to belong to the estate, and is also claimed by the representative of the estate to belong to him in his individual capacity, the superior court sitting in probate ha

2013A judgment may only be reversed on appeal for instructional error, such as that complained of here, if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ; People v. Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 603 [applying Watson standard to erroneous instruction of the jury under CALJIC No. 2.06].) Our review of the record convinces us that it is not reasonably probable that had the trial court withheld the disputed instruction, the jury would have reached a result more favorable to a

1979In applying that test, we have often emphasized that when a case is “closely balanced” it is more likely to be “reasonably probable that a verdict more favorable to the [appealing party] might have resulted if the error had not occurred.” (People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 603 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 885 , 564 P.2d 1203 ]; accord, People v. Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d 612, 621 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 532 P.2d 105 ], and cases there cited.) In Hannon the trial court, over the defendant’s objection, instructed the jury that it could consider certain evidence as a circumstance tending to show a consciousn

2008(See, e.g., Lewis v. Alpha Beta Co. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 29 [, 189 Cal.Rptr. 840 ]; see also National Computer Rental, Ltd. v. Bergen Brunswig Corp. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 58, 63 [, 130 Cal.Rptr. 360 ] [defendant awarded fees under section 1717 because it prevailed on the only disputed claim, even though plaintiff obtained judgment on undisputed claims].) But when one party obtains a `simple, unqualified win' on the single contract claim presented by the action, the trial court may not invoke equitable considerations unrelated to litigation success, such as the parties' behavior during settleme

2008(See, e.g., Lewis v. Alpha Beta Co. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 29 [, 189 Cal.Rptr. 840 ]; see also National Computer Rental, Ltd. v. Bergen Brunswig Corp. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 58, 63 [, 130 Cal.Rptr. 360 ] [defendant awarded fees under section 1717 because it prevailed on the only disputed claim, even though plaintiff obtained judgment on undisputed claims].) But when one party obtains a `simple, unqualified win' on the single contract claim presented by the action, the trial court may not invoke equitable considerations unrelated to litigation success, such as the parties' behavior during settleme

2008(See, e.g., Deane Garden-home Assn. v. Denktas ([1993]) 13 Cal. App.4th 1394, 1398-1399 [, 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 816 ] [trial court improperly relied on party's obstreperous behavior and uncompromising litigation stance to find there was no prevailing party]; Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1059 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 813 ] [stating that party's failure to offer to compromise did not affect that party's right to attorney fees under section 1717].) To admit such factors into the `prevailing party' equation would convert the attorney fees motion from a relatively uncomplicated

2008(See, e.g., Deane Garden-home Assn. v. Denktas ([1993]) 13 Cal. App.4th 1394, 1398-1399 [, 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 816 ] [trial court improperly relied on party's obstreperous behavior and uncompromising litigation stance to find there was no prevailing party]; Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1059 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 813 ] [stating that party's failure to offer to compromise did not affect that party's right to attorney fees under section 1717].) To admit such factors into the `prevailing party' equation would convert the attorney fees motion from a relatively uncomplicated

2008(See, e.g., Deane Garden-home Assn. v. Denktas ([1993]) 13 Cal. App.4th 1394, 1398-1399 [, 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 816 ] [trial court improperly relied on party's obstreperous behavior and uncompromising litigation stance to find there was no prevailing party]; Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1059 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 813 ] [stating that party's failure to offer to compromise did not affect that party's right to attorney fees under section 1717].) To admit such factors into the `prevailing party' equation would convert the attorney fees motion from a relatively uncomplicated

2008(See, e.g., Deane Garden-home Assn. v. Denktas ([1993]) 13 Cal. App.4th 1394, 1398-1399 [, 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 816 ] [trial court improperly relied on party's obstreperous behavior and uncompromising litigation stance to find there was no prevailing party]; Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1059 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 813 ] [stating that party's failure to offer to compromise did not affect that party's right to attorney fees under section 1717].) To admit such factors into the `prevailing party' equation would convert the attorney fees motion from a relatively uncomplicated

1980(Everts v. Will S. Fawcett Co. (1937) 24 Cal.App.2d 213, 215-217 [ 74 P.2d 815 ]; Comment, 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 172, 178.) This procedure created the danger that the forced sale of the disputed claim or cause of action would realize far less than it was worth.

1980(Everts v. Will S. Fawcett Co. (1937) 24 Cal.App.2d 213, 215-217 [ 74 P.2d 815 ]; Comment, 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 172, 178.) This procedure created the danger that the forced sale of the disputed claim or cause of action would realize far less than it was worth.

1964(Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 14 [285 P.2d 906]; Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 372 [ 273 P.2d 897 ]; Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 3, 8-9 [ 314 P.2d 10 ] ; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676 [ 234 P.2d 962 ] ; Estate of Helvey, 146 Cal.App.2d 662, 665 [ 303 P.2d 1076 ].) Accordingly, it is established that when title to property of an estate is claimed by heirs or other beneficiaries of the estate to belong to the estate, and is also claimed by the representative of the estate to belong to him in his individual capacity, the superior court sitting in probate ha

1964(Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 14 [285 P.2d 906]; Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 372 [ 273 P.2d 897 ]; Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 3, 8-9 [ 314 P.2d 10 ] ; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676 [ 234 P.2d 962 ] ; Estate of Helvey, 146 Cal.App.2d 662, 665 [ 303 P.2d 1076 ].) Accordingly, it is established that when title to property of an estate is claimed by heirs or other beneficiaries of the estate to belong to the estate, and is also claimed by the representative of the estate to belong to him in his individual capacity, the superior court sitting in probate ha

1964(Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 14 [285 P.2d 906]; Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 372 [ 273 P.2d 897 ]; Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 3, 8-9 [ 314 P.2d 10 ] ; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676 [ 234 P.2d 962 ] ; Estate of Helvey, 146 Cal.App.2d 662, 665 [ 303 P.2d 1076 ].) Accordingly, it is established that when title to property of an estate is claimed by heirs or other beneficiaries of the estate to belong to the estate, and is also claimed by the representative of the estate to belong to him in his individual capacity, the superior court sitting in probate ha

1964(Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 10, 14 [285 P.2d 906]; Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 372 [ 273 P.2d 897 ]; Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 3, 8-9 [ 314 P.2d 10 ] ; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676 [ 234 P.2d 962 ] ; Estate of Helvey, 146 Cal.App.2d 662, 665 [ 303 P.2d 1076 ].) Accordingly, it is established that when title to property of an estate is claimed by heirs or other beneficiaries of the estate to belong to the estate, and is also claimed by the representative of the estate to belong to him in his individual capacity, the superior court sitting in probate ha

2007Szetela specifically rejected the contention that the availability of a meaningful opportunity to obtain the offered goods or services elsewhere without the offending contract term “is the relevant test for unconscionability.” (Szetela, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100 .) “[W]hether Szetela could have found another credit card issuer who would not have required his acceptance of a similar clause is not the deciding factor.” (Id. at p. 1100.) The court observed that procedural unconscionability focuses “on the manner in which the disputed clause is presented to the party in the weaker bargainin

2007Szetela specifically rejected the contention that the availability of a meaningful opportunity to obtain the offered goods or services elsewhere without the offending contract term "is the relevant test for unconscionability." ( Szetela, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 862 .) "[W]hether Szetela could have found another credit card issuer who would not have required his acceptance of a similar clause is not the deciding factor." ( Id. at p. 1100, 118 Cal. *365 Rptr.2d 862.) The court observed that procedural unconscionability focuses "on the manner in which the disputed claus

2017Rather, it was an agreement to forbear on the collection of a debt that was admittedly owed for goods that had been delivered so long as timely installment payments were made." ( Jade Fashion , supra , 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 , 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 184 .) The Court of Appeal emphasized the parties' agreement provided the $17,500 discount was part of the original $340,000 debt that the defendant expressly admitted it owed, and therefore section 1671(b) did not apply and the enforceability of the discount provision did not turn on its relationship to any anticipated damages. ( Jade Fashion , at p.

2017Rather, it was an agreement to forbear on the collection of a debt that was admittedly owed for goods that had been delivered so long as timely installment payments were made." ( Jade Fashion , supra , 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 , 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 184 .) The Court of Appeal emphasized the parties' agreement provided the $17,500 discount was part of the original $340,000 debt that the defendant expressly admitted it owed, and therefore section 1671(b) did not apply and the enforceability of the discount provision did not turn on its relationship to any anticipated damages. ( Jade Fashion , at p.

2014(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177 ; People v. Wooten (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1849 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 ].) Despite the presence in this case of the requirement that defendant’s belief that the landing strip metal and piece of equipment had been dumped be reasonable, and the possibility that at least one juror construed that to mean objectively reasonable, under other instructions given, as well as the last sentence of the disputed instruction, the jury was still required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew the items had been stolen.

2014(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177 ; People v. Wooten (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1849 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 ].) Despite the presence in this case of the requirement that defendant’s belief that the landing strip metal and piece of equipment had been dumped be reasonable, and the possibility that at least one juror construed that to mean objectively reasonable, under other instructions given, as well as the last sentence of the disputed instruction, the jury was still required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew the items had been stolen.

2007In the absence of both procedural and substantive elements of unconscionability, this court should decline to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce the disputed clause. {Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 ] {Armendariz).) The trial court erred when it denied the motion to compel arbitration, and its order so holding should be reversed.

2007In the absence of both procedural and substantive elements of unconscionability, this court should decline to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce the disputed clause. {Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 ] {Armendariz).) The trial court erred when it denied the motion to compel arbitration, and its order so holding should be reversed.

1993The rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting duties, or be led to an attempt to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than to enforce to their full extent the rights of the interest which he should alone represent. [Citation.]” (Anderson v. Eaton (1930) 211 Cal. 113, 116 [ 293 P. 788 ].) When an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to two clients, it is impossible for him or her to advise either one as to a dispu

1993The rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting duties, or be led to an attempt to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than to enforce to their full extent the rights of the interest which he should alone represent. [Citation.]” (Anderson v. Eaton (1930) 211 Cal. 113, 116 [ 293 P. 788 ].) When an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to two clients, it is impossible for him or her to advise either one as to a dispu

1961(Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal.2d 592, 602 [ 234 P.2d 16 ]; see Corbin on Contracts, vol. 6, § 1289, p. 128) and an offer and acceptance of such an amount given in full payment for the disputed claim therefore discharges the debt.

1961(Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal.2d 592, 602 [ 234 P.2d 16 ]; see Corbin on Contracts, vol. 6, § 1289, p. 128) and an offer and acceptance of such an amount given in full payment for the disputed claim therefore discharges the debt.