disputed claim in Georgia

1981There was a bona fide controversy as to causation—as testified to by the experts on both sides. “ ‘A mere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not the equivalent of stubborn litigiousness.’ ” Murphy v. Morse, 96 Ga. App. 513 (3) ( 100 SE2d 623 ).

1981There was a bona fide controversy as to causation—as testified to by the experts on both sides. “ ‘A mere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not the equivalent of stubborn litigiousness.’ ” Murphy v. Morse, 96 Ga. App. 513 (3) ( 100 SE2d 623 ).

1984“A mere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not the equivalent of stubborn litigiousness or causing unnecessary trouble and expense [Cits.] The key to the test is whether there is a ‘bona fide controversy.’ Where none exists, forcing a plaintiff to resort to the courts in order to collect is plainly causing him to go to ‘unnecessary trouble and expense.’ [Cit.]” Franchise Enterprises v. Ridgeway, 157 Ga. App. 458, 460 (2) ( 278 SE2d 33 ) (1981).

1984“A mere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not the equivalent of stubborn litigiousness or causing unnecessary trouble and expense [Cits.] The key to the test is whether there is a ‘bona fide controversy.’ Where none exists, forcing a plaintiff to resort to the courts in order to collect is plainly causing him to go to ‘unnecessary trouble and expense.’ [Cit.]” Franchise Enterprises v. Ridgeway, 157 Ga. App. 458, 460 (2) ( 278 SE2d 33 ) (1981).

2023And “[a] mere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not the equivalent of stubborn litigiousness.” Dimambro Northend Assocs. 19 v. Williams, 169 Ga. App. 219, 225 (6) ( 312 SE2d 386 ) (1983) (citations and punctuation omitted) (where a bona fide controversy existed; the evidence did not demand a verdict for either side; and there was no evidence of bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, or unnecessary trouble and expense, an award for attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 was not supported).

2023And “[a] mere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not the equivalent of stubborn litigiousness.” Dimambro Northend Assocs. 19 v. Williams, 169 Ga. App. 219, 225 (6) ( 312 SE2d 386 ) (1983) (citations and punctuation omitted) (where a bona fide controversy existed; the evidence did not demand a verdict for either side; and there was no evidence of bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, or unnecessary trouble and expense, an award for attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 was not supported).

2019See Pincherli v. State , 295 Ga. App. 408 , 414-415 (3) (b) & n.25, 671 S.E.2d 891 (2008) ; McKenzie v. State , 293 Ga. App. 350 , 352-353 (3), 667 S.E.2d 142 (2008). 9 But looking at the jury instructions as a whole, a reasonable jury would not have understood the disputed instruction to mean that they should be more skeptical of Williamson's statements and testimony than those of other witnesses.

2019See Pincherli v. State , 295 Ga. App. 408 , 414-415 (3) (b) & n.25, 671 S.E.2d 891 (2008) ; McKenzie v. State , 293 Ga. App. 350 , 352-353 (3), 667 S.E.2d 142 (2008). 9 But looking at the jury instructions as a whole, a reasonable jury would not have understood the disputed instruction to mean that they should be more skeptical of Williamson's statements and testimony than those of other witnesses.

1994Typo-Repro Svcs. v. Bishop, 188 Ga. App. 576, 580 ( 373 SE2d 758 ).

1994Typo-Repro Svcs. v. Bishop, 188 Ga. App. 576, 580 ( 373 SE2d 758 ).

2019See Pincherli v. State , 295 Ga. App. 408 , 414-415 (3) (b) & n.25, 671 S.E.2d 891 (2008) ; McKenzie v. State , 293 Ga. App. 350 , 352-353 (3), 667 S.E.2d 142 (2008). 9 But looking at the jury instructions as a whole, a reasonable jury would not have understood the disputed instruction to mean that they should be more skeptical of Williamson's statements and testimony than those of other witnesses.

2019See Pincherli v. State , 295 Ga. App. 408 , 414-415 (3) (b) & n.25, 671 S.E.2d 891 (2008) ; McKenzie v. State , 293 Ga. App. 350 , 352-353 (3), 667 S.E.2d 142 (2008). 9 But looking at the jury instructions as a whole, a reasonable jury would not have understood the disputed instruction to mean that they should be more skeptical of Williamson's statements and testimony than those of other witnesses.

1987Accord General Refractories Co. v. Rogers, 240 Ga. 228, 235 (2) ( 239 SE2d 795 ) (1977); Gordon v. Ogden, 154 Ga. App. 641, 642 (2) ( 269 SE2d 499 ) (1980).

1987Accord General Refractories Co. v. Rogers, 240 Ga. 228, 235 (2) ( 239 SE2d 795 ) (1977); Gordon v. Ogden, 154 Ga. App. 641, 642 (2) ( 269 SE2d 499 ) (1980).

2017Further, “an offer to compromise a disputed claim ... is no more admissible in pleading than in evidence.” Malcolm v. Dobbs, 127 Ga. 487, 491 ( 56 SE 622 ) (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5194).

2017Further, “an offer to compromise a disputed claim ... is no more admissible in pleading than in evidence.” Malcolm v. Dobbs, 127 Ga. 487, 491 ( 56 SE 622 ) (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5194).

2017Not only is evidence of the letter and of Brindle’s demand for $12 million during the mediation proceeding inadmissible as efforts to compromise a claim, “[t]he ‘threats’ associated with institution of a civil action cannot and do not constitute duress and are not actionable in tort.” Rolleston v. Huie, 198 Ga. App. 49, 51 (2) ( 400 SE2d 349 ) (1990), overruled in part on other grounds, Sewell v. Cancel, 295 Ga. 235, 239, n. 2 ( 759 SE2d 485 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017Not only is evidence of the letter and of Brindle’s demand for $12 million during the mediation proceeding inadmissible as efforts to compromise a claim, “[t]he ‘threats’ associated with institution of a civil action cannot and do not constitute duress and are not actionable in tort.” Rolleston v. Huie, 198 Ga. App. 49, 51 (2) ( 400 SE2d 349 ) (1990), overruled in part on other grounds, Sewell v. Cancel, 295 Ga. 235, 239, n. 2 ( 759 SE2d 485 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017Not only is evidence of the letter and of Brindle’s demand for $12 million during the mediation proceeding inadmissible as efforts to compromise a claim, “[t]he ‘threats’ associated with institution of a civil action cannot and do not constitute duress and are not actionable in tort.” Rolleston v. Huie, 198 Ga. App. 49, 51 (2) ( 400 SE2d 349 ) (1990), overruled in part on other grounds, Sewell v. Cancel, 295 Ga. 235, 239, n. 2 ( 759 SE2d 485 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017Not only is evidence of the letter and of Brindle’s demand for $12 million during the mediation proceeding inadmissible as efforts to compromise a claim, “[t]he ‘threats’ associated with institution of a civil action cannot and do not constitute duress and are not actionable in tort.” Rolleston v. Huie, 198 Ga. App. 49, 51 (2) ( 400 SE2d 349 ) (1990), overruled in part on other grounds, Sewell v. Cancel, 295 Ga. 235, 239, n. 2 ( 759 SE2d 485 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2013Driggers v. Campbell, 247 Ga. App. 300, 304 (4) ( 543 SE2d 787 ) (2000). 7 It follows that, where a bona fide controversy clearly exists between the parties, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees and expenses of litigation based on stubborn litigiousness or the causing of unnecessary trouble and expense.

2013Driggers v. Campbell, 247 Ga. App. 300, 304 (4) ( 543 SE2d 787 ) (2000). 7 It follows that, where a bona fide controversy clearly exists between the parties, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees and expenses of litigation based on stubborn litigiousness or the causing of unnecessary trouble and expense.

2013See also White v. Scott, 284 Ga. App. 87, 90 (1) ( 643 SE2d 356 ) (2007) (“[T]he existence of a bona fide dispute and a reasonable defense at trial precludes the award of attorney fees and expenses of litigation under OCGA§ 13-6-11.”) (citation and punctuation omitted) (physical precedent only); Evans v. Willis, 212 Ga. App. 335, 338 (1) (c) ( 441 SE2d 770 ) (1994) (“[Mjere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not sufficient to award attorney fees on grounds of either stubborn litigiousness or causing unnecessary trouble and expense.”) (citation omitted).

2013See also White v. Scott, 284 Ga. App. 87, 90 (1) ( 643 SE2d 356 ) (2007) (“[T]he existence of a bona fide dispute and a reasonable defense at trial precludes the award of attorney fees and expenses of litigation under OCGA§ 13-6-11.”) (citation and punctuation omitted) (physical precedent only); Evans v. Willis, 212 Ga. App. 335, 338 (1) (c) ( 441 SE2d 770 ) (1994) (“[Mjere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not sufficient to award attorney fees on grounds of either stubborn litigiousness or causing unnecessary trouble and expense.”) (citation omitted).

2013See also White v. Scott, 284 Ga. App. 87, 90 (1) ( 643 SE2d 356 ) (2007) (“[T]he existence of a bona fide dispute and a reasonable defense at trial precludes the award of attorney fees and expenses of litigation under OCGA§ 13-6-11.”) (citation and punctuation omitted) (physical precedent only); Evans v. Willis, 212 Ga. App. 335, 338 (1) (c) ( 441 SE2d 770 ) (1994) (“[Mjere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not sufficient to award attorney fees on grounds of either stubborn litigiousness or causing unnecessary trouble and expense.”) (citation omitted).

2013See also White v. Scott, 284 Ga. App. 87, 90 (1) ( 643 SE2d 356 ) (2007) (“[T]he existence of a bona fide dispute and a reasonable defense at trial precludes the award of attorney fees and expenses of litigation under OCGA§ 13-6-11.”) (citation and punctuation omitted) (physical precedent only); Evans v. Willis, 212 Ga. App. 335, 338 (1) (c) ( 441 SE2d 770 ) (1994) (“[Mjere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not sufficient to award attorney fees on grounds of either stubborn litigiousness or causing unnecessary trouble and expense.”) (citation omitted).

2007Tyson v. Woodruff, 108 Ga. 368, 372 , 33 S.E. 981 (1899).

1969As far as our investigation has extended, the authorities are uniform and unbroken to the effect that when there is an honest difference of opinion between parties touching a disputed claim, and especially if the difference is of such a nature as to render it at. all doubtful as to who is correct, any settlement or compromise of the differences will be enforced by the courts, and néither party will be allowed to defend by showing that he was right in his original contention.” Tyson v. Woodruff, 108 Ga. 368, 372 ( 33 SE 981 ).

2004The key is whether a bona fide controversy exists.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rivergate Corp. v. Atlanta Indoor Advertising Concepts, 210 Ga. App. 501, 504 (4) ( 436 SE2d 697 ) (1993).

2004The key is whether a bona fide controversy exists.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rivergate Corp. v. Atlanta Indoor Advertising Concepts, 210 Ga. App. 501, 504 (4) ( 436 SE2d 697 ) (1993).

1992However, “[questions of bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, and unnecessary expense, under OCGA § 13-6-11, are generally questions for the factfinder. [Cit.] ” Manderson & Assoc. v. Gore, 193 Ga. App. 723, 735 (9) ( 389 SE2d 251 ) (1989).

1992However, “[questions of bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, and unnecessary expense, under OCGA § 13-6-11, are generally questions for the factfinder. [Cit.] ” Manderson & Assoc. v. Gore, 193 Ga. App. 723, 735 (9) ( 389 SE2d 251 ) (1989).

1987Accord General Refractories Co. v. Rogers, 240 Ga. 228, 235 (2) ( 239 SE2d 795 ) (1977); Gordon v. Ogden, 154 Ga. App. 641, 642 (2) ( 269 SE2d 499 ) (1980).

1987Accord General Refractories Co. v. Rogers, 240 Ga. 228, 235 (2) ( 239 SE2d 795 ) (1977); Gordon v. Ogden, 154 Ga. App. 641, 642 (2) ( 269 SE2d 499 ) (1980).

1984Gordon v. Ogden, 154 Ga. App. 641 (2) ( 269 SE2d 499 ); Brooks v. Steele, 139 Ga. App. 496, 498 (2) ( 229 SE2d 3 ).

1984Gordon v. Ogden, 154 Ga. App. 641 (2) ( 269 SE2d 499 ); Brooks v. Steele, 139 Ga. App. 496, 498 (2) ( 229 SE2d 3 ).

1949Co., 27 Ga. App. 688 ( 109 S. E. 676 ), it was held: “In determining the validity of an agreement in accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim, it is not the merit, but the bona fides of the debtor’s contention which is the controlling factor; and this as a general proposition is a question of fact for the jury. *634 Ryan v. Progressive Pub.

1934While it is true, under our decisions, that “in determining the validity of an agreement in accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim, it is not the merit, but the bona lides of the . . contention which is the controlling factor” (Riley v. London Guaranty Co., 27 Ga. App. 686 , 109 S. E. 676 ), “where the contention [is] made in good faith and . . honestly believed in” (Armour Fertilizer Works v. Wynne Mercantile Co., 40 Ga. App. 842 , 151 S. E. 671 ); that “the compromise of a contention as to property rights, the final outcome of which, if settled by litigation, the parties consider to be

1949“A defendant must stand or fall upon his defense as laid [citing cases], and since the defendant by his evidence admitted that the note actually represented a disputed consideration, and thus failed to sustain his plea as made, setting up a want of consideration, he would not, in the absence of a sufficient plea of fraud, be able to vary by parol the terms of his unconditional promise by which the disputed claim had been liquidated.” (Citing cases.) Stewart v. Hardin, 24 Ga. App. 611, 612 (2) ( 101 S. E. 716 ).

1921A note voluntarily given in liquidation of a disputed claim is not without consideration (Stewart v. Hardin, 24 Ga. App. 611 (2), 101 S. E. 716 ) ; but if the plea shows that such was not the purpose and intent of the parties to the contract and that it was a mere nudum pactum, the defendant owing nothing to and receiving nothing from the plaintiff and the plaintiff parting with nothing, the contract would be void, because lacking in consideration; and the defendant would be entitled to set up and prove such a defense.

1987When bad faith is not in issue and only the elements of stubborn litigiousness or unnecessary trouble and expense are relied upon, “if a bona fide controversy clearly exists between the parties [cit.] ... attorney fees are not authorized under OCGA § 13-6-11 ... if the evidence shows that ‘a genuine dispute exists — whether of law or fact, on liability or amount of damages, or on any comparable issue.” Dimambro Northend Assoc. v. Williams, 169 Ga. App. 219, 225 ( 312 SE2d 386 ) (1983). “ ‘ “A mere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not the equivalent of stubborn litigiousness” ’ ” (Ideal Pool,

1987When bad faith is not in issue and only the elements of stubborn litigiousness or unnecessary trouble and expense are relied upon, “if a bona fide controversy clearly exists between the parties [cit.] ... attorney fees are not authorized under OCGA § 13-6-11 ... if the evidence shows that ‘a genuine dispute exists — whether of law or fact, on liability or amount of damages, or on any comparable issue.” Dimambro Northend Assoc. v. Williams, 169 Ga. App. 219, 225 ( 312 SE2d 386 ) (1983). “ ‘ “A mere refusal to pay a disputed claim is not the equivalent of stubborn litigiousness” ’ ” (Ideal Pool,

1934While it is true, under our decisions, that “in determining the validity of an agreement in accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim, it is not the merit, but the bona lides of the . . contention which is the controlling factor” (Riley v. London Guaranty Co., 27 Ga. App. 686 , 109 S. E. 676 ), “where the contention [is] made in good faith and . . honestly believed in” (Armour Fertilizer Works v. Wynne Mercantile Co., 40 Ga. App. 842 , 151 S. E. 671 ); that “the compromise of a contention as to property rights, the final outcome of which, if settled by litigation, the parties consider to be

1926See also Glenn v. Zenovitch, 128 Ga. 596 (3) ( 58 S. E. 26 ); Johnson v. Redwine, 98 Ga. 112 (1) ( 25 S. E. 924 ); Belt v. Lazenby, 126 Ga. 767 (2) ( 56 S. E. 81 ); Preston v. Ham, 156 Ga. 224 (1 b, d) ( 119 S. E. 658 ).

1934While it is true, under our decisions, that “in determining the validity of an agreement in accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim, it is not the merit, but the bona lides of the . . contention which is the controlling factor” (Riley v. London Guaranty Co., 27 Ga. App. 686 , 109 S. E. 676 ), “where the contention [is] made in good faith and . . honestly believed in” (Armour Fertilizer Works v. Wynne Mercantile Co., 40 Ga. App. 842 , 151 S. E. 671 ); that “the compromise of a contention as to property rights, the final outcome of which, if settled by litigation, the parties consider to be

1926See also Glenn v. Zenovitch, 128 Ga. 596 (3) ( 58 S. E. 26 ); Johnson v. Redwine, 98 Ga. 112 (1) ( 25 S. E. 924 ); Belt v. Lazenby, 126 Ga. 767 (2) ( 56 S. E. 81 ); Preston v. Ham, 156 Ga. 224 (1 b, d) ( 119 S. E. 658 ).

2024See State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 556 (820 SE2d 1) (2018).

2024See State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 556 (820 SE2d 1) (2018).

2023“We will affirm an award under OCGA § 13-6-11 if there is any evidence to support it.” Vol Repairs II v. Knighten, 322 Ga. App. 416, 419 (1) ( 745 SE2d 673 ) (2013).

2023“We will affirm an award under OCGA § 13-6-11 if there is any evidence to support it.” Vol Repairs II v. Knighten, 322 Ga. App. 416, 419 (1) ( 745 SE2d 673 ) (2013).