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62 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1901–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bryant v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Cox, 658 S.W.2d at 671 , citing Bryant v. State, 627 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (evidence insufficient to support conviction for theft of landscaping plants where controversy between two parties to a verbal landscaping construction contract centered not upon removal of plants from the job site but upon the work progress and periodic payments therefor). 1992Cox, 658 S.W.2d at 671 , citing Bryant v. State, 627 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (evidence insufficient to support conviction for theft of landscaping plants where controversy between two parties to a verbal landscaping construction contract centered not upon removal of plants from the job site but upon the work progress and periodic payments therefor). | 3 | 3 |
In Re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.green2 sentences2025Standard of Review “[A] party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and show that the disputed claim falls within the scope of that agreement.” Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277 , 282 (Tex. 2021) (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)). 2025Standard of Review “[A] party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and show that the disputed claim falls within the scope of that agreement.” Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277 , 282 (Tex. 2021) (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)). | 2 | 2 |
Henry v. Cash Biz, LPgreen2 sentences2023See Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018). 2022Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018). | 2 | 2 |
Yelderman v. McCarthygreen2 sentences2021The court further held that “[a] creditor who accepts and cashes a check tendered as full payment of a disputed claim cannot vary the legal effect of such acceptance as an accord and satisfaction by protesting that he is accepting the check as part payment only.” Id. 2021See Yelderman, 474 S.W.2d at 784 (“A creditor who accepts and cashes a check tendered as full payment of a disputed claim cannot vary the legal effect of such acceptance as an accord and satisfaction by protesting that he is accepting the check as part payment only.”). | 2 | 2 |
Stable Energy, L.P. v. Newberrygreen2 sentences2016The disputed clause gives the Hyders a “cost-free (except only its portion of production taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5.0%) of gross production obtained from each [directionally drilled] well.” This Court has held that “[a]n overriding royalty is an interest in the oil and gas produced at the surface, free of the expense of production.” Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177 , 180 n. 1 (Tex.2012) (quoting Stable Energy, L.P. v. Newberry, 999 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied)). 2015The disputed clause gives the Hyders a “cost-free (except only its portion of production taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5.0%) of gross production obtained from each [directionally drilled] well.” This Court has held that “[a]n overriding royalty is an interest in the oil and gas produced at the surface, free of the expense of production.” Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177 , 180 n.1 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Stable Energy, L.P. v. Newberry, 999 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied)). | 2 | 2 |
cluster 15904green2 sentences2000See Lubart , 154 F.3d at 541 -42 ; Gajda , 158 F.3d at 804 -805 ; Ball , 163 F.3d at 309 . 2000See Lubart, 154 F.3d at 541-42 ; Gujda, 158 F.3d at 804-805 ; Ball, 163 F.3d at 309 . | 2 | 2 |
In Re Rubiolagreen2 sentences2024See Wagner, 627 S.W.3d at 282-83; In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 223 . 2013In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (original proceeding). | 1 | 2 |
Burgamy v. Davisgreen2 sentences2020Compromise & Settlement § 11); see also Burgamy v. Davis, 313 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 1958, no writ) (“The test is not whether the debtor was correct in his contention, in that he really had a legal or equitable defense to the claim in whole or in part, but consists in the -9- 04-18-00900-CV fact that he in good faith urged or asserted a defense which he really believed was substantial.”); In re Swift, 198 B.R. 927, 939 (Bankr. 1971Burgamy v. Davis, 313 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1958) ; Industrial Life Ins. | 1 | 2 |
Willis v. City Nat. Bank of Galvestongreen2 sentences2013App.—San Antonio 1949, no writ) (“[F]ailure to return a [cashier’s] check tendered in settlement of a disputed claim within a reasonable time, must be regarded in law as an acceptance of the compromise offer.”); Willis v. City Nat’l Bank of Galveston, 280 S.W. 270, 273 (Tex. Civ. 1949It was so held in Willis v. City National Bank of Galveston, Tex.Civ.App., 280 S.W. 270 , wr. ref. | 1 | 2 |
Peeples v. Honorable Fourth Supreme Judicial Districtgreen2 sentences1987See Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56 , 58 (Tex. 1986); Peeples v. Honorable Fourth Supreme Judicial District, 701 S.W.2d 635 , 637 (Tex. 1985). 1987See Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.Zd 56, 3 (Tex. 1986); Peeples v. Honorable Fourth Supreme Judicial District, 701 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. 1985). | 1 | 2 |
Republic Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc.green1 sentence2021Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 426 (Tex. 2004). 10 the insurance claim context,” it is the insurer’s responsibility to seek prompt resolution of a disputed claim through appraisal to avoid statutory interest on amounts that were not promptly paid. 44 * * * This appeal from a summary judgment in State Farm’s favor does not address Hinojos’s affirmative claim for relief under Chapter 542. | 1 | 1 |
Landrum v. Devenportgreen1 sentence2021On the other hand, “[c]onduct that can be otherwise explained may not 17 effect ratification.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 cmt. d; see also Landrum, 616 S.W.2d at 363 (“Intention to ratify or waive cannot be inferred from acts where . . . the party had no satisfactory alternative.”). | 1 | 1 |
Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass'n, Inc.green1 sentence2021“However, doubts should be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises, and any ambiguity must be strictly construed against the party seeking to enforce the restrictive covenant.” Buckner, 133 S.W.3d at 297 ; see also Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280 (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted) (“[C]ovenants restricting the free use of property are not favored, because the right of individuals to use their own property as they wish remains one of the most fundamental rights that individual property owners possess.”). (c) Analysis The disputed clause is a not a coven | 1 | 1 |
Swift v. Seidler (In Re Swift)green1 sentence2020Compromise & Settlement § 11); see also Burgamy v. Davis, 313 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 1958, no writ) (“The test is not whether the debtor was correct in his contention, in that he really had a legal or equitable defense to the claim in whole or in part, but consists in the -9- 04-18-00900-CV fact that he in good faith urged or asserted a defense which he really believed was substantial.”); In re Swift, 198 B.R. 927, 939 (Bankr. | 1 | 1 |
In re Lipskygreen1 sentence2020Under the first step, the party moving for dismissal must make an initial showing, supported by a preponderance of the evidence, that the disputed claim “is based on, relates to, or is in response to the [movant’s] exercise of: (1) the right of free speech; (2) the right to petition; or (3) the right of association.” Id. § 27.005(b); see also In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tex. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
| Northern Liberty Market Co. v. Kellygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Eifertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fernando Osornia v. Amerimex Motor & Controls, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mandola v. Oggerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gibson v. Turnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dickson v. Stockmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Currygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grindstaff v. North Richland Hills Corporation No. 2green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Babcock & Russell v. Hawkins
green
2 sentences1967Keefe v. Vogle, 36 Iowa 87 ; Babcock v. Hawkins, 23 Vt. 561 ; 1 Daniel, Neg.Inst. § 205; 1 Add.Cont. § 14.”’ Although Dr. Maddox denies in his affidavit that he had any actual knowledge of the fraud until after he had executed the renewal note on December 8, 1958, he admits in his affidavit that he wrote the letter to Mr. Harris on December 5, 1957, in which he included the title opinions showing that Oldham had not in fact conveyed him the title to the minerals under the Cooper-Neel tract. 1902So a note is supported by a sufficient consideration if executed to secure the abandonment of suit brought to enforce a doubtful right, or in compromise of a disputed claim in good faith, though it ultimately appears that the claim was without merit.” Citing Keope v. Vagle, 36 Iowa, 87 ; Babcock v. Hawkins, 23 Vt., 561 ; 1 Dan. | 5 | 1902–1967 |
Hunter, Evans & Co. v. Lanius
green
2 sentences1967The rule in this state was laid down by the Supreme Court of Texas in 1892 in Hunter v. Lanius, 82 Tex. 677 , 18 S.W. 201 , that: “ * * * a note is supported by a sufficient consideration, if executed to secure the abandonment of a suit brought to enforce a doubtful right, or in compromise of a disputed claim made in good faith, though it ultimately appears that the claim was without merit.” (Emphasis added.) 18 S.W. 205 , col. 1. 1967The rule in this state was laid down by the Supreme Court of Texas in 1892 in Hunter v. Lanius, 82 Tex. 677 , 18 S.W. 201 , that: “ * * * a note is supported by a sufficient consideration, if executed to secure the abandonment of a suit brought to enforce a doubtful right, or in compromise of a disputed claim made in good faith, though it ultimately appears that the claim was without merit.” (Emphasis added.) 18 S.W. 205 , col. 1. | 5 | 1923–1967 |
Keefe v. Vogle
green
2 sentences1967Keefe v. Vogle, 36 Iowa 87 ; Babcock v. Hawkins, 23 Vt. 561 ; 1 Daniel, Neg.Inst. § 205; 1 Add.Cont. § 14.”’ Although Dr. Maddox denies in his affidavit that he had any actual knowledge of the fraud until after he had executed the renewal note on December 8, 1958, he admits in his affidavit that he wrote the letter to Mr. Harris on December 5, 1957, in which he included the title opinions showing that Oldham had not in fact conveyed him the title to the minerals under the Cooper-Neel tract. 1902So a note is supported by a sufficient consideration if executed to secure the abandonment of suit brought to enforce a doubtful right, or in compromise of a disputed claim in good faith, though it ultimately appears that the claim was without merit.” Citing Keope v. Vagle, 36 Iowa, 87 ; Babcock v. Hawkins, 23 Vt., 561 ; 1 Dan. | 5 | 1902–1967 |
Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016The disputed clause gives the Hyders a “cost-free (except only its portion of production taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5.0%) of gross production obtained from each [directionally drilled] well.” This Court has held that “[a]n overriding royalty is an interest in the oil and gas produced at the surface, free of the expense of production.” Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177 , 180 n. 1 (Tex.2012) (quoting Stable Energy, L.P. v. Newberry, 999 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied)). 2015The disputed clause gives the Hyders a “cost-free (except only its portion of production taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5.0%) of gross production obtained from each [directionally drilled] well.” This Court has held that “[a]n overriding royalty is an interest in the oil and gas produced at the surface, free of the expense of production.” Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177 , 180 n.1 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Stable Energy, L.P. v. Newberry, 999 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied)). | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Joseph J. Gajda and Lillian A. Gajda v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
green
2 sentences2000See Lubart , 154 F.3d at 541 -42 ; Gajda , 158 F.3d at 804 -805 ; Ball , 163 F.3d at 309 . 2000See Lubart, 154 F.3d at 541-42 ; Gujda, 158 F.3d at 804-805 ; Ball, 163 F.3d at 309 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Ball v. Commissioner
green
2 sentences2000See Lubart , 154 F.3d at 541 -42 ; Gajda , 158 F.3d at 804 -805 ; Ball , 163 F.3d at 309 . 2000See Lubart, 154 F.3d at 541-42 ; Gujda, 158 F.3d at 804-805 ; Ball, 163 F.3d at 309 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Cox v. State
green
2 sentences1992Cox, 658 S.W.2d at 671 , citing Bryant v. State, 627 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (evidence insufficient to support conviction for theft of landscaping plants where controversy between two parties to a verbal landscaping construction contract centered not upon removal of plants from the job site but upon the work progress and periodic payments therefor). 1992Cox, 658 S.W.2d at 671 , citing Bryant v. State, 627 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (evidence insufficient to support conviction for theft of landscaping plants where controversy between two parties to a verbal landscaping construction contract centered not upon removal of plants from the job site but upon the work progress and periodic payments therefor). | 2 | 1992–1992 |
Walker-Smith Co. v. Pouns
neutral
2 sentences1967The rule was followed in Walker-Smith Co. v. Pouns, Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 256 S.W. 613 (no writ), in which the court said: “It is the universal holding of courts that the execution of a note in settlement of a doubtful or disputed claim is supported by a sufficient consideration.” 256 S.W. 615 , col. 1. 1935We believe that the issues in this case are controlled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hunter v. Lanius, 82 Tex. 677 , 18 S.W. 201, 205 , in which the following language is used: “So, a note is supported by a sufficient consideration, if executed to secure the abandonment of a suit brought to enforce a doubtful right, or in compromise of a disputed claim made in good faith, though it ultimately appears that the claim was without merit.” See, also, Walker-Smith Co. v. Pouns (Tex.Civ.App.) 256 S.W. 613 . | 2 | 1935–1967 |
Citizens' Garage Co. v. Wilson
neutral
2 sentences1967It is well settled that the compromise and settlement of a disputed claim is a valid consideration for a promissory note, even though it later appears that the claim was without merit. 11 Am.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes, § 231, p. 260 ; 9 Tex.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes, § 46, p. 58; Citizens Garage Co. v. Wilson, Tex. Civ.App., 252 S.W. 186 , no wr. hist.; Aydelotte v. Anderson, Tex.Civ.App., 284 S.W. 2d 804 , wr. ref. n.r.e.; Hunter v. Lanius, 82 Tex. 677 , 18 S.W. 201 . 1931App.) 252 S. W. 186 , cited by appellant. | 2 | 1931–1967 |
Hunt v. Ogden
neutral
2 sentences1916App. 250 , 94 S. W. 136 : “Among the numerous modifications and exceptions, none, however, is better established than that if the claim, though evidenced by a bill or note, is in dispute an agreement, by way of compromise, to receive a part payment of the disputed claim in settlement of the whole demand, when performed, will discharge it.” See, also, Hunt v. Ogden, 58 Tex. Civ. 1916App. 443 , 125 S. W. 386 ; Cristler v. Williams, 62 Tex. Civ. | 2 | 1914–1916 |
Daugherty v. Herndon
neutral
2 sentences1914Hunt v. Ogden, 125 S. W. 386 ; Daugherty v. Herndon, 27 Tex. Civ. 1914Daugherty v. Herndon, 27 Tex. Civ. | 2 | 1914–1914 |
Buckner v. Lakes of Somerset Homeowners Ass'n
green
1 sentence2021“However, doubts should be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises, and any ambiguity must be strictly construed against the party seeking to enforce the restrictive covenant.” Buckner, 133 S.W.3d at 297 ; see also Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280 (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted) (“[C]ovenants restricting the free use of property are not favored, because the right of individuals to use their own property as they wish remains one of the most fundamental rights that individual property owners possess.”). (c) Analysis The disputed clause is a not a coven | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Cox Media Group, LLC v. Joselevitz
green
1 sentence2021See Pacheco v. Rodriguez, 600 S.W.3d 401 , 407 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.) (“[T]he unique aspect of the TCPA convinces us that we must, as part of our de novo review, be satisfied that the movant has met the initial burden under the statute to show the disputed claim is based on, relates to, or is in response to the exercise of free speech, petition, or associational rights.”); Joselevitz, 524 S.W.3d at 859 . 6In their motion to dismiss, they elaborate on these communications as pertaining to whether “they should ask Dr. Pustilnik to perform the autopsy, despite their concerns about his | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Cummings v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 406 . 6 personally or as Leo’s Auto Collision, Inc., when conducting business relevant to the disputed claim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Iden v. Ackerman
green
1 sentence2020The court further noted the disputed claim was sufficient consideration even though Mildred and Helen’s claim was in fact “unfounded.” Id. (quoting 15 C.J.S. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In Re BLD green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Liberty National Fire Insurance Co. v. Akin green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Stewart v. Selder green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Robinson v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Marshall v. Ballard green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Pennington v. Caldwell neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Aydelotte v. Anderson green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| McBride v. Willis & Bro. green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Peaslee v. Walker neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Root & Fehl v. Murray Tool Co. green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Walter v. Hammonds neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| First Nat. Bank of Charlotte v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Martin v. National Surety Co. green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Rogers-Hill & Co. v. San Antonio Hotel Co. neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| United Hay Co. v. Ford green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Minney v. Furman, Lawrence Parker neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| United Hay Co. v. Ford green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Desmarais v. People's Gas Light Co. neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| United States v. Throckmorton green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| McDougall v. Walling green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Powers v. Harris green | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| Gilliam v. Alford green | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co. green | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.