disputed claim in Florida

2025“Where a disputed claim becomes liquidated by the trier of fact as to the amount recoverable, interest should be awarded from the date the payment was due.” Id. (quoting Reimbursement Recovery, Inc. v. Indian River Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 22 So. 3d 679, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).

2025“Where a disputed claim becomes liquidated by the trier of fact as to the amount recoverable, interest should be awarded from the date the payment was due.” Id. (quoting Reimbursement Recovery, Inc. v. Indian River Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 22 So. 3d 679, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).

2015Inc. v. Earth Tech, Inc., 25 So.3d 593, 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“Once the jury sets the amount of damages to be awarded, the damages are retroactively considered liquidated damages, and the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgmeht interest back to the date that the damages were due.”); Reimbursement Recovery, 22 So.3d at 682 (“Where a disputed claim becomes liquidated by the trier of fact as to the amount recoverable, interest should be awarded from the date the payment was due.”).

2012Inc. v. Earth Tech, Inc., 25 So.3d 593, 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“Once the jury sets the amount of damages to be awarded, the damages are retroactively considered liquidated damages, and the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest back to the date that the damages were due.”); Reimbursement Recovery, Inc. v. Indian River Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 22 So.3d 679, 682-83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“Where a disputed claim becomes liquidated by the trier of fact as to the amount recoverable, interest should be awarded from the date the payment was due.

2012Id. [Berloni v. Della Casa, 972 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).] (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Buildex, Inc., 476 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)).”); see e.g., Bevins v. Antuna, 68 So.3d 420, 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“Antunas should recover from the Bevins the accrued prejudgment interest on their escrow deposit from the date the funds should have been returned to them.”); Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 65 So.3d 22 , 34 n. 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“[I]f the trial court were basing the prejudgment interest on the ‘agreement’ of the parties, then interest would not accrue until Dr. Santini actu

2009Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Buildex, Inc., 476 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)).

1995Co. v. Barile Excavating & Pipeline Co., 685 F. Supp. 839, 840 (M.D.Fla. 1988)).

1994Co. v. Barile Excavating & Pipeline Co., 685 F. Supp. 839, 840 (M.D.Fla. 1988).

2025“Where a disputed claim becomes liquidated by the trier of fact as to the amount recoverable, interest should be awarded from the date the payment was due.” Id. (quoting Reimbursement Recovery, Inc. v. Indian River Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 22 So. 3d 679, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).

2025“Where a disputed claim becomes liquidated by the trier of fact as to the amount recoverable, interest should be awarded from the date the payment was due.” Id. (quoting Reimbursement Recovery, Inc. v. Indian River Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 22 So. 3d 679, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).

1990Moreover, settlement of a disputed claim may form a valid consideration for a new or substituted agreement between the parties, where the claim is well-founded, Miller-Dunn Co. v. Green, 154 Fla. 72 , 16 So.2d 637 (1944), or where there is a good faith belief in the validity of the claim.

1990Moreover, settlement of a disputed claim may form a valid consideration for a new or substituted agreement between the parties, where the claim is well-founded, Miller-Dunn Co. v. Green, 154 Fla. 72 , 16 So.2d 637 (1944), or where there is a good faith belief in the validity of the claim.

2016Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Schocoff, 725 So.2d 454, 456 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Republic Funding Corp. of Fla. v. Juarez, 563 So.2d 145, 147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

2016Regarding the disputed claim, the only error identified in Lucas is the trial court’s failure “to follow” the Fourth District’s “binding precedent” that there is no requirement for a “ ‘defendant to provide the name of a particular expert where the defendant claims that trial counsel failed to secure an expert in a named field of expertise.’ ” 147 So. 3d at 612 (quoting Terrell v. State, 9 So. 3d 1284, 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).

2016Regarding the disputed claim, the only error identified in Lucas is the trial court’s failure “to follow” the Fourth District’s “binding precedent” that there is no requirement for a “ ‘defendant to provide the name of a particular expert whére the defendant claims that trial counsel failed to secure an expert in a named field of expertise.’” 147 So.3d at 612 (quoting Terrell v. State, 9 So.3d 1284, 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).

2016Florida case law acknowledges that accord and satisfaction results “when an offeree accepts a payment which is tendered only on the express condition that its receipt is to be deemed a complete satisfaction of a disputed claim.” Hannah v. James A. Ryder Corp., 380 So.2d 507, 509-10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (emphasis added); see also, St.

2016Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Schocoff, 725 So.2d 454, 456 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Republic Funding Corp. of Fla. v. Juarez, 563 So.2d 145, 147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

2015“The lower court’s ultimate factual determinations during a non-jury trial may not be disturbed on appeal unless shown to be unsupported by competent and substantial evidence or to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Zupnik Haverland, L.L.C. v. Current Builders of Fla., Inc., 7 So.3d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citing Berlin v. Pecora, 968 So.2d 47, 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), rev. denied, 982 So.2d 684 (Fla.2008)); see also Merkin, 902 So.2d at 290 (‘When a cause is tried without a jury,the trial judge’s findings of fact are clothed with a presumption of correctness on appeal, and these findi

2015“The lower court’s ultimate factual determinations during a non-jury trial may not be disturbed on appeal unless shown to be unsupported by competent and substantial evidence or to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Zupnik Haverland, L.L.C. v. Current Builders of Fla., Inc., 7 So.3d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citing Berlin v. Pecora, 968 So.2d 47, 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), rev. denied, 982 So.2d 684 (Fla.2008)); see also Merkin, 902 So.2d at 290 (‘When a cause is tried without a jury,the trial judge’s findings of fact are clothed with a presumption of correctness on appeal, and these findi

2012Id. [Berloni v. Della Casa, 972 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).] (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Buildex, Inc., 476 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)).”); see e.g., Bevins v. Antuna, 68 So.3d 420, 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“Antunas should recover from the Bevins the accrued prejudgment interest on their escrow deposit from the date the funds should have been returned to them.”); Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 65 So.3d 22 , 34 n. 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“[I]f the trial court were basing the prejudgment interest on the ‘agreement’ of the parties, then interest would not accrue until Dr. Santini actu

2012See also Francois v. Harris, 366 So.2d 851, 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (observing that “in all but the most extreme cases, our system entrusts juries with the ultimate decisions” on a disputed claim, and that “[o]ur experience has demonstrated that juries deserve this trust and that they are well able to discern the truth and to render judgment accordingly”).

2006See id.

1992As a general rule, offers to compromise a disputed claim are not admissible to prove liability for the claim. § 90.408, Fla. Stat. (1989); see Bill Currie Ford, Inc. v. Cash, 252 So.2d 407 (Fla.2d DCA 1971), cert. denied, 256 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1972); City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So.2d 60 (Fla.3d DCA), aff'd, 191 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1966).