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21 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1960–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass'ngreen2 sentences2017Albans Sch., 134 A.3d 789, 817 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass’n, 930 A.2d 984, 994 (D.C. 2007) and Fed. 2016It is well established that a trial court may'not “use the information provided in settlement letters for the purpose of determining what is an appropriate resolution of a matter.” Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass’n, 930 A.2d 984, 994 (D.C.2007); see also Fed.R.Evid. 408(a)(2) (stating that “conduct or statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim” is not admissible “to prove or disprove the validity or- amount of a disputed claim”). | 2 | 2 |
Stinson v. Muellergreen2 sentences2008For there to be an accord and satisfaction, there must be “(1) a legitimately disputed or unliquidated claim, (2) a mutual agreement that the debtor will pay and the creditor will accept something other than the original amount due in satisfaction of the disputed claim, and (3) the actual giving and taking of the agreed upon substitution.” Pierola, 687 A.2d at 947 (citing Stinson v. *44 Mueller, 449 A.2d 329, 331-32 (D.C.1982)). 1997Stinson v. Mueller, 449 A.2d 329, 331-32 (D.C.1982). | 2 | 2 |
Moore v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2003As a voluntary settlement of a disputed claim, the consent decree was to be “construed within its four corners” and “enforced as written, absent a showing of good cause to set it aside, such as fraud, duress, or mistake.” Moore v. Jones, 542 A.2d 1253, 1254 (D.C.1988); accord, Camalier & Buckley, Inc. v. Sandoz & Lamberton, Inc., 667 A.2d 822, 825 (D.C.1995). 1988The agreement was made in satisfaction of a disputed claim after arbitration without further appeal to the courts as allowed by D.C.Code §§ 16-4311, -4312 (1981). 5 “Voluntary settlement of civil controversies is in high judicial favor.” Moore v. Jones, 542 A.2d 1253, 1255 (D.C.1988), quoting Autera v. Robinson, 136 U.S.App. | 2 | 2 |
Pierola v. Moschonasgreen2 sentences2008For there to be an accord and satisfaction, there must be “(1) a legitimately disputed or unliquidated claim, (2) a mutual agreement that the debtor will pay and the creditor will accept something other than the original amount due in satisfaction of the disputed claim, and (3) the actual giving and taking of the agreed upon substitution.” Pierola, 687 A.2d at 947 (citing Stinson v. *44 Mueller, 449 A.2d 329, 331-32 (D.C.1982)). 2003Accord and Satisfaction “[A]n accord and satisfaction is a valid affirmative defense to a breach of contract claim where there is proof of: (1) a legitimately disputed or unliquidated claim, (2) a mutual agreement that the debtor will pay and the creditor will accept something other than the original amount due in satisfaction of the disputed claim, *865 and (3) the actual giving and taking of the agreed upon substitution.” Pierola v. Moschonas, 687 A.2d 942, 947 (D.C.1997). | 1 | 3 |
MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY v. ST. ALBANS SCHOOLgreen1 sentence2017Albans Sch., 134 A.3d 789, 817 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass’n, 930 A.2d 984, 994 (D.C. 2007) and Fed. | 1 | 1 |
Camalier & Buckley, Inc. v. Sandoz & Lamberton, Inc.green1 sentence2003As a voluntary settlement of a disputed claim, the consent decree was to be “construed within its four corners” and “enforced as written, absent a showing of good cause to set it aside, such as fraud, duress, or mistake.” Moore v. Jones, 542 A.2d 1253, 1254 (D.C.1988); accord, Camalier & Buckley, Inc. v. Sandoz & Lamberton, Inc., 667 A.2d 822, 825 (D.C.1995). | 1 | 1 |
Grad v. Wetherholt Galleriesgreen1 sentence1997Grad v. Wetherholt Galleries, 660 A.2d 903, 907-08 (D.C.1995).” | 1 | 1 |
Holland v. Hannangreen1 sentence1990Rather, we conclude that interpreting it “depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence.” Holland v. Hannon, 456 A.2d 807, 815 (D.C.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences1990See Harrison v. District of Columbia, 95 A.2d 332, 334 (D.C.1953). 1990See Harrison v. District of Columbia, 95 A.2d 332, 334 (D.C.1953). | 1 | 1 |
Teodore Dorotee Autera v. Manuel Dudley Robinson, Anthony C. Autera v. Manuel Dudley Robinsongreen1 sentence1988D.C. 216, 218, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
Norling v. Carrgreen1 sentence1982Norling v. Carr, 211 F.2d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 1954), relying on Hanlon , also concluded that the defendant’s offer to pay plaintiff’s medical expenses which arose out of a hunting accident, was not an offer in compromise. | 1 | 1 |
Laganas v. Installation Specialties, Inc.green1 sentence1982See Laganas v. Installation Specialties, Inc., D.C.App., 291 A.2d 187 (1972); Voight & McMakin Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Property Redevelopment Corp., D.C.App., 276 A.2d 239 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schlossman & Gunkelman, Inc. v. Tallman
green
2 sentences2025Schlossman & Gunkelman, Inc. v. Tallman, 1999 ND 89, ¶ 26 , 593 N.W.2d 374 . 2025Schlossman & Gunkelman, Inc. v. Tallman, 1999 ND 89, ¶ 26 , 593 N.W.2d 374 . | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp.
green
2 sentences2003To begin with, the court said, “the determination of whether an insured is a ‘polluter,’ is a fact-based conclusion that should encompass consideration of a wide variety of factors,” including, “the nature of the insured’s business, whether that type of business presents a risk of pollution, whether the insured has a separate policy covering the disputed claim, whether the insured should have known from a read of the exclusion that a separate policy covering pollution damages would be necessary for the insured’s business, who the insurer typically insures, any other claims made under the polic 2003To begin with, the court said, "the determination of whether an insured is a `polluter,' is a fact-based conclusion that should encompass consideration of a wide *351 variety of factors," including, "the nature of the insured's business, whether that type of business presents a risk of pollution, whether the insured has a separate policy covering the disputed claim, whether the insured should have known from a read of the exclusion that a separate policy covering pollution damages would be necessary for the insured's business, who the insurer typically insures, any other claims made under the | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Clifford v. United States
green
1 sentence1994Appellant also urges, citing Clifford, supra, that the instruction the court gave “singles out the defendant’s interest in the outcome of a trial.” However, the disputed instruction nowhere employed the term “defendant,” but rather used the term “person.” Interestingly, several government witnesses admitted in their testimony at trial that they lied in their pretrial statements and grand jury testimony. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Voight & McMakin Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Property Redevelopment Corp.
green
1 sentence1982See Laganas v. Installation Specialties, Inc., D.C.App., 291 A.2d 187 (1972); Voight & McMakin Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Property Redevelopment Corp., D.C.App., 276 A.2d 239 (1971). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
United States v. Link
green
1 sentence1976In United States v. Hughes, supra (income tax evasion), and United States v. Link, supra (conspiracy), the issues were complex and a combination of errors, including the objectionable instruction, required reversal. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
In Re Melvin W. Alexander, Ratient
green
2 sentences1976Cf. Millard v. Harris, supra, 132 U.S.App.D.C. at 150, 406 F.2d at 968 ; In re Alexander, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 352 , 372 F.2d 925 (1967). 1976Cf. Millard v. Harris, supra, 132 U.S.App.D.C. at 150, 406 F.2d at 968 ; In re Alexander, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 352 , 372 F.2d 925 (1967). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. Christopher Hughes
green
1 sentence1976In United States v. Hughes, supra (income tax evasion), and United States v. Link, supra (conspiracy), the issues were complex and a combination of errors, including the objectionable instruction, required reversal. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Maurice I. Millard v. David W. Harris, Acting Superintendent, St. Elizabeths Hospital
green
1 sentence1976Cf. Millard v. Harris, supra, 132 U.S.App.D.C. at 150, 406 F.2d at 968 ; In re Alexander, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 352 , 372 F.2d 925 (1967). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Fire Ins. Assn., Ltd. v. Wickham
green
2 sentences1971Fire Insurance Ass’n v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 564, 577 , 12 S.Ct. 84 , 35 L. 1971Fire Insurance Ass’n v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 564, 577 , 12 S.Ct. 84 , 35 L. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Magruder v. National Metropolitan Bank of Washington
green
2 sentences1960The authorities differ in their language, but in general it may be said that the great weight of authority is that forbearance to press a claim is sufficient consideration unless the claim is so clearly unreasonable that it is evident that the claim cannot be asserted in good faith. [3] In Magruder v. National Metropolitan Bank, D.C.Mun.App., 40 A.2d 828, 830 , we said: "* * * there seems to be general agreement that if the claim is advanced in good faith and is not obviously absurd in fact or plainly unfounded in law, its forbearance constitutes a good consideration." Using our language above 1960The authorities differ in their language, but in general it may be said that the great weight of authority is that forbearance to press a claim is sufficient consideration unless the claim is so clearly unreasonable that it is evident that the claim cannot be asserted in good faith. 3 In Magruder v. National Metropolitan Bank, D.C.Mun.App., 40 A.2d 828, 830 , we said: “ * * * there seems to be general agreement that if the claim is advanced in good faith and is not obviously absurd in fact or plainly unfounded in law, its forbearance constitutes a good consideration.” Using our language above | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.