9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1930–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equipment Co.green1 sentence2015See also Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equipment Co., 595 A.2d 1190 , (Pa.Super. 1991) (“A term or clause is ‘conspicuous’ when it is ‘so written that a reasonable person -5- J-S21040-15 against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it . . . . | 1 | 1 |
J. J. Fagan & Co. v. Burnsgreen2 sentences1977“By the great weight of authority, the term clause, which is the habendum clause, dominates the period for which the lease shall run, so that unless it is properly modified by other provisions, all rights of the lessee cease at the expiration of the fixed time stated in the term clause, except in the one contingency that at the expiration of such time the lessee is actually producing oil and gas on the premises.” Fagan and Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674 , 226 N.W. 653, 655 , 67 A.L.R. 522, 524 (1929). 1977“By the great weight of authority, the term clause, which is the habendum clause, dominates the period for which the lease shall run, so that unless it is properly modified by other provisions, all rights of the lessee cease at the expiration of the fixed time stated in the term clause, except in the one contingency that at the expiration of such time the lessee is actually producing oil and gas on the premises.” Fagan and Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674 , 226 N.W. 653, 655 , 67 A.L.R. 522, 524 (1929). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gallucci v. Ben Avon Borough
green
1 sentence2011Id. (citing Higbee Corp. v. Kennedy, 286 Pa.Super. 101 , 428 A.2d 592 (1981)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Higbee Corporation v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2011Id. (citing Higbee Corp. v. Kennedy, 286 Pa.Super. 101 , 428 A.2d 592 (1981)). 2011Id. (citing Higbee Corp. v. Kennedy, 286 Pa.Super. 101 , 428 A.2d 592 (1981)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Watkins v. Prudential Insurance
green
2 sentences1985Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315 Pa. 497 , 173 A. 644 (1934). 1985Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315 Pa. 497 , 173 A. 644 (1934). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Kantor v. Herd
green
1 sentence1949In Kantor v. Herd et al., 276 Pa. 519, 524 , it is suggested that the court is not strictly bound by the term rule in a statutory proceeding. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Salus v. Fogel
green
1 sentence1949In Salus et al. v. Fogel, 302 Pa. 268, 271 , it was held that where the judgment is entered on the last day of the term it is inequitable to refuse to consider a motion to open which must of necessity be made after the term in which the judgment was rendered. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Ladner v. Siegel (No. 4)
green
1 sentence1939Judgment affirmed. 1 Ladner et al. v. Siegel (No. 4), 298 Pa. 487, 494 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Commonwealth v. Taylor
neutral
1 sentence1933It has been repeatedly held that in a case of this character, a failure to explain the meaning of the term is not error where no explanation is requested: Com. v. Berney, 262 Pa. 176 , 105 A. 54 ; Com. v. Taylor, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 386 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Commonwealth v. Berney
green
2 sentences1933It has been repeatedly held that in a case of this character, a failure to explain the meaning of the term is not error where no explanation is requested: Com. v. Berney, 262 Pa. 176 , 105 A. 54 ; Com. v. Taylor, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 386 . 1933It has been repeatedly held that in a case of this character, a failure to explain the meaning of the term is not error where no explanation is requested: Com. v. Berney, 262 Pa. 176 , 105 A. 54 ; Com. v. Taylor, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 386 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Commonwealth v. Brady
green
1 sentence1932“To entitle a defendant to a new trial on this ground [after-discovered evidence] the evidence must have been discovered since the trial, and be such as could not have been obtained at the trial by the use of reasonable diligence; it must not be simply corroborative or cumulative or merely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and it must be such as would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted: Com. v. Brady, 76 Pa. Superior Ct. 488 ; Com. v. Carter, 272 Pa. 551 ; Com. v. Flanagan, 7 W. & S. 415 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Fisher v. Hestonville, Mantua & Fairmount Passenger Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1932Co., 185 Pa. 602 , 40 A. 97 ; Penna. 1932Co., 185 Pa. 602 , 40 A. 97 ; Penna. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Commonwealth v. Carter
green
1 sentence1932“To entitle a defendant to a new trial on this ground [after-discovered evidence] the evidence must have been discovered since the trial, and be such as could not have been obtained at the trial by the use of reasonable diligence; it must not be simply corroborative or cumulative or merely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and it must be such as would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted: Com. v. Brady, 76 Pa. Superior Ct. 488 ; Com. v. Carter, 272 Pa. 551 ; Com. v. Flanagan, 7 W. & S. 415 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Commonwealth v. Flanagan
green
1 sentence1932“To entitle a defendant to a new trial on this ground [after-discovered evidence] the evidence must have been discovered since the trial, and be such as could not have been obtained at the trial by the use of reasonable diligence; it must not be simply corroborative or cumulative or merely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and it must be such as would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted: Com. v. Brady, 76 Pa. Superior Ct. 488 ; Com. v. Carter, 272 Pa. 551 ; Com. v. Flanagan, 7 W. & S. 415 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Kauffman v. Reese
neutral
1 sentence1930Of course, where a judgment is obtained by extrinsic fraud (of which there is here no suggestion), the term rule above stated has no application: McEvoy v. Quaker City Cab Co., 267 Pa. 527 ; Kauffman v. Reese, 77 Pa. Superior Ct. 601 . | 1 | 1930–1930 |
McEvoy v. Quaker City Cab Co.
green
1 sentence1930Of course, where a judgment is obtained by extrinsic fraud (of which there is here no suggestion), the term rule above stated has no application: McEvoy v. Quaker City Cab Co., 267 Pa. 527 ; Kauffman v. Reese, 77 Pa. Superior Ct. 601 . | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.