term clause (Kentucky) · Go Syfert
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term clause in Kentucky

7 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1961–2023 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.green
scotus · 1991 · cited in 1 Kentucky opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 , 111 S.Ct. 2123 , 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991); Lake Village Water Assn. v. Sorrell, Ky. App., 815 S.W.2d 418 (1991).

1996See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 , 111 S.Ct. 2123 , 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991); Lake Village Water Assn. v. Sorrell, Ky. App., 815 S.W.2d 418 (1991).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd. green
ky · 1998
2 sentences

2023Nevertheless, the term “claim preclusion” is often preferable to the term “res judicata,” if only for the sake of clarity and to use a term that parallels “issue preclusion.” See, e.g., Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465 n.2 (“In this opinion we employ the term claim preclusion to refer to the doctrine which bars subsequent litigation of a cause of action which has previously been adjudicated.

2011Nevertheless, the term “claim preclusion” is often preferable to the term “res judicata,” if only for the sake of clarity and to use a term that parallels “issue preclusion.” See, e.g., Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465 n. 2 (“In this opinion we employ the term claim preclusion to refer to the doctrine which bars subsequent litigation of a cause of action which has previously been adjudicated.

22011–2023
Lewis v. B & R CORPORATION green
kyctapp · 2001
2 sentences

2007Language contained in the body of a form is regarded as conspicuous “if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color.” Id.

2007Id.

12007–2007
Lake Village Water Ass'n v. Sorrell green
kyctapp · 1991
1 sentence

1996See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 , 111 S.Ct. 2123 , 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991); Lake Village Water Assn. v. Sorrell, Ky. App., 815 S.W.2d 418 (1991).

11996–1996
Vaughn v. Hearrell green
kyctapphigh · 1961
2 sentences

1991We find this view to have been expressed in Vaughn v. Hearrell, supra, wherein the court noted that the term clause of an oil and gas lease dictates the period for which the lease shall run, unless the clause is properly modified by another lease provision.

1991The lease form in Vaughn, supra, contained both a delay rental clause and a dry hole clause, which are intended to keep the lease in force only within the primary term.

11991–1991
Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards green
kyctapphigh · 1970
1 sentence

1985Hertz relied in part on Childers & Venters, supra. The terms and conditions on the reverse side of the retail purchase order do include limited warranties, and to this extent, the identification of these must be “conspicuous.” The Uniform Commercial Code, found in KRS 355.1-201(10), defines “conspicuous” as: A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.

11985–1985
J. J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns green
mich · 1929
2 sentences

1961Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674 , 226 N.W. 653, 655 , 67 A.L.R. 522 , speaking of the form of the oil and gas lease known as Producers 88, the court said: “ * * * By the great weight of authority, the term clause, * * * dominates the period for which the lease shall run, so that, unless it is properly modified by other provisions, all rights of the lessees cease at the expiration of the fixed time stated in the term clause, except in the one contingency that at the expiration of such time the lessee is actually producing oil and gas on the premises * * *.

1961Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674 , 226 N.W. 653, 655 , 67 A.L.R. 522 , speaking of the form of the oil and gas lease known as Producers 88, the court said: “ * * * By the great weight of authority, the term clause, * * * dominates the period for which the lease shall run, so that, unless it is properly modified by other provisions, all rights of the lessees cease at the expiration of the fixed time stated in the term clause, except in the one contingency that at the expiration of such time the lessee is actually producing oil and gas on the premises * * *.

11961–1961
Lester v. Mid-South Oil Co. neutral
ca6 · 1924
1 sentence

1961At the expiration of the fixed time, if there is no production to extend it, the lease ends, not by forfeiture, but by its own terms. * * * ” Though the Michigan case just quoted holds that under a Producers 88 lease it is not enough for the lessee to commence drilling within the primary term, and that the lease terminates at the end of the primary term in the absence of actual production, thus declining to follow Lester v. Mid-South Oil Co., 6 Cir., 296 F. 661 , which, in construing a Kentucky lease, held otherwise, certainly that portion of the opinion applicable to the question in this case

11961–1961

Where else courts name it

CA 66 (1865–2026) NY 25 (1901–2025) IL 24 (1907–2026) MO 22 (1892–2022) TX 22 (1911–2024) WI 19 (1988–2026) CT 13 (1972–2015) MA 13 (1973–2018) OH 12 (1943–2025) WY 11 (1971–2023) PA 9 (1930–2015) WA 9 (1893–2017) FL 9 (1939–2017) MD 8 (1977–2024) KS 8 (1952–2022) GA 7 (1913–2007) IN 7 (1881–2005) OR 7 (1954–2016) KY 7 (1961–2023) NC 6 (1957–2023) NH 5 (2006–2016) MI 4 (1942–2010) ME 4 (1960–2025) NM 4 (1998–2020) DC 4 (2012–2024) IA 4 (1972–2000) AR 3 (1941–2002) NE 3 (1952–1992) OK 3 (1926–1938) HI 3 (1899–2016) WV 3 (1926–2012) MS 3 (1881–2020) NV 2 (2002–2002) AK 2 (1981–1989) LA 2 (1979–2011) TN 2 (1946–1979) ID 2 (1976–1991) CO 2 (2012–2016) AL 2 (1911–1990)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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