term rule in Kansas

2001See In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 203-04 , 542 P.2d 676 (1975) (refusing to apply the prior term rule to judge because of his role in the judicial system); Schroeder, 199 Kan. at 414 (re *391 fusing to apply prior term rule where county commissioner “stoutly denied” any wrongdoing from acts occurring in his first term); State, ex rel, v. Harvey, 148 Kan. 166, 172 , 80 P.2d 1095 (1938) (county clerk had continuing duty to make restitution for missing funds which precluded application of the prior term rule).

2001See In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 203-04 , 542 P.2d 676 (1975) (refusing to apply the prior term rule to judge because of his role in the judicial system); Schroeder, 199 Kan. at 414 (re *391 fusing to apply prior term rule where county commissioner “stoutly denied” any wrongdoing from acts occurring in his first term); State, ex rel, v. Harvey, 148 Kan. 166, 172 , 80 P.2d 1095 (1938) (county clerk had continuing duty to make restitution for missing funds which precluded application of the prior term rule).

2022App. 2d 964 , 911 P.2d 192 (1996)—a case involving a separation agreement containing the term material change in circumstances—other panels of this court have mistakenly used the term as a test when considering maintenance modification disputes controlled by K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2903.

2020He cites State v. Royal, 234 Kan. 218 , 670 P.2d 1337 (1983), to support his claim.

2020He cites State v. Royal, 234 Kan. 218 , 670 P.2d 1337 (1983), to support his claim.

2001In State, ex rel., v. Schroeder, 199 Kan. 403, 414 , 430 P.2d 315 (1967), this court discussed the rationale behind the prior term rule, stating: “[T]he principal rationale of the rule is that reelection or reappointment of the officer amounts to condonation of his prior misconduct.

2001In State, ex rel., v. Schroeder, 199 Kan. 403, 414 , 430 P.2d 315 (1967), this court discussed the rationale behind the prior term rule, stating: “[T]he principal rationale of the rule is that reelection or reappointment of the officer amounts to condonation of his prior misconduct.

1976Cir. 1931].) The Supreme Court of Kansas in Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas *312 Co., 172 Kan. 351 , 240 P. 2d 465 , was confronted with a drilling clause in an oil and gas lease using the expression “found in paying quantities” and a habendum clause designed to continue the lease beyond the primary term, where oil or gas was found in paying quantities, for a secondary term “as long thereafter'as oil or gas, or either of them is produced from said land.” The court there found it necessary to construe the ambiguity between the habendum (the term clause) and the drilling clause of the oil and gas le

1976Cir. 1931].) The Supreme Court of Kansas in Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas *312 Co., 172 Kan. 351 , 240 P. 2d 465 , was confronted with a drilling clause in an oil and gas lease using the expression “found in paying quantities” and a habendum clause designed to continue the lease beyond the primary term, where oil or gas was found in paying quantities, for a secondary term “as long thereafter'as oil or gas, or either of them is produced from said land.” The court there found it necessary to construe the ambiguity between the habendum (the term clause) and the drilling clause of the oil and gas le

1974Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C.

1974Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A. 2d 834 (D.

1967From our consideration of the instructions as a whole, as such is required on appellate review (see State v. Spohr, 171 Kan. 129 , 230 P. 2d 1013 , West’s Kansas Digest, Criminal Law, §822; Hatcher’s Kansas Digest, Criminal Law, §295), we find them to be sufficient.

1967From our consideration of the instructions as a whole, as such is required on appellate review (see State v. Spohr, 171 Kan. 129 , 230 P. 2d 1013 , West’s Kansas Digest, Criminal Law, §822; Hatcher’s Kansas Digest, Criminal Law, §295), we find them to be sufficient.

1952Corp. v. Urschel, 159 Kan. 674, 678 , 157 P. 2d 805 ; Jerecki Manufacturing Co. v. Shields, 169 Kan. 640, 642 , 220 P. 2d 144 .) Appellant argues the district court erred in changing that part of the journal entry which pertained to the claim of the son after the term in which that claim was dismissed.

1952Corp. v. Urschel, 159 Kan. 674, 678 , 157 P. 2d 805 ; Jerecki Manufacturing Co. v. Shields, 169 Kan. 640, 642 , 220 P. 2d 144 .) Appellant argues the district court erred in changing that part of the journal entry which pertained to the claim of the son after the term in which that claim was dismissed.

1952Corp. v. Urschel, 159 Kan. 674, 678 , 157 P. 2d 805 ; Jerecki Manufacturing Co. v. Shields, 169 Kan. 640, 642 , 220 P. 2d 144 .) Appellant argues the district court erred in changing that part of the journal entry which pertained to the claim of the son after the term in which that claim was dismissed.

1952Corp. v. Urschel, 159 Kan. 674, 678 , 157 P. 2d 805 ; Jerecki Manufacturing Co. v. Shields, 169 Kan. 640, 642 , 220 P. 2d 144 .) Appellant argues the district court erred in changing that part of the journal entry which pertained to the claim of the son after the term in which that claim was dismissed.