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8 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wabash Railway Co. v. City of Garygreen2 sentences2024Co. v. Gary, 132 N.E. 737, 738 (Ind. 1921) (“[T]he motion by appellee to set aside and vacate such judgment, duly presented before the expiration of the term, kept the proceedings in fieri, so that the motion could be ruled on at a later term, with like effect as if the judgment had been set aside at the same term.”); First Christian Church of Medford v. Robb, 138 P. 856, 857 (Or. 1914) (explaining that “an appropriate motion” to set aside a judgment could cause proceedings to “remain under consideration and not finally disposed of”). 2024Co. v. Gary, 132 N.E. 737, 738 (Ind. 1921) (“[T]he motion by appellee to set aside and vacate such judgment, duly presented before the expiration of the term, kept the proceedings in fieri, so that the motion could be ruled on at a later term, with like effect as if the judgment had been set aside at the same term.”); First Christian Church of Medford v. Robb, 138 P. 856, 857 (Or. 1914) (explaining that “an appropriate motion” to set aside a judgment could cause proceedings to “remain under consideration and not finally disposed of”). | 2 | 2 |
First Christian Church v. Robbgreen2 sentences2024Co. v. Gary, 132 N.E. 737, 738 (Ind. 1921) (“[T]he motion by appellee to set aside and vacate such judgment, duly presented before the expiration of the term, kept the proceedings in fieri, so that the motion could be ruled on at a later term, with like effect as if the judgment had been set aside at the same term.”); First Christian Church of Medford v. Robb, 138 P. 856, 857 (Or. 1914) (explaining that “an appropriate motion” to set aside a judgment could cause proceedings to “remain under consideration and not finally disposed of”). 2024Co. v. Gary, 132 N.E. 737, 738 (Ind. 1921) (“[T]he motion by appellee to set aside and vacate such judgment, duly presented before the expiration of the term, kept the proceedings in fieri, so that the motion could be ruled on at a later term, with like effect as if the judgment had been set aside at the same term.”); First Christian Church of Medford v. Robb, 138 P. 856, 857 (Or. 1914) (explaining that “an appropriate motion” to set aside a judgment could cause proceedings to “remain under consideration and not finally disposed of”). | 2 | 2 |
Spalding v. Spaldinggreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Spalding v. Spalding, 12 Ohio Law Abs. 589, 590 (Ohio App. 1932) (holding that court had jurisdiction at a later term to rule upon a timely motion to set aside a judgment, even though the motion was not formally continued, because “a 6 presumption exists that the continuance was made and that the motion stood for hearing at the succeeding term”); Wabash Ry. 2024See, e.g., Spalding v. Spalding, 12 Ohio Law Abs. 589, 590 (Ohio App. 1932) (holding that court had jurisdiction at a later term to rule upon a timely motion to set aside a judgment, even though the motion was not formally continued, because “a 6 presumption exists that the continuance was made and that the motion stood for hearing at the succeeding term”); Wabash Ry. | 2 | 2 |
White v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See White v. State , 23 Md. 2018See White v. State, 23 Md. | 2 | 2 |
Curtis v. Stategreen2 sentences1981See, e.g., Veney v. Warden, 259 Md. 437, 442 , 271 A.2d 133, 137 (1970); Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 294-99 , 164 A.2d 526, 633-35 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961). 3 In explaining why the asserted right to a sequestered jury can be waived by a defendant through his failure to object, we note that the term waiver "is ambiguous, susceptible to numerous meanings depending upon the particular context in which it is used.” Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 141 , 395 A.2d 464, 469 (1978). 1981See, e.g., Veney v. Warden, 259 Md. 437, 442 , 271 A.2d 133, 137 (1970); Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 294-99 , 164 A.2d 526, 633-35 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961). 3 In explaining why the asserted right to a sequestered jury can be waived by a defendant through his failure to object, we note that the term waiver "is ambiguous, susceptible to numerous meanings depending upon the particular context in which it is used.” Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 141 , 395 A.2d 464, 469 (1978). | 1 | 2 |
Midgett v. Stategreen2 sentences1981See, e.g., Veney v. Warden, 259 Md. 437, 442 , 271 A.2d 133, 137 (1970); Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 294-99 , 164 A.2d 526, 633-35 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961). 3 In explaining why the asserted right to a sequestered jury can be waived by a defendant through his failure to object, we note that the term waiver "is ambiguous, susceptible to numerous meanings depending upon the particular context in which it is used.” Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 141 , 395 A.2d 464, 469 (1978). 1981See, e.g., Veney v. Warden, 259 Md. 437, 442 , 271 A.2d 133, 137 (1970); Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 294-99 , 164 A.2d 526, 633-35 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961). 3 In explaining why the asserted right to a sequestered jury can be waived by a defendant through his failure to object, we note that the term waiver "is ambiguous, susceptible to numerous meanings depending upon the particular context in which it is used.” Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 141 , 395 A.2d 464, 469 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Veney v. Wardengreen2 sentences1981See, e.g., Veney v. Warden, 259 Md. 437, 442 , 271 A.2d 133, 137 (1970); Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 294-99 , 164 A.2d 526, 633-35 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961). 3 In explaining why the asserted right to a sequestered jury can be waived by a defendant through his failure to object, we note that the term waiver "is ambiguous, susceptible to numerous meanings depending upon the particular context in which it is used.” Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 141 , 395 A.2d 464, 469 (1978). 1981See, e.g., Veney v. Warden, 259 Md. 437, 442 , 271 A.2d 133, 137 (1970); Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 294-99 , 164 A.2d 526, 633-35 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961). 3 In explaining why the asserted right to a sequestered jury can be waived by a defendant through his failure to object, we note that the term waiver "is ambiguous, susceptible to numerous meanings depending upon the particular context in which it is used.” Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 141 , 395 A.2d 464, 469 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Stategreen1 sentence1978See Evans v. State, supra, 28 Md. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Midgett v. Maryland
green
1 sentence1981See, e.g., Veney v. Warden, 259 Md. 437, 442 , 271 A.2d 133, 137 (1970); Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 294-99 , 164 A.2d 526, 633-35 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961). 3 In explaining why the asserted right to a sequestered jury can be waived by a defendant through his failure to object, we note that the term waiver "is ambiguous, susceptible to numerous meanings depending upon the particular context in which it is used.” Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 141 , 395 A.2d 464, 469 (1978). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1981In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L. 1981In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Stanford v. District Title Insurance
green
2 sentences1977After explaining the underlying purposes of the dismissal rule in Stanford, supra, 260 Md. at 555 , Judge Digges turned his attention, oh behalf of the Court, to the narrowness of the escape route provided by the rule: “Seizing upon eighteen months as the utmost reasonable time period in which a case can be permitted to remain catatonic, that rule permits the trial judge to allow a brief reprieve where it is affirmatively demonstrated that total inaction has been justified. 1977After explaining the underlying purposes of the dismissal rule in Stanford, supra, 260 Md. at 555 , Judge Digges turned his attention, oh behalf of the Court, to the narrowness of the escape route provided by the rule: “Seizing upon eighteen months as the utmost reasonable time period in which a case can be permitted to remain catatonic, that rule permits the trial judge to allow a brief reprieve where it is affirmatively demonstrated that total inaction has been justified. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.