term waiver in Connecticut

2003"By this broadest possible definition . . . [of the term claim, the Bankruptcy Code] contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be deal with in the bankruptcy case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lighttowler v. Continental Insurance Co. . 255 Conn. 639 , 649 , 769 A.2d 49 (2001).

2003"By this broadest possible definition . . . [of the term claim, the Bankruptcy Code] contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be deal with in the bankruptcy case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lighttowler v. Continental Insurance Co. . 255 Conn. 639 , 649 , 769 A.2d 49 (2001).

2001“By this broadest possible definition ... [of the term claim, the Bankruptcy Code] contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 , 1003 (2d Cir. 1991), quoting H.R.

1998"Section 53a-119a (b) [now § 53a-119a (c) which refers to the provisions of § 53a-119a (a)] eliminates the requirement of proof of commission of the crime or conviction as the basis of a merchant's freedom from civil liability by granting merchants a qualified privilege to detain and question suspected shoplifters CT Page 11325 and by creating a rebuttable presumption of guilt in a civil action by the detainer, if reasonable grounds to believe that the detained person was committing or attempting to commit a larceny are shown." (Emphasis added.) State v. Diaz , 39 Conn. Sup. 392 , 395 , 466 A.

1998"Section 53a-119a (b) [now § 53a-119a (c) which refers to the provisions of § 53a-119a (a)] eliminates the requirement of proof of commission of the crime or conviction as the basis of a merchant's freedom from civil liability by granting merchants a qualified privilege to detain and question suspected shoplifters CT Page 11325 and by creating a rebuttable presumption of guilt in a civil action by the detainer, if reasonable grounds to believe that the detained person was committing or attempting to commit a larceny are shown." (Emphasis added.) State v. Diaz , 39 Conn. Sup. 392 , 395 , 466 A.

1996In Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh, 218 Conn. 681 , 590 A.2d 957 (1991), the court outlined two elements which must be demonstrated in order to assert an implied waiver or estoppel claim, "Under Connecticut law, any claim of estoppel is predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury. . . .

1996In Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh, 218 Conn. 681 , 590 A.2d 957 (1991), the court outlined two elements which must be demonstrated in order to assert an implied waiver or estoppel claim, "Under Connecticut law, any claim of estoppel is predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury. . . .

1996"If conduct or action on the part of the [defendant] is responsible for the [plaintiff's] failure to comply in time with the conditions precedent . . . injustice is avoided and adequate relief assured without doing violence to the plain language used by the legislature, by resort to traditional principles of waiver and estoppel." Boyce v. Allstate Insurance Co., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 374599 (January 4, 1994, Corradino, J., 9 CSCR 90 ).

1994Given the above interpretation of the term hearing, the decision of our Supreme Court in Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 192 Conn. 183 , involving an analogous situation, provides persuasive authority to uphold the FOIC decision rendered in this case.

1994Given the above interpretation of the term hearing, the decision of our Supreme Court in Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 192 Conn. 183 , involving an analogous situation, provides persuasive authority to uphold the FOIC decision rendered in this case.

1973The “latent ambiguity” rule does not permit extrinsic evidence of the testator’s intention “which would substitute in place of the term or word another term or word not used by the testator, or add to a term or a clause an omission.” Id., 221 .