6 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Walstongreen2 sentences2014App. __, __, 747 S.E.2d 720 , 726–28 (2013) (concluding the trial court’s use of the term “victim” in its instruction to the jury was prejudicial error), disc. review denied, __ N.C. __, __ S.E.2d __ (No. 023P14) (filed Mar. 6, 2014). 2013App. _, _, _, 747 S.E.2d 720, 726, 728 (2013) (concluding the trial court’s use of the term “victim” in its instruction to the jury was prejudicial error). | 1 | 2 |
Henderson County v. Osteengreen2 sentences2023DILLON, J., concurring The term presumption “is often loosely used.” Henderson Cty. v. Osteen, 297 N.C. 113, 117 , 254 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1979). 2023DILLON, J., concurring The term presumption “is often loosely used.” Henderson Cty. v. Osteen, 297 N.C. 113, 117 , 254 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Revis v. . Ramsey
neutral
2 sentences1972Plaintiff appealed “upon the theory that the matter was then res judicata and no appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another.” The appeal was dismissed as premature, but Chief Justice Stacy pointed out that the “principle of res judicata does not extend to ordinary motions incidental to the progress of a cause but only to those involving substantial rights.” Id. at 817 , 164 S.E. at 358 . 1972Plaintiff appealed “upon the theory that the matter was then res judicata and no appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another.” The appeal was dismissed as premature, but Chief Justice Stacy pointed out that the “principle of res judicata does not extend to ordinary motions incidental to the progress of a cause but only to those involving substantial rights.” Id. at 817 , 164 S.E. at 358 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
cluster 263736
green
1 sentence1972Boeing Airplane Company v. O’Malley, 329 F. 2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964) ; Greenspun v. American Adhesives, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Greenspun v. American Adhesives, Inc.
green
1 sentence1972Boeing Airplane Company v. O’Malley, 329 F. 2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964) ; Greenspun v. American Adhesives, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
In Re the Will of Wall
green
2 sentences1957The Court said in In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591 , 27 S.E.2d 728 , 730: "The term presumption as connotating a presumption of law is generally used as indicative of a mandatory deduction which the law directs to be made, in the sense of a rule of law laid down by the Court, while a presumption of fact used in the sense of an inference is a deduction from the evidence, having its origin in the well recognized relation between certain facts in evidence and the ultimate question to be proven." In that case the Court quoted from Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410 , 171 N.W. 5 1957The Court said in In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591 , 27 S.E.2d 728 , 730: "The term presumption as connotating a presumption of law is generally used as indicative of a mandatory deduction which the law directs to be made, in the sense of a rule of law laid down by the Court, while a presumption of fact used in the sense of an inference is a deduction from the evidence, having its origin in the well recognized relation between certain facts in evidence and the ultimate question to be proven." In that case the Court quoted from Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410 , 171 N.W. 5 | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co.
green
2 sentences1957The Court said in In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591 , 27 S.E.2d 728 , 730: "The term presumption as connotating a presumption of law is generally used as indicative of a mandatory deduction which the law directs to be made, in the sense of a rule of law laid down by the Court, while a presumption of fact used in the sense of an inference is a deduction from the evidence, having its origin in the well recognized relation between certain facts in evidence and the ultimate question to be proven." In that case the Court quoted from Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410 , 171 N.W. 5 1957The Court said in In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591 , 27 S.E.2d 728 , 730: "The term presumption as connotating a presumption of law is generally used as indicative of a mandatory deduction which the law directs to be made, in the sense of a rule of law laid down by the Court, while a presumption of fact used in the sense of an inference is a deduction from the evidence, having its origin in the well recognized relation between certain facts in evidence and the ultimate question to be proven." In that case the Court quoted from Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410 , 171 N.W. 5 | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.