22 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1911–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. Crim. 2015Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982); Willis v. State, 790 S.W.2d at 315; and Sanders v. State. | 3 | 3 |
Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2022For purposes of this opinion, we use the term immunity to refer to governmental immunity. 15 altogether.”); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2003) (“Unlike immunity from suit, immunity from liability does not affect a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case and cannot be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction.”). 2016See Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 , 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003). | 2 | 2 |
U.S. Rentals, Inc. v. Mundy Service Corp.green1 sentence2024Corp., 901 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied). 2 At the time of Dresser, UCC section 1.201(10) defined “conspicuous” as: A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. | 1 | 1 |
Federal Sign v. Texas Southern Universityred1 sentence2022In Federal Sign v. Texas Southern University, 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 (Tex. 1997), the supreme court held that a governmental entity does not waive9 immunity from a breach-of-contract suit simply by entering into a contract for goods and 9 Although cases often use the term waiver-by-conduct, the supreme court has clarified that abrogation is a more appropriate term. | 1 | 1 |
Giesberg v. Stategreen1 sentence2020The term defense should not be used for an issue that has not been specifically labeled as such by the Legislature.” Giesberg v. State, 984 S.W.2d 245, 250-51 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Patrick v. Barrettgreen2 sentences2017The term exception is broader than the term reservation, as it can be used either to exempt an interest from the grant and retain it with the grantor or exempt “from the operation of the deed some part of the thing granted the title of which is at the time in another.” Id.; see also Patrick v. Barrett, 734 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. 1987) (citing Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 648 ; Benge, 259 S.W.2d at 167–68). 2017The term exception is broader than the term reservation, as it can be used either to exempt an interest from the grant and retain it with the grantor or exempt “from the operation of the deed some part of the thing granted the title of which is at the time in -another.” Id.; see also Patrick v. Barrett, 734 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. 1987). (citing Pick, 302 S.W.2d at 648 ; Benge, 259 S.W.2d at 167-68 ). | 1 | 1 |
Pich v. Lankfordgreen2 sentences2017The term exception is broader than the term reservation, as it can be used either to exempt an interest from the grant and retain it with the grantor or exempt “from the operation of the deed some part of the thing granted the title of which is at the time in another.” Id.; see also Patrick v. Barrett, 734 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. 1987) (citing Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 648 ; Benge, 259 S.W.2d at 167–68). 2017The term exception is broader than the term reservation, as it can be used either to exempt an interest from the grant and retain it with the grantor or exempt “from the operation of the deed some part of the thing granted the title of which is at the time in -another.” Id.; see also Patrick v. Barrett, 734 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. 1987). (citing Pick, 302 S.W.2d at 648 ; Benge, 259 S.W.2d at 167-68 ). | 1 | 1 |
Clanin v. Claningreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Clanin v. Clanin, 918 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 1996, no writ) (explaining that trial court could enforce property division agreement to the extent of the property covered by the agreement and make a just and right division of the rest of the community estate). | 1 | 1 |
Newman v. Obersteller Ex Rel. Oberstellergreen1 sentence2008See Newman v. Obersteller , 960 S.W.2d 621 , 622 B 23 (Tex. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Miles v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Moreover, that burden remains upon the State throughout the trial until the jury reaches a verdict.” Miles v. State, 154 S.W.3d at 688 (Hudson, J., coneurringXcitations and internal quotes omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc.green1 sentence2006Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc ., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Stevens v. National Education Centers, Inc.green2 sentences2004See Stevens I, 990 S.W.2d at 379 . 2004See Stevens I, 990 S.W.2d at 379 . | 1 | 1 |
Cibro Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Sohio Alaska Petroleum Co.green2 sentences1994The court held that “Notwithstanding [] protestations to the contrary, these contracts are admissible to aid the court in interpreting the term clause at issue in this litigation.” Id. 1994See 602 F.Supp. at 1551 (“Notwithstanding defendant’s protestations to the contrary, these contracts are admissible to aid the court in interpreting the term clause at issue in this litigation.”) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. v. Jerry Aldridge
green
1 sentence2019Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9 , 19 n.6 (Tex. 2014) (noting that Texas courts usually use the term presumption while federal courts generally refer to a spoliation instruction as an adverse-inference instruction). –17– what happened to the actual documents in the back of the vehicle. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Benge v. Scharbauer
green
2 sentences2017The term exception is broader than the term reservation, as it can be used either to exempt an interest from the grant and retain it with the grantor or exempt “from the operation of the deed some part of the thing granted the title of which is at the time in another.” Id.; see also Patrick v. Barrett, 734 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. 1987) (citing Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 648 ; Benge, 259 S.W.2d at 167–68). 2017The term exception is broader than the term reservation, as it can be used either to exempt an interest from the grant and retain it with the grantor or exempt “from the operation of the deed some part of the thing granted the title of which is at the time in -another.” Id.; see also Patrick v. Barrett, 734 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. 1987). (citing Pick, 302 S.W.2d at 648 ; Benge, 259 S.W.2d at 167-68 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Moreno
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Mokkala v. Mead
green
1 sentence2006We also considered the term A claim @ as defined by statute as A > a health care liability claim. = @ Id. (quoting T ex. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Willis v. State
green
2 sentences1998Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d, 640 , 644 *251 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Willis v. State, 790 S.W.2d at 315 ; and Sanders v. State . 1998Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d, 640, 644 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Willis v. State, 790 S.W.2d at 315 ; and Sanders v. State. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Mary S. Smith v. Don Chapman, D/B/A Don Chapman Motor Sales
green
1 sentence1984A provision buried in a mass of fine print on the reverse side of a contract is not “conspicuous.” See Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968 (5th Cir.1980) (interpreting Texas law). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Carr v. Radkey
green
1 sentence1979This is pointed out in Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.1965), where the court was of the opinion expert witnesses may testify to ultimate issues if their testimony promoted understanding of the issues and helped the jury to reach a decision, where to do so did not involve legal definitions, legal tests, or pure questions of law. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Carr v. Jones
green
1 sentence1976Moore v. Sellers, supra; Carr v. Jones, supra; Bogert, Law of Trusts, § 59, p. 223 (Fifth Edition 1973). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Caruthers v. Leonard
green
1 sentence1928App.) 254 S. W. 779 , in an opinion by Section B of the Commission of Appeals, approved by the Supreme Court, it is held, in substance, that a lease conveying oil and gas in place with a right to enter and appropriate creates a determinable fee, or fee-simple determinable in the oil and gas in place, and not an. estate upon condition subsequent, the only estate remaining in the lessor being a mere possibility of reverter, and that while such possibility of reverter is assignable that a conveyance of an undivided one-half interest in minerals, in terms subject to existing mining lease, conveyed | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Brown v. Ruse
green
2 sentences1911In Brown v. Ruse, 69 Tex. 589 , 7 S. W. 489 , where the commissioners’ court after approving and directing the payment of a claim entered an order at a subsequent term, reciting that, there being no money in the treasury to meet claims of that character, no draft should issue on it or tax be levied to meet it, as provided in a former order, it was said by Judge Stayton, in passing( upon this question: “No subsequent action óf the court, had without notice to appellee, could affect his right, if this could have been done at all after the close of the term at which the claim was allowed,” approv 1911In Brown v. Ruse, 69 Tex. 589 , 7 S. W. 489 , where the commissioners’ court after approving and directing the payment of a claim entered an order at a subsequent term, reciting that, there being no money in the treasury to meet claims of that character, no draft should issue on it or tax be levied to meet it, as provided in a former order, it was said by Judge Stayton, in passing( upon this question: “No subsequent action óf the court, had without notice to appellee, could affect his right, if this could have been done at all after the close of the term at which the claim was allowed,” approv | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Callaghan v. Salliway
green
1 sentence1911In Callaghan v. Salliway, 5 Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.