resolution claim in California

2024(People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297 , 308-310 & fn. 3 (Collins).) The California Supreme Court has offered “some general guidance to help ensure that a defendant’s jury trial waiver is knowing and intelligent, and to facilitate the resolution of a challenge to a jury waiver on appeal,” recommending “that trial courts advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all

2024We instead examine the totality of the circumstances.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167 .) Our Supreme Court in Sivongxxay “offer[ed] some general guidance to help ensure that a defendant’s jury trial waiver is knowing and intelligent, and to facilitate the resolution of a challenge to a jury waiver on appeal.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169 .) It “recommend[s] that trial courts advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a defend

2024(People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297 , 308-310 & fn. 3 (Collins).) The California Supreme Court has offered “some general guidance to help ensure that a defendant’s jury trial waiver is knowing and intelligent, and to facilitate the resolution of a challenge to a jury waiver on appeal,” recommending “that trial courts advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all

2018We instead examine the totality of the circumstances." ( Id. at p. 167, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 .) However, a jury waiver is only valid " ' "if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances." ' " ( People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961 , 991, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 777 , 400 P.3d 385 ) ( Daniels ) (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.); accord, id . at p. 1018, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 777 , 400 P.3d 385 (conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.; People v. Collins , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 310 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 .) The Supreme Court in S

2021“It is, after all, the . . . claimant in arbitration, like the plaintiff in litigation, who bears the primary responsibility of exercising diligence in order to advance progress towards the resolution of its claim [citation], and [the defendant] is under no obligation to press for appointment of arbitrators when a claimant is himself dilatory.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 980 .) Thus, Moore’s argument that “Bamboo failed to initiate the Arbitration it compelled” has it backward.

2020“It is, after all, the . . . claimant in arbitration, like the plaintiff in litigation, who bears the primary responsibility of exercising diligence in order to advance progress towards the resolution of its claim [citation], and [the defendant] is under no obligation to press for appointment of arbitrators when a claimant is himself dilatory.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 980 .) DISPOSITION The order restoring the case to the civil active list and setting trial dates is reversed.

2025(Id. at p. 485.) Compare Central Coast Baptist, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 822 , where the plaintiff, a voluntary association of Southern Baptist churches, alleged that an attempted takeover of a local church by a nondenominational church triggered a reversionary clause in the local church’s constitution, which provided that its assets would pass to the plaintiff if it should ‘“cease to be a Southern Baptist Church.’” (Id. at p. 827.) The court held the First 26 Amendment barred the resolution of the claim because the determination of whether the local church ‘“cease[d] to be a Southern Baptist Ch

2025(Id. at p. 485.) Compare Central Coast Baptist, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 822 , where the plaintiff, a voluntary association of Southern Baptist churches, alleged that an attempted takeover of a local church by a nondenominational church triggered a reversionary clause in the local church’s constitution, which provided that its assets would pass to the plaintiff if it should ‘“cease to be a Southern Baptist Church.’” (Id. at p. 827.) The court held the First 26 Amendment barred the resolution of the claim because the determination of whether the local church ‘“cease[d] to be a Southern Baptist Ch

2025And plaintiffs’ supplemental memorandum in opposition to the motion argued that DUSD’s conduct was contrary to application of section 3364.5. 18 workers may be deemed employees for workers’ compensation by a resolution “ ‘so declaring.’ ” (Larkin, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 160 .) It did not hold that any particular language, let alone the term “deemed,” was required to be used in the resolution.

2025Appeals Bd. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 509 , the resolution requirement in this third category reflects types of service “where more direct, local control may be warranted.” (Id. at p. 522.) The legislative history of section 3362 confirms this intent to provide local entities with such control over coverage, stating that benefits could be offered “if the local entity desires” but are “purely optional.” (Senator Stanford C.

2023“ICWA provides: ‘In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, . . . shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.’ [Citation.] ICWA also requires child welfare agencies to notify the [BIA] of the proceedings, if the juvenile court knows or has reason to know the child may be

2021McCann (1942) 317 U.S. 269, 278 .) The California Supreme Court has offered “some general guidance to help ensure that a defendant’s jury trial waiver is knowing and intelligent, and to facilitate the resolution of a challenge to a jury waiver on appeal. [The court] recommend[ed] that trial courts advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may 17 participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimo

2021While our analysis in this opinion focuses on the effect of the 1971 amendment on section 13009, the ultimate resolution of that inquiry applies to both section 13009 and section 13009.1. 9 PRESBYTERIAN CAMP AND CONFERENCE CENTERS, INC. v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. committed by an employee within the scope of employment.” (See Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 208 ; 1872 Civ.

2021Proc., § 2019.030; Hixson, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1122-1123.) As discussed above, the trial court properly concluded that husband’s RFO did not trigger its jurisdiction under the MSA since it did not seek a resolution of a claim to omitted or undisclosed assets.

2020(People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1660 .) Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th 151 , is instructive.

2020San Jacinto Community College Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 104 , 115–116.) Stein’s brief does not mention that the addendum issue was raised by her, or by someone else, when County Waste adopted the resolution under challenge.

2017(See Patton v. United States (1930) 281 U.S. 276 , 313, 50 S.Ct. 253 , 74 L.Ed. 854 .) Notwithstanding these deficiencies, I agree with Justice Corrigan that the record before us sufficiently demonstrates that defendant's choice to waive his right to jury trial on the charges related to special-circumstance murder was "made with eyes open." ( Adams v. U.S. ex rel.

2017(See Patton v. United States (1930) 281 U.S. 276 , 313, 50 S.Ct. 253 , 74 L.Ed. 854 .) Notwithstanding these deficiencies, I agree with Justice Corrigan that the record before us sufficiently demonstrates that defendant's choice to waive his right to jury trial on the charges related to special-circumstance murder was "made with eyes open." ( Adams v. U.S. ex rel.

2017The Favorable Termination Requirement In Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 383 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 ] (Heck), the United States Supreme Court considered ‘“whether a state prisoner may challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under [section] 1983.” {Id. at p. 478.) The court concluded that a state prisoner’s section 1983 claims are not cognizable when the resolution of such a claim would call into question the validity of an outstanding criminal conviction or sentence.

2017The Favorable Termination Requirement In Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 383 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 ] (Heck), the United States Supreme Court considered ‘“whether a state prisoner may challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under [section] 1983.” {Id. at p. 478.) The court concluded that a state prisoner’s section 1983 claims are not cognizable when the resolution of such a claim would call into question the validity of an outstanding criminal conviction or sentence.

2015Co. v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1988) 836 F.2d 1176, 1177 ; see Sager Glove Corp. v. Commissioner (1961) 36 T.C. 1173, 1180 [“The taxability of the proceeds of a lawsuit, or of a sum received in settlement thereof, depends upon the nature of the claim and the actual basis of recovery.”], affd. (7th Cir. 1962) 311 F.2d 210 .) Cifuentes cites no case law suggesting an award of back or front pay for breach of an employment contract should be treated differently for tax purposes because it arose from a judgment rather than a settlement.

2014In Armendariz, for [footnote continued on next page] 11 However, the effect of the unavailability of the then-applicable rules is limited by language in the agreement that such rules apply “except as . . . may be modified by this Agreement.” In Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 494 , a similar provision was interpreted to mean that the specific provisions of the agreement “trump[] the otherwise applicable AAA and JAMS rules.” (Id. at p. 511.) Here, the agreement provides specific rules as to the location of the arbitration, payment of fees and costs, the use of a sing

2014But whether an act is business related “ ‘is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each case.’ ” 28 (People v. E.W.A.P., Inc. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 315, 320-321 .) The resolution of the claim here will depend on a determination of factual issues, such as whether Black was engaged in business-related activity, that cannot be resolved at this stage of the proceedings.

2012By raising the objection that the plaintiff corporation lacks the capacity to sue because its corporate powers have been suspended, the defendant does not seek a final resolution of that claim, but instead seeks only to avoid further prosecution of the claim at that time, “leaving it open [for the plaintiff] to renew the suit... at another time” (Nevills v. Shortridge, supra, 146 Cal. at p. 278 )—namely, when the plaintiff’s corporate powers have been revived.