resolution claim in Connecticut

2022Stated another way, res judicata is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate. . . . [W]here a party has fully and fairly liti- gated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446 , 459–60, 998 A.2d 766 (2010). ‘‘[A]lthough parties are not required to resolve all disputes during a . . . proceeding, when a party had the opportunity to raise the c

2022Stated another way, res judicata is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate. . . . [W]here a party has fully and fairly liti- gated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446 , 459–60, 998 A.2d 766 (2010). ‘‘[A]lthough parties are not required to resolve all disputes during a . . . proceeding, when a party had the opportunity to raise the c

2019The resolution of this inquiry will largely depend on the likely success of any new defenses or trial tactics that would have been available but for counsel’s ineffective assistance.’’ (Cita- tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scales, 82 Conn. App. 126 , 129–30, 842 A.2d 1158 , cert. denied, 269 Conn. 902 , 851 A.2d 305 (2004). ‘‘In its analysis, a reviewing court may look to the performance prong or to the prejudice prong, and the petitioner’s failure to prove either is fatal to a [claim of ineffective assistance of counsel].’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Stat

2008The resolution of this inquiry will largely depend on the likely success of any new defenses or trial tactics that would have been available but for counsel’s ineffective assistance.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scales, 82 Conn. App. 126, 129-30 , 842 A.2d 1158 , cert. denied, 269 Conn. 902 , 851 A.2d 305 (2004).

2019The resolution of this inquiry will largely depend on the likely success of any new defenses or trial tactics that would have been available but for counsel’s ineffective assistance.’’ (Cita- tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scales, 82 Conn. App. 126 , 129–30, 842 A.2d 1158 , cert. denied, 269 Conn. 902 , 851 A.2d 305 (2004). ‘‘In its analysis, a reviewing court may look to the performance prong or to the prejudice prong, and the petitioner’s failure to prove either is fatal to a [claim of ineffective assistance of counsel].’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Stat

2008The resolution of this inquiry will largely depend on the likely success of any new defenses or trial tactics that would have been available but for counsel’s ineffective assistance.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scales, 82 Conn. App. 126, 129-30 , 842 A.2d 1158 , cert. denied, 269 Conn. 902 , 851 A.2d 305 (2004).

2019The resolution of this inquiry will largely depend on the likely success of any new defenses or trial tactics that would have been available but for counsel’s ineffective assistance.’’ (Cita- tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scales, 82 Conn. App. 126 , 129–30, 842 A.2d 1158 , cert. denied, 269 Conn. 902 , 851 A.2d 305 (2004). ‘‘In its analysis, a reviewing court may look to the performance prong or to the prejudice prong, and the petitioner’s failure to prove either is fatal to a [claim of ineffective assistance of counsel].’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Stat

2019The resolution of this inquiry will largely depend on the likely success of any new defenses or trial tactics that would have been available but for counsel’s ineffective assistance.’’ (Cita- tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scales, 82 Conn. App. 126 , 129–30, 842 A.2d 1158 , cert. denied, 269 Conn. 902 , 851 A.2d 305 (2004). ‘‘In its analysis, a reviewing court may look to the performance prong or to the prejudice prong, and the petitioner’s failure to prove either is fatal to a [claim of ineffective assistance of counsel].’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Stat

2008“A reviewing court can find against the [defendant] on whichever ground is easier.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Silva, 65 Conn. App. 234, 259 , 783 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 929 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001).

2008"A reviewing court can find against the [defendant] on whichever ground is easier." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Silva, 65 Conn.App. 234, 259 , 783 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 929 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001).

2008“A reviewing court can find against the [defendant] on whichever ground is easier.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Silva, 65 Conn. App. 234, 259 , 783 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 929 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001).

2008"A reviewing court can find against the [defendant] on whichever ground is easier." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Silva, 65 Conn.App. 234, 259 , 783 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 929 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001).

2008“A reviewing court can find against the [defendant] on whichever ground is easier.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Silva, 65 Conn. App. 234, 259 , 783 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 929 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001).

2008“A reviewing court can find against the [defendant] on whichever ground is easier.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Silva, 65 Conn. App. 234, 259 , 783 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 929 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001).

2008Our review is therefore plenary.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Flowers, 85 Conn. App. 681, 694 , 858 A.2d 827 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 278 Conn. 533 , 898 A.2d 789 (2006).

2008Our review is therefore plenary.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Flowers, 85 Conn. App. 681, 694 , 858 A.2d 827 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 278 Conn. 533 , 898 A.2d 789 (2006).

2008Our review is therefore plenary.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Flowers, 85 Conn. App. 681, 694 , 858 A.2d 827 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 278 Conn. 533 , 898 A.2d 789 (2006).

2008Our review is therefore plenary.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Flowers, 85 Conn. App. 681, 694 , 858 A.2d 827 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 278 Conn. 533 , 898 A.2d 789 (2006).

2002Accordingly, we are guided in the resolution of this claim by State v. Hines, 243 Conn. 796 , 709 A.2d 522 (1998).

2002Accordingly, we are guided in the resolution of this claim by State v. Hines, 243 Conn. 796 , 709 A.2d 522 (1998).

2025The third count of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleged statutory theft.21 The court found in favor of Khan on this count, stating in relevant part that ‘‘the plaintiffs did not prove that [Khan] had the requisite intent to deprive the plaintiffs (her own children) of the policy proceeds.’’22 In light of the court’s finding that Khan did not have the requisite intent to deprive the plaintiffs of the policy proceeds, Khan con- tends that the court’s conclusion that she breached her 21 ‘‘A person commits statutory theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the

2025The third count of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleged statutory theft.21 The court found in favor of Khan on this count, stating in relevant part that ‘‘the plaintiffs did not prove that [Khan] had the requisite intent to deprive the plaintiffs (her own children) of the policy proceeds.’’22 In light of the court’s finding that Khan did not have the requisite intent to deprive the plaintiffs of the policy proceeds, Khan con- tends that the court’s conclusion that she breached her 21 ‘‘A person commits statutory theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the

2025Although ordinarily ‘‘[a] possible absence of subject matter jurisdic- tion must be addressed and decided whenever the issue is raised’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Wucik v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 113 Conn. App. 502, 506 , 967 A.2d 572 (2009); given the plaintiff’s clarification in his reply brief that he is not challenging the court’s denial of the motion Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc. The following additional facts are necessary for the resolution of this claim.

2025Although ordinarily ‘‘[a] possible absence of subject matter jurisdic- tion must be addressed and decided whenever the issue is raised’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Wucik v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 113 Conn. App. 502, 506 , 967 A.2d 572 (2009); given the plaintiff’s clarification in his reply brief that he is not challenging the court’s denial of the motion Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc. The following additional facts are necessary for the resolution of this claim.

2022Stated another way, res judicata is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate. . . . [W]here a party has fully and fairly liti- gated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446 , 459–60, 998 A.2d 766 (2010). ‘‘[A]lthough parties are not required to resolve all disputes during a . . . proceeding, when a party had the opportunity to raise the c

2022Stated another way, res judicata is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate. . . . [W]here a party has fully and fairly liti- gated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446 , 459–60, 998 A.2d 766 (2010). ‘‘[A]lthough parties are not required to resolve all disputes during a . . . proceeding, when a party had the opportunity to raise the c

2019Additionally, it is well set- tled that even if the evidence was improperly admitted, the [plaintiff] must also establish that the ruling was harmful and likely to affect the result of the trial.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of New York v. Savvidis, 174 Conn. App. 843, 849 , 165 A.3d 1266 (2017).

2019Additionally, it is well set- tled that even if the evidence was improperly admitted, the [plaintiff] must also establish that the ruling was harmful and likely to affect the result of the trial.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of New York v. Savvidis, 174 Conn. App. 843, 849 , 165 A.3d 1266 (2017).

2019The court finds that the petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, either prong of the [ Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ] standard." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A The petitioner claims that the second habeas court wrongly concluded that § 54-193 (d), not State v. Crawford , supra, 202 Conn. at 450 -52 , 521 A.2d 1034 , governs the resolution of his claim that Cosgrove rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a statute of limitations affirmative defense w

2019The court finds that the petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, either prong of the [ Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ] standard." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A The petitioner claims that the second habeas court wrongly concluded that § 54-193 (d), not State v. Crawford , supra, 202 Conn. at 450 -52 , 521 A.2d 1034 , governs the resolution of his claim that Cosgrove rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a statute of limitations affirmative defense w

2019The court finds that the petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, either prong of the [ Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ] standard." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A The petitioner claims that the second habeas court wrongly concluded that § 54-193 (d), not State v. Crawford , supra, 202 Conn. at 450 -52 , 521 A.2d 1034 , governs the resolution of his claim that Cosgrove rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a statute of limitations affirmative defense w

2019The court finds that the petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, either prong of the [ Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ] standard." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A The petitioner claims that the second habeas court wrongly concluded that § 54-193 (d), not State v. Crawford , supra, 202 Conn. at 450 -52 , 521 A.2d 1034 , governs the resolution of his claim that Cosgrove rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a statute of limitations affirmative defense w

2018Id., at 376 , 908 A.2d 506 . 1 Kirkwood's Statements The following additional facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this claim.

2018Id., at 376 , 908 A.2d 506 . 1 Kirkwood's Statements The following additional facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this claim.

2016The question before us is whether the facts as alleged in the pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to survive dismissal on the grounds of absolute immunity.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Perugini v. Giuli- ano, 148 Conn. App. 861, 873 , 89 A.3d 358 (2014). ‘‘It is well settled that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are abso- lutely privileged so long as they are in some way perti- nent to the subject of the controversy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hopkins v. O’Connor, supra, 2

2016The question before us is whether the facts as alleged in the pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to survive dismissal on the grounds of absolute immunity.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Perugini v. Giuli- ano, 148 Conn. App. 861, 873 , 89 A.3d 358 (2014). ‘‘It is well settled that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are abso- lutely privileged so long as they are in some way perti- nent to the subject of the controversy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hopkins v. O’Connor, supra, 2

2015The defendant concedes that this claim is unpreserved, but, nevertheless, seeks review pursu- ant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989).6 We conclude that, pursuant to State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447 , 10 A.3d 942 (2011),7 the defendant has implicitly waived this challenge to the relevant jury instruction and, therefore, is not entitled to Golding review.8 The following facts are necessary for the resolution of this claim.

2015The defendant concedes that this claim is unpreserved, but, nevertheless, seeks review pursu- ant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989).6 We conclude that, pursuant to State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447 , 10 A.3d 942 (2011),7 the defendant has implicitly waived this challenge to the relevant jury instruction and, therefore, is not entitled to Golding review.8 The following facts are necessary for the resolution of this claim.

2015The defendant concedes that this claim is unpreserved, but, nevertheless, seeks review pursu- ant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989).6 We conclude that, pursuant to State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447 , 10 A.3d 942 (2011),7 the defendant has implicitly waived this challenge to the relevant jury instruction and, therefore, is not entitled to Golding review.8 The following facts are necessary for the resolution of this claim.

2015The defendant concedes that this claim is unpreserved, but, nevertheless, seeks review pursu- ant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989).6 We conclude that, pursuant to State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447 , 10 A.3d 942 (2011),7 the defendant has implicitly waived this challenge to the relevant jury instruction and, therefore, is not entitled to Golding review.8 The following facts are necessary for the resolution of this claim.

2014Pursuant to Practice Book § 61-14, ‘‘[t]he sole remedy for any party desiring the court to review an order concerning a stay of execution shall be by motion for review under Section 66-6.’’ ‘‘Issues regarding a stay of execution cannot be raised on direct appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Morales, 67 Conn. App. 139, 140 , 786 A.2d 1134 (2001).

2014Pursuant to Practice Book § 61-14, ‘‘[t]he sole remedy for any party desiring the court to review an order concerning a stay of execution shall be by motion for review under Section 66-6.’’ ‘‘Issues regarding a stay of execution cannot be raised on direct appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Morales, 67 Conn. App. 139, 140 , 786 A.2d 1134 (2001).

2011Within its discretion, the court might have “made inquiries to clarify the responses of the various witnesses,” such as in McGuire v. McGuire, 102 Conn. App. 79, 85 , 924 A.2d 886 (2007), but it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to provide farther assistance to the defendant in presenting her evidence.

2011Within its discretion, the court might have “made inquiries to clarify the responses of the various witnesses,” such as in McGuire v. McGuire, 102 Conn. App. 79, 85 , 924 A.2d 886 (2007), but it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to provide farther assistance to the defendant in presenting her evidence.

2009Under these circumstances, equity and good conscience will not permit allowance of the plaintiffs’ claim on reargument to eliminate the setoff.” We agree with the court’s resolution of that claim. “[A] trial court may allow, in its discretion, an amendment to pleadings before, during, or . . . after trial to conform to the proof.” Saphir v. Neustadt, 177 Conn. 191, 206 , 413 A.2d 843 (1979); see also Practice Book § 10-62.

2009Under these circumstances, equity and good conscience will not permit allowance of the plaintiffs’ claim on reargument to eliminate the setoff.” We agree with the court’s resolution of that claim. “[A] trial court may allow, in its discretion, an amendment to pleadings before, during, or . . . after trial to conform to the proof.” Saphir v. Neustadt, 177 Conn. 191, 206 , 413 A.2d 843 (1979); see also Practice Book § 10-62.

2008The difficulty involved in a resolution of which standard of review should apply in this case arises because a motion for a continuance traditionally involves the discretion of a trial court that will not ordinarily be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion; State v. Fabricatore, 89 Conn. App. 729, 734-35 , 875 A.2d 48 (2005), aff'd, 281 Conn. 469 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007); whereas the basis for the particular motion in this case was the exercise of a right, allocution, which is based on the rules of practice, as well as decisional law, a basis that ordinarily requires plenary review.

2008The difficulty involved in a resolution of which standard of review should apply in this case arises because a motion for a continuance traditionally involves the discretion of a trial court that will not ordinarily be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion; State v. Fabricatore, 89 Conn. App. 729, 734-35 , 875 A.2d 48 (2005), aff'd, 281 Conn. 469 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007); whereas the basis for the particular motion in this case was the exercise of a right, allocution, which is based on the rules of practice, as well as decisional law, a basis that ordinarily requires plenary review.

2008The difficulty involved in a resolution of which standard of review should apply in this case arises because a motion for a continuance traditionally involves the discretion of a trial court that will not ordinarily be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion; State v. Fabricatore, 89 Conn. App. 729, 734-35 , 875 A.2d 48 (2005), aff'd, 281 Conn. 469 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007); whereas the basis for the particular motion in this case was the exercise of a right, allocution, which is based on the rules of practice, as well as decisional law, a basis that ordinarily requires plenary review.

2008The difficulty involved in a resolution of which standard of review should apply in this case arises because a motion for a continuance traditionally involves the discretion of a trial court that will not ordinarily be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion; State v. Fabricatore, 89 Conn. App. 729, 734-35 , 875 A.2d 48 (2005), aff'd, 281 Conn. 469 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007); whereas the basis for the particular motion in this case was the exercise of a right, allocution, which is based on the rules of practice, as well as decisional law, a basis that ordinarily requires plenary review.

2008It is well established that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self incrimination.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2008It is well established that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self incrimination.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.