resolution claim in Ohio

2001Bd. of Elections (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 154 , 19 OBR 437, 484 N.E.2d 153 , to compel the rejection of referendum petition papers not in compliance with the R.C. 305.32 requirement that "each petition paper shall contain a full and correct copy of the title and text of the resolution or rule sought to be referred." There, as here, the board of elections argued that these were technical requirements, the absence of which did not invalidate the petition.

2001Bd. of Elections (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 154 , 19 OBR 437, 484 N.E.2d 153 , to compel the rejection of referendum petition papers not in compliance with the R.C. 305.32 requirement that "each petition paper shall contain a full and correct copy of the title and text of the resolution or rule sought to be referred." There, as here, the board of elections argued that these were technical requirements, the absence of which did not invalidate the petition.

2019Id. ; Reading v. Pub.

2017As we determine the provision on fees is ambiguous, and a contract must be interpreted as whole, see Skidmore, 2014-Ohio-4423, at ¶ 28 , we conclude that the trial court must consider in the first instance not only whether the facts in the record prevent or support summary judgment in light of the ambiguity in the fees provision, but also how the parties’ arguments related to the end-waste residue management provision affect the resolution of the claim.

2015If a factual dispute exists that is material to the resolution of the claim, however, then the moving party is not entitled to judgment on Civ.R. 12(C). {¶11} The Morleys likewise erroneously argued in support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings that the federal court’s heightened pleading standard as stated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), applies to the Mangelluzzis’ complaint.

2015If a factual dispute exists that is material to the resolution of the claim, however, then the moving party is not entitled to judgment on Civ.R. 12(C). {¶11} The Morleys likewise erroneously argued in support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings that the federal court’s heightened pleading standard as stated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), applies to the Mangelluzzis’ complaint.

2015Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370 , 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998).

2015Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370 , 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998).

2015The Manns state that the trial court disregarded the law of the case when it again granted Resolution’s motion and that Resolution’s positions are barred by res judicata. {¶ 29} The law-of-the-case doctrine “provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.” Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 , 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984).

2015The Manns state that the trial court disregarded the law of the case when it again granted Resolution’s motion and that Resolution’s positions are barred by res judicata. {¶ 29} The law-of-the-case doctrine “provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.” Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 , 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984).

2012No. 23879, 2008-Ohio-1379, ¶ 16-17 . {¶15} In Miller Lakes I, we concluded that Miller Lakes’ claims “alleging unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are dependent upon the resolution of its claim for declaratory relief.” Id. at ¶ 20.

2011As the Texas Supreme Court recently stated, “[t]he uniformity argument for preemption is not triggered by the mere fact that a claim requires state courts to interpret federal bankruptcy law.” Graber v. Fuqua (2009), 279 S.W.3d 608, 619 .

2011As the Texas Supreme Court recently stated, “[t]he uniformity argument for preemption is not triggered by the mere fact that a claim requires state courts to interpret federal bankruptcy law.” Graber v. Fuqua (2009), 279 S.W.3d 608, 619 .

2011We agree. –5– {¶ 8} To prevail on a motion under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds for relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment * * *.” GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Indus. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146 , 351 N.E.2d 113 , paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 9} In the present case, Resolution has

2011We agree. –5– {¶ 8} To prevail on a motion under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds for relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment * * *.” GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Indus. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146 , 351 N.E.2d 113 , paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 9} In the present case, Resolution has

1995“As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress.” Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox (1965), 379 U.S. 650, 652 , 85 S.Ct. 614, 616 , 13 L.Ed.2d 580, 583 .

1995“As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress.” Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox (1965), 379 U.S. 650, 652 , 85 S.Ct. 614, 616 , 13 L.Ed.2d 580, 583 .

1986Allis-Chalmers Corp., supra; see, also, Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. (C.A. 9, 1984), 740 F.2d 1468 .