Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
34 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DeSMET EX REL. v. County of Rock Islandgreen2 sentences2016See DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 509 (“[W]e assume a defendant owes a duty, for the sake of analysis, in order to expedite the resolution of an immunity issue.”). 2016See DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 509 (“[W]e assume a defendant owes a duty, for the sake of analysis, in order to expedite the resolution of an immunity issue.”). | 4 | 5 |
Cunha v. Shapirogreen2 sentences2025Rather, it is “ ‘a conditional settlement.’ ” Pinske, 2015 IL App (1st) 150537 , ¶ 23 (quoting Cunha v. Shapiro, 837 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163 (App. Div. 2007)). “ ‘The condition of the agreement is that the jury render a verdict that falls outside the range of the high-low agreement. 2025Rather, - 31 - No. 1-23-0087 it is “ ‘a conditional settlement.’ ” Pinske, 2015 IL App (1st) 150537 , ¶ 23 (quoting Cunha v. Shapiro, 837 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163 (App. Div. 2007)). “ ‘The condition of the agreement is that the jury render a verdict that falls outside the range of the high-low agreement. | 2 | 2 |
Murray v. Chicago Youth Centergreen2 sentences2011See DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 509 (2006) (assuming defendant owed a duty, “for the sake of analysis, in order to expedite the resolution of an immunity issue”), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (2007). 2011See DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 509 (2006) (assuming defendant owed a duty, “for the sake of analysis, in order to expedite the resolution of an immunity issue”), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (2007). | 2 | 2 |
People v. K.S.green2 sentences2011See K.S., 387 Ill. 2011See K.S., 387 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Churchgreen2 sentences2006A "claim" for purposes of Rule 304(a) "is any right, liability or matter raised in an action." Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465 (1990). 2006A “claim” for purposes of Rule 304(a) “is any right, liability or matter raised in an action.” Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Cejagreen2 sentences2006As we may reject an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case on the basis of lack of prejudice, assuming counsel’s deficient performance, arguendo, for purposes of analytical expedience (see People v. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332, 358 (2003)), so may we assume a defendant owes a duty, for the sake of analysis, in order to expedite the resolution of an immunity issue. 2006As we may reject an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case on the basis of lack of prejudice, assuming *1039 counsel's deficient performance, arguendo, for purposes of analytical expedience (see People v. Ceja, 204 Ill.2d 332, 358 , 273 Ill.Dec. 796 , 789 N.E.2d 1228 (2003)), so may we assume a defendant owes a duty, for the sake of analysis, in order to expedite the resolution of an immunity issue. | 2 | 2 |
Grauer v. Clare Oaksgreen1 sentence2025Grauer, 2019 IL App (1st) 180835, ¶¶ 126, 152 . | 1 | 1 |
Eddy v. Kerrgreen1 sentence2022Eddy v. Kerr, 96 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Fort v. Smithgreen1 sentence2021(Fort v. Smith, 85 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Kim v. Alvey, Inc.green1 sentence2020See Kim v. Alvey, Inc., 322 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist.green1 sentence2013“The purpose of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is to dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact at the outset of litigation.” Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Jessee v. Amoco Oil Co.green1 sentence2013“Where there is a resolution of a claim by virtue of a settlement, and the terms of the settlement are made known to the court, there has been a preliminary showing of good faith which creates a presumption of validity.” Jessee v. Amoco Oil Co., 230 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Boardgreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., id. at 531-43 . | 1 | 1 |
Ratkovich v. Hamiltongreen1 sentence1998See Ratkovich v. Hamilton, 267 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
green
2 sentences1987(Lueck v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. (1984), 116 Wis. 2d 559 , 342 N.W.2d 699 .) The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that where, as there, the resolution of the State claim “is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract” the claim is either a section 301 claim or one “preempted by Federal labor contract law.” ( 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 85 L. 1987(Lueck v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. (1984), 116 Wis. 2d 559 , 342 N.W.2d 699 .) The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that where, as there, the resolution of the State claim “is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract” the claim is either a section 301 claim or one “preempted by Federal labor contract law.” ( 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 85 L. | 3 | 1986–1987 |
Pinske v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2025Rather, it is “ ‘a conditional settlement.’ ” Pinske, 2015 IL App (1st) 150537 , ¶ 23 (quoting Cunha v. Shapiro, 837 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163 (App. Div. 2007)). “ ‘The condition of the agreement is that the jury render a verdict that falls outside the range of the high-low agreement. 2025Rather, - 31 - No. 1-23-0087 it is “ ‘a conditional settlement.’ ” Pinske, 2015 IL App (1st) 150537 , ¶ 23 (quoting Cunha v. Shapiro, 837 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163 (App. Div. 2007)). “ ‘The condition of the agreement is that the jury render a verdict that falls outside the range of the high-low agreement. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
McComb v. Seestadt
green
2 sentences1992(McComb v. Seestadt (1981), 93 Ill. 1985(McComb v. Seestadt (1981), 93 Ill. | 2 | 1985–1992 |
Bituminous Ins. Cos. v. Ruppenstein
neutral
2 sentences1992(Bituminous Insurance Cos. v. Ruppenstein (1986), 150 Ill. 1989App. 3d 402 , 501 N.E.2d 907 , this court noted that the presumption of validity is created whenever there is a resolution of a claim by virtue of a release or covenant. | 2 | 1989–1992 |
Snoddy v. Teepak, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992Where there is a resolution of a claim by virtue of a settlement, and the terms of the settlement are made known to the court, there has been a preliminary showing of good faith which creates a presumption of validity. ( Snoddy v. Teepak, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill.App.3d 966, 969 , 145 Ill.Dec. 64 , 556 N.E.2d 682 .) Because public policy favors the peaceful and voluntary resolution of disputes through settlement, any assertion of bad faith must be proved by clear and convincing evidence by the party claiming absence of good faith. 1992Where there is a resolution of a claim by virtue of a settlement, and the terms of the settlement are made known to the court, there has been a preliminary showing of good faith which creates a presumption of validity. ( Snoddy v. Teepak, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill.App.3d 966, 969 , 145 Ill.Dec. 64 , 556 N.E.2d 682 .) Because public policy favors the peaceful and voluntary resolution of disputes through settlement, any assertion of bad faith must be proved by clear and convincing evidence by the party claiming absence of good faith. | 2 | 1992–1992 |
Meyer v. Murray
green
2 sentences1992App. 3d 106 , 387 N.E.2d 878 .) Where there is a resolution of a claim by virtue of a release or covenant, a presumption of validity is created. 1985App. 3d 106 , 387 N.E.2d 878 .) Where there is a resolution of a claim by virtue of a release or covenant, a presumption of validity is created. | 2 | 1985–1992 |
Wasmund v. Metropolitan Sanitary District
green
2 sentences1992App. 3d 926 , 482 N.E.2d 351 .) Further, the settling defendants state that a presumption of validity is created whenever there is a resolution of a claim by virtue of a release or covenant. 1986“Where there is a resolution of a claim by virtue of a release or covenant, a presumption of validity is created. [Citation.] Thereafter, the party challenging the release carries the burden of proving any assertion of invalidity.” (Wasmund v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1985), 135 Ill. | 2 | 1986–1992 |
Bartley v. University Asphalt Co.
green
2 sentences1986Since a resolution of the claim against the union was "`substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of [the collective-bargaining] agreement'" ( Bartley v. University Asphalt Co. (1986), 111 Ill.2d 318, 332 , quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206, 221 , 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1916 ), the claim was preempted by Federal labor-contract law. 1986Since a resolution of the claim against the union was “ ‘substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of [the collective-bargaining] agreement’ ” (Bartley v. University Asphalt Co. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 318, 332 , quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 85 L. | 2 | 1986–1987 |
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Protos Shipping Inc.
green
1 sentence2024Likewise, subsection (a)(1) allows a trial court to dismiss if it does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of a cause, “provided the defect cannot be removed by a transfer of the case to a court having jurisdiction.” Id. § 2- 619(a)(1). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Calanca v. D & S MANUFACTURING CO.
green
1 sentence1995Calanca involved an employment contract between an Illinois resident and a Wisconsin corporation, wherein the parties agreed that "in the event of any litigation ***, [the] proper forum for the resolution of such claim shall be the Circuit Court for Jackson County, Wisconsin.” (Calanca, 157 Ill. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Geneva
green
1 sentence1993App. 3d at 1026 , 554 N.E.2d at 562 .) The jury here resolved the matter against defendant; we cannot say such a resolution was in error. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Argueta v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad
green
2 sentences1992Argueta v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. (1991), 224 Ill.App.3d 11, 22 , 166 Ill.Dec. 428 , 586 N.E.2d 386 ; Banks v. R.D. 1992Argueta v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. (1991), 224 Ill.App.3d 11, 22 , 166 Ill.Dec. 428 , 586 N.E.2d 386 ; Banks v. R.D. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989(Lingle, 486 U.S. 399 , 100 L. 1989(Lingle, 486 U.S. 399 , 100 L. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp.
green
2 sentences1987Bartley v. University Asphalt Co. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 318, 332 , 489 N.E.2d 1367 ; Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 1, 9 , 503 N.E.2d 308, 312 , quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 85 L. 1987Bartley v. University Asphalt Co. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 318, 332 , 489 N.E.2d 1367 ; Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 1, 9 , 503 N.E.2d 308, 312 , quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 85 L. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lueck v. Aetna Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1987(Lueck v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. (1984), 116 Wis. 2d 559 , 342 N.W.2d 699 .) The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that where, as there, the resolution of the State claim “is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract” the claim is either a section 301 claim or one “preempted by Federal labor contract law.” ( 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 85 L. 1987(Lueck v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. (1984), 116 Wis. 2d 559 , 342 N.W.2d 699 .) The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that where, as there, the resolution of the State claim “is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract” the claim is either a section 301 claim or one “preempted by Federal labor contract law.” ( 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 85 L. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.