resolution claim in Pennsylvania

2023An interest is “substantial” if it is an interest in the resolution of the challenge which “surpasses the common interests of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.” In re Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243 .

2015An interest is substantial if it is an interest in the resolution of the challenge which “surpasses the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.” Id.

2019Finally, an interest is “immediate” if the causal connection is not remote or speculative. 14 Id. (citations omitted).

2007Pittsburgh Palisades Park, 888 A.2d at 660 .

2016On that issue, the majority assumes, arguendo, the retroactive applicability of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), as suggested by the Keller Heirs, to the resolution of this claim.

2016On that issue, the majority assumes, arguendo, the retroactive applicability of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust, 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 , 103 S.Ct. 2706 , 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983), as suggested by the Keller Heirs, to the resolution of this claim.

2016On that issue, the majority assumes, arguendo, the retroactive applicability of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), as suggested by the Keller Heirs, to the resolution of this claim.

2016On that issue, the majority assumes, arguendo, the retroactive applicability of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust, 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 , 103 S.Ct. 2706 , 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983), as suggested by the Keller Heirs, to the resolution of this claim.

2022By requiring that docketed municipal liens in first-class counties “be given the effect of a judgment[,]” the General Assembly has expressed its intent that these docketed municipal liens be treated as the equivalent of a final resolution of a claim between parties. .... 12 Pennsylvania Supreme Court in PGW II resulted in “a fundamental break from the previous law upon which PGW relied,” and the newly established principle of law “was not clearly foreshadowed by precedent.” Id. at 28.8 PGW maintains that “[p]rior to PGW II, numerous cases had interpreted or commented on the lien perfection pro

2022Likewise, PGW contends that in Graffen, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that recording a lien in the City pursuant to the Lien Law gave rise to a statutory lien rather than a judicial lien, as it was not predicated on a judicial determination, and that the court did not “suggest that a lien docketed in the City was a ‘judgment’ that constituted a final resolution of the claim.’” PGW’s Br. at 28 (citing Graffen, 984 F.2d at 96 ).

2022By requiring that docketed municipal liens in first-class counties “be given the effect of a judgment[,]” the General Assembly has expressed its intent that these docketed municipal liens be treated as the equivalent of a final resolution of a claim between parties. .... 12 Pennsylvania Supreme Court in PGW II resulted in “a fundamental break from the previous law upon which PGW relied,” and the newly established principle of law “was not clearly foreshadowed by precedent.” Id. at 28.8 PGW maintains that “[p]rior to PGW II, numerous cases had interpreted or commented on the lien perfection pro

2021Id. at __, slip op. at 11.

2020Appellant’s ____________________________________________ 2 In Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002), our Supreme Court held that, as a general rule, defendants must wait to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims until collateral review.

2020Tax Claim Bureau, 735 A.2d 178 , 181 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 747 A.2d 373 (Pa. 1999)). 7 mandates a showing that the matter complained of ‘caused harm to the party’s interest,’ i.e., a causal connection between the harm and the violation of law.

2020An interest is ‘substantial’ if it is an interest in the resolution of the challenge which ‘surpasses the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.’ Likewise, a ‘direct’ interest 3 “Our scope of review in tax sale cases is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, rendered a decision with a lack of supporting evidence, or clearly erred as a matter of law.” Shipley v. Tax Claim Bureau of Delaware Cnty., 74 A.3d 1101 , 1104 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (quoting Plank v. Monroe Cnty.

2008Finally, an interest is ‘immediate’ if the causal connection is not remote or speculative.” Id. at 668 , 902 A.2d at 412-413 . (citations omitted) Determining whether the petitioners have standing is paramount to whether the adoption may proceed.

2008Finally, an interest is ‘immediate’ if the causal connection is not remote or speculative.” Id. at 668 , 902 A.2d at 412-413 . (citations omitted) Determining whether the petitioners have standing is paramount to whether the adoption may proceed.

1996Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 , 266 n.18, 102 S.Ct. 2428 -29 n.18 (1982); Engle v. West Penn Power Co., 366 Pa. Super. 104, 111 , 530 A.2d 913, 916-17 (1987).

1993Initially, we find that the Plaintiffs living arrangement with the natural father warrants categorizing her as a “third party” (versus a “parent”) in this litigation. 3 Consequently, the law dictates that the appropriate manner for a “third party” to obtain child custody is through a dependency proceeding. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301; Helsel v. Blair County Children and Youth Services, 359 Pa.Super. 487 , 519 A.2d 456 (1986).

1993Initially, we find that the Plaintiffs living arrangement with the natural father warrants categorizing her as a “third party” (versus a “parent”) in this litigation. 3 Consequently, the law dictates that the appropriate manner for a “third party” to obtain child custody is through a dependency proceeding. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301; Helsel v. Blair County Children and Youth Services, 359 Pa.Super. 487 , 519 A.2d 456 (1986).

1990Kaiser v. Meinzer, 272 Pa.Super. 207, 216 , 414 A.2d 1080, 1085 (1979), appeal dismissed 498 Pa. 136 , 445 A.2d 104 (1982).

1990Kaiser v. Meinzer, 272 Pa.Super. 207, 216 , 414 A.2d 1080, 1085 (1979), appeal dismissed 498 Pa. 136 , 445 A.2d 104 (1982).

1989DER argues that since the insurance policies here at issue are contracts (citing Cleland Simpson Co. v. Firemen's Insurance Co. of Newark, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 607 (1957), aff’d, 392 Pa. 67 , 140 A.2d 41 (1958)), the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve these claim disputes. 72 ES. §4651-4 provides, in pertinent part: “The Board of Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims against the Commonwealth arising from contracts hereafter entered into with the Commonwealth, where the amount in controversy amounts to $300.00 or more.” *478 Appellees, on the other hand

1989In Nichols v. Horn, 363 Pa. Super. 301 , 525 A.2d 1242 (1987), the court noted the inherently prejudicial effect of this circumstance.

1989In Nichols v. Horn, 363 Pa. Super. 301 , 525 A.2d 1242 (1987), the court noted the inherently prejudicial effect of this circumstance.

1989DER argues that since the insurance policies here at issue are contracts (citing Cleland Simpson Co. v. Firemen's Insurance Co. of Newark, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 607 (1957), aff’d, 392 Pa. 67 , 140 A.2d 41 (1958)), the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve these claim disputes. 72 ES. §4651-4 provides, in pertinent part: “The Board of Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims against the Commonwealth arising from contracts hereafter entered into with the Commonwealth, where the amount in controversy amounts to $300.00 or more.” *478 Appellees, on the other hand

1985Were we to find the arrest to be illegal, we would be required to suppress all evidence incident to the arrest, unless the Commonwealth was able to establish that “the evidence is sufficiently purged of any taint from the illegal arrest.” Commonwealth v. Farley, 468 Pa. 487, 494 , 364 A.2d 299, 302 (1976), citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Betrand Appeal, 451 Pa. 381 , 303 A.2d 486 (1973); Pa. Const. Art.

1985Were we to find the arrest to be illegal, we would be required to suppress all evidence incident to the arrest, unless the Commonwealth was able to establish that “the evidence is sufficiently purged of any taint from the illegal arrest.” Commonwealth v. Farley, 468 Pa. 487, 494 , 364 A.2d 299, 302 (1976), citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Betrand Appeal, 451 Pa. 381 , 303 A.2d 486 (1973); Pa. Const. Art.

1985Were we to find the arrest to be illegal, we would be required to suppress all evidence incident to the arrest, unless the Commonwealth was able to establish that “the evidence is sufficiently purged of any taint from the illegal arrest.” Commonwealth v. Farley, 468 Pa. 487, 494 , 364 A.2d 299, 302 (1976), citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Betrand Appeal, 451 Pa. 381 , 303 A.2d 486 (1973); Pa. Const. Art.

1985Were we to find the arrest to be illegal, we would be required to suppress all evidence incident to the arrest, unless the Commonwealth was able to establish that “the evidence is sufficiently purged of any taint from the illegal arrest.” Commonwealth v. Farley, 468 Pa. 487, 494 , 364 A.2d 299, 302 (1976), citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Betrand Appeal, 451 Pa. 381 , 303 A.2d 486 (1973); Pa. Const. Art.

1902It is an appropriation of money for a private individual, and not for a municipal purpose : Speer v. School Directors, etc., of Blairsville, 50 Pa. 150 ; Wilkes-Barre City Hospital v. County of Luzerne, 84 Pa. 55 .

1902It is an appropriation of money for a private individual, and not for a municipal purpose : Speer v. School Directors, etc., of Blairsville, 50 Pa. 150 ; Wilkes-Barre City Hospital v. County of Luzerne, 84 Pa. 55 .