Certification of question of law.

- Because two conflicting decisions that governed a case regarding interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 15-11-521(b) were before the Supreme Court of Georgia on certiorari review, the court certified resolution of the case to the Supreme Court via a certified question under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. IV. To await the Supreme Court's decision would run afoul of the two-term rule, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Para. II. In the Interest of J. F., 338 Ga. App. 15, 789 S.E.2d 274 (2016).

Effect of reversal by Supreme Court is to place the case where it stood prior thereto; and thereafter the trial court should enter an order sustaining the exceptions of law, and a finding sustaining the exceptions of fact. Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga. 506, 6 S.E.2d 304 (1939).

It is the duty of the Supreme Court to inquire upon its own motion into question of its jurisdiction. Abel v. State, 190 Ga. 651, 10 S.E.2d 198 (1940); City of Summerville v. Georgia Power Co., 204 Ga. 276, 49 S.E.2d 661 (1948); Findley v. City of Vidalia, 204 Ga. 279, 49 S.E.2d 661 (1948); Carter v. Walker, 209 Ga. 807, 76 S.E.2d 401 (1953); Alderman v. Crenshaw, 208 Ga. 71, 65 S.E.2d 178 (1951), overruled on other grounds, Wiley v. Wiley, 233 Ga. 824, 213 S.E.2d 682 (1975); United States Cas. Co. v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 212 Ga. 569, 94 S.E.2d 422 (1956).

Supreme Court has jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction of particular case and to order its transfer to the court having jurisdiction of the case. Water Power & Mining Co. v. Arnold, 149 Ga. 107, 99 S.E. 382 (1919).

Decision rendered by divided Supreme Court is authoritative as precedent, and the Court of Appeals is bound thereby. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Michael, 43 Ga. App. 703, 160 S.E. 93 (1931).

When Supreme Court can decline to answer.

- When the answer to a certified question would constitute the decision in the main case, the Supreme Court will decline to answer the question. Lawrence v. State, 268 Ga. 420, 489 S.E.2d 850 (1997).

Court of Appeals was created as an arm of the Supreme Court with no original jurisdiction for the purpose of correcting errors of law in lower tribunals. Harmon v. Southern Ry., 123 Ga. App. 309, 180 S.E.2d 604 (1971).

The issue of venue is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 409 S.E.2d 208 (1991).

Limited jurisdiction of Court of Appeals.

- Court of Appeals only has jurisdiction in all cases in which such jurisdiction has not been conferred by the Constitution upon the Supreme Court. Evans v. Pennington, 50 Ga. App. 146, 177 S.E. 357 (1934); Findley v. City of Vidalia, 204 Ga. 279, 49 S.E.2d 658 (1948); United States Cas. Co. v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 212 Ga. 569, 94 S.E.2d 422 (1956).

Ga. L. 1963, p. 70, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-19-30), establishing the State Bar, does not violate this paragraph. Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939, 90 S. Ct. 369, 24 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1969) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Interpretation of legal document.

- Appeals filed by a trustee and a beneficiary were transferred from the supreme court to the court of appeals because the cases did not come within the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction over "equity cases" under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III; the issue presented on appeal, how to interpret a specific provision of a legal document, was a straightforward legal question. Durham v. Durham, 291 Ga. 231, 728 S.E.2d 627 (2012).

Allowing videotaping of criminal calendar proceedings.

- Trial court erred in excluding a camera and denying a purported student's request to make video recordings of the criminal calendar proceedings because the trial court erred in the court's application of O.C.G.A. § 15-1-10.1 and did not properly consider the factors set forth therein. McLaurin v. Ott, 327 Ga. App. 488, 759 S.E.2d 567 (2014).

Cited in Henderson v. Easters, 178 Ga. App. 867, 345 S.E.2d 42 (1986); Jost v. Jost, 179 Ga. App. 1, 345 S.E.2d 115 (1986); Lemke v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 182 Ga. App. 700, 356 S.E.2d 739 (1987); Rybert & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 258 Ga. 347, 368 S.E.2d 739 (1988); Cohran v. Haldi, 189 Ga. App. 529, 376 S.E.2d 416 (1988); Piedmont Properties, Inc. v. Sims, 195 Ga. App. 353, 393 S.E.2d 496 (1990); Bryant v. Employees Retirement Sys., 264 Ga. 125, 441 S.E.2d 757 (1994); Firearms Training Sys. v. Sharp, 213 Ga. App. 566, 445 S.E.2d 538 (1994); United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Park 'N Go of Ga., Inc., 66 F.3d 273 (11th. Cir. 1995); Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass'n, 243 Ga. App. 222, 531 S.E.2d 376 (2000); Henson v. Tucker, 278 Ga. App. 859, 630 S.E.2d 64 (2006); Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. 600, 706 S.E.2d 634 (2011); Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014); DOCO Credit Union v. Chambers, 330 Ga. App. 633, 768 S.E.2d 808 (2015); Wallace v. Wallace, 301 Ga. 195, 800 S.E.2d 303 (2017); Merch. Law Firm, P.C. v. Emerson, 301 Ga. 609, 800 S.E.2d 557 (2017); Peterson v. Peterson, 303 Ga. 211, 811 S.E.2d 309 (2018); City of Dublin Sch. Dist. v. MMT Holdings, LLC, 346 Ga. App. 546, 816 S.E.2d 494 (2018).

When jurisdiction alterable by General Assembly.

- Jurisdiction of Supreme Court over cases not involving construction of Constitution or constitutionality of statutes is alterable by legislative enactment. Taylor v. Stovall, 155 Ga. 894, 118 S.E. 715 (1923).

Power of General Assembly to set conditions on right of review.

- This paragraph vests in the General Assembly the power to prescribe conditions as to the right of review of a case in the Supreme Court. Gordy v. Dunwody, 210 Ga. 810, 83 S.E.2d 7 (1954) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Constitution gives General Assembly authority to enact laws placing conditions upon appeals. Fife v. Johnston, 225 Ga. 447, 169 S.E.2d 167 (1969); State v. Hollomon, 132 Ga. App. 304, 208 S.E.2d 167 (1974); Reed v. Hopper, 235 Ga. 298, 219 S.E.2d 409 (1975).

General Assembly has no authority to prescribe cases to Supreme Court. Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977).

Supreme Court not a court for hearing appeals from Court of Appeals generally.

- As to most cases, that court is and should be considered as a court of last resort, though technically it is not such. Adair v. Traco Div., 192 Ga. 59, 14 S.E.2d 466, answer conformed to, 65 Ga. App. 110, 15 S.E.2d 306 (1941).

When Supreme Court will not review Court of Appeals decisions.

- Supreme Court will not ordinarily review judgment of Court of Appeals because of assignment of error complaining that Court of Appeals has erroneously construed pleadings, nor will it ordinarily review a decision of the Court of Appeals merely because of an assignment of error complaining that the judgment of such court is incorrect. Frazier v. Southern Ry., 200 Ga. 590, 37 S.E.2d 774 (1946).

Meaning of term "cases involving title to land."

- "Cases involving title to land," as that term is used in this paragraph, refers to and means actions at law, such as ejectment and statutory substitutes, in which the plaintiff asserts a presently enforceable legal title against the possession of the defendant for the purpose of recovering the land. Bond v. Ray, 207 Ga. 559, 63 S.E.2d 399 (1951), commented on in 3 Mercer L. Rev. 220 (1951); Reid v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Ga. 289, 127 S.E.2d 678 (1962); Barton v. Gammell, 238 Ga. 643, 235 S.E.2d 18, aff'd, 143 Ga. App. 291, 238 S.E.2d 445 (1977) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Supreme Court has no jurisdiction when title to land is not directly, but only incidentally, involved. Colley v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R., 156 Ga. 43, 118 S.E. 712 (1923); Radcliffe v. Jones, 174 Ga. 324, 162 S.E. 679 (1932); Reece v. McCrary, 179 Ga. 812, 177 S.E. 741 (1934); Lewis v. Fry, 194 Ga. 842, 22 S.E.2d 817 (1942); Miller v. Ray, 208 Ga. 27, 64 S.E.2d 449 (1951).

Since the children sought a determination that their deceased parent had a one-half interest in a home occupied by the parent and the second spouse and the second spouse sought a determination that the parent had no interest in the property, the parties were not seeking recovery of the land and the case was not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Cole v. Cole, 205 Ga. App. 332, 422 S.E.2d 230 (1992).

Plaintiff must depend for recovery on maintenance of title.

- The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of cases in which the plaintiff asserts the plaintiff's title to the land in question, and depends for a recovery upon the plaintiff's maintenance of it; or to supply a link in the chain, wanting by reason of accident or other cause. Colley v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R., 156 Ga. 43, 118 S.E. 712 (1923).

Plaintiff must not be in actual possession of land.

- Where petition shows that the plaintiff is in actual possession of the land described in the deed involved in the action, the action is not one at law for the recovery of land. Bond v. Ray, 207 Ga. 559, 63 S.E.2d 399 (1951), commented on in 3 Mercer L. Rev. 220 (1951).

Action seeking legal and equitable title to estate.

- The Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction of cases "involving title to land" was not applied to an action by alleged illegitimate children of a decedent seeking legal and equitable title to the decedent's estate. Tolbert v. Whatley, 223 Ga. App. 508, 478 S.E.2d 587 (1996).

Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in contest over title growing out of proceeding for homestead exemption. Adams v. Bishop, 174 Ga. 262, 162 S.E. 531 (1932).

In action seeking rule nisi to require defendants to show cause why nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding should not be allowed to proceed, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction. Graham v. Tallent, 235 Ga. 47, 218 S.E.2d 799 (1975).

In action for abatement in contract price for purchase of described realty, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction. Halliburton v. Collier, 201 Ga. 340, 39 S.E.2d 698 (1946).

In appeal from judgment in favor of widow's application for dower, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction. Rowe v. Rowe, 221 Ga. 820, 147 S.E.2d 447 (1966).

In overruling of demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to petition seeking to recover damages for breach of warranty of title, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction. Sanders v. Calloway, 211 Ga. 580, 87 S.E.2d 397 (1955).

In action to confirm sale of land under power of sale, pursuant to former Code 1933, § 37-608 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161), the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction. Tingle v. Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 211 Ga. 636, 87 S.E.2d 841 (1955).

Determining if defective security deed exists.

- Where purchaser of property at a tax sale sought determination that assignee of security deed had no interest in the property by virtue of a defective security deed in the chain of title, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction. Hooten v. Goldome Credit Corp., 224 Ga. App. 581, 481 S.E.2d 550 (1997).

Where dispossessory warrant is sued out to evict tenant who files a counter-affidavit alleging defensive facts only, and no equitable or affirmative relief is prayed, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Brumfield v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 196 Ga. 821, 27 S.E.2d 678 (1943).

Appeal of judgment determining local church held property in trust for national church within Supreme Court's jurisdiction.

- Appeal by the trustees of a local church of a judgment determining that the possessory interest in property held by the local church was held in trust for the benefit of a national church and ordering that property delivered to the national church was within the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction over all equity cases under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(2); because resolution of the equitable issue would not be a matter of routine once the underlying legal issues were resolved, a substantive issue on appeal involved the legality or propriety of equitable relief. Kemp v. Neal, 288 Ga. 324, 704 S.E.2d 175 (2010).

Ownership as defense.

- Where the statutory affidavit provided for in former Civil Code 1910, § 5385 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50), seeking to evict one alleged to be tenant holding over beyond the tenant's term, was resisted by the filing of a counter-affidavit denying tenancy and asserting ownership as a defense, the issue presented was not a case respecting title to land. Anderson v. Watkins, 170 Ga. 483, 153 S.E. 8 (1930).

Denial of tenancy.

- Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of a case brought after the overruling of a motion for new trial after verdict upon an issue made by the filing of a counter-affidavit to a dispossessory warrant, which affidavit merely denied the tenancy alleged in the warrant. Downs v. Weaver, 184 Ga. 856, 193 S.E. 858 (1937).

Rights of possession, not title was issue.

- Where defendants appealed to the Supreme Court from entry by the state court of an order granting a writ of possession in a dispossessory proceeding filed after foreclosure of defendants' interest under a deed to secure debt, as right of possession, not title to land, was the issue before the state court, jurisdiction of the appeal was in the Court of Appeals. Jordan v. Atlanta Neighborhood Hous. Servs., Inc., 251 Ga. 37, 302 S.E.2d 568 (1983).

Easements.

- The Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal on grounds that the case "involved title to land" where the party against whom default judgment had been entered admitted that there was no slope-and-fill easement on the party's property and the title-insurance policy covering such easements did not affect title to property. Krystal Co. v. Carter, 256 Ga. 43, 343 S.E.2d 490 (1986).

Form of judgment affected nature of case.

- Where in an action to establish a copy of a lost deed the jury found in favor of the plaintiff's contention as to the character of the deed, and upon such verdict the judge entered a decree that the plaintiff recover the land described, that fee-simple title be vested in it, and that the deed attached to the petition be established as prayed, the only effect of the decree was to establish the deed as prayed by the plaintiff; the provisions therein as to recovery of land and decree of title being surplusage. Accordingly, the form of the judgment did not make the case one in equity or one respecting title to land. Loftin v. Carroll County Bd. of Educ., 195 Ga. 689, 25 S.E.2d 293 (1943).

Proceeding not converted into equity case by defendant's answer.

- A proceeding to establish a copy of a lost deed was not converted into an equity case by the answer of the defendant, asserting only that the deed executed by the defendant contained a provision whereby title would revert to the defendant on a certain condition stated, and not invoking any equitable relief; nor did it constitute a suit respecting title to land, hence appellate jurisdiction was not in the Supreme Court. Loftin v. Carroll County Bd. of Educ., 195 Ga. 689, 25 S.E.2d 293 (1943).

Question of whether condemnor properly tendered award outside jurisdiction.

- On appeal of an award by assessors in a condemnation proceeding in which the condemnor was dissatisfied, the question of whether or not the condemnor properly tendered the amount of the award before entering the appeal did not make a question for decision within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, nor did the allegation of estoppel by reason of a judgment decreeing fee-simple title to be in the condemnor make a question involving title to land and within the jurisdiction thereof. Wilson v. State Hwy. Dep't, 208 Ga. 510, 67 S.E.2d 578 (1951).

Location of dividing line appropriate issue for Court of Appeals.

- Where the parties by agreement have eliminated all issues in a case to enjoin a continuing trespass and an action in ejectment, except the issue as to the location of the dividing line, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the writ of error. Whaley v. Ellis, 209 Ga. 147, 71 S.E.2d 209 (1952).

Title to land not involved.

- Where the controlling question in an encroachment action between owners of adjoining lots is the location of the dividing line separating the lots, title to land is not directly involved. Grobli v. Foreman, 171 Ga. 712, 156 S.E. 622 (1931).

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court embraces both good and bad equity cases.

- Consequently, even though a petition, may not state a valid and subsisting cause of action for equitable relief, it is within that court's jurisdiction. Sutker v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App. 627, 152 S.E.2d 578 (1966), transferred to, 223 Ga. 58, 153 S.E.2d 540 (1967).

Where action is not one in equity, Supreme Court is without jurisdiction, and the action should be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Regal Textile Co. v. Feil, 189 Ga. 581, 6 S.E.2d 908 (1940); Gay v. Lewis, 215 Ga. 317, 109 S.E.2d 646 (1959).

Case the Court of Appeals transferred to the Supreme Court was returned to the Court of Appeals because the matter was not an equity case that triggered the Supreme Court's jurisdiction; the issues raised in the case, which placed an implied trust on disputed property, were legal in nature, and the issues did not relate to the propriety of an implied trust itself. Reeves v. Newman, 287 Ga. 317, 695 S.E.2d 626 (2010).

Constitution of will.

- Where none of the findings or exceptions thereto are of such a character as to make a case in equity, and the case does not involve the validity or construction of a will, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter, the jurisdiction being in the Court of Appeals. Adams v. Bishop, 170 Ga. 238, 152 S.E. 108 (1930).

Supreme Court has jurisdiction over affirmative equitable relief.

- If there are pleadings and facts to warrant affirmative equitable relief, only the Supreme Court could entertain jurisdiction for purposes of review, but where the pleadings and evidence do not authorize affirmative equitable relief, the Supreme Court would have no jurisdiction for purposes of review. Alsabrook v. Prudential Ins. Co., 174 Ga. 637, 163 S.E. 706 (1932).

Transfer of case by Supreme Court equivalent to holding that action is not in equity. Stone v. Edwards, 32 Ga. App. 479, 124 S.E. 54 (1924); Taylor Lumber Co. v. Clark Lumber Co., 53 Ga. App. 815, 127 S.E. 905 (1924); Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).

Where an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land is transferred by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, transfer of the appeal is tantamount to a ruling eliminating and resolving the equitable issues which lie only within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to determine. Brooks v. Boykin, 194 Ga. App. 854, 392 S.E.2d 46 (1990).

Equitable complaint rejected by Supreme Court states no cause of action at law.

- Where the plaintiff has instituted an action and has prosecuted an appeal upon the theory that the plaintiff has some right that is cognizable in a court of equity, and the Supreme Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction of writs of error in equity cases, has decided that no jurisdiction of the cause exists in that court, it does not appear that the plaintiff has stated a cause of action at law. Citizens' & S. Nat'l Bank v. Georgia R.R. Bank, 43 Ga. App. 387, 159 S.E. 287 (1931).

Judgment sustaining demurrer to equitable petition reviewable.

- In a suit brought in a superior court seeking equitable relief, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the petition, regardless of whether a valid and subsisting cause of action was stated. O'Callaghan v. Bank of Eastman, 180 Ga. 812, 180 S.E. 847 (1935).

Test is what remains in case for review.

- The test of a case as to whether it is one in equity, and hence reviewable by the Supreme Court, is not what it might have been at any given time during its pendency in the trial court but what remained in it for review. Matters eliminated either by the parties or by order of the trial court constitute no part of the case in the Supreme Court. Douglas-Guardian Whse. Corp. v. Todd, 212 Ga. 791, 96 S.E.2d 275 (1957); Benton v. State Hwy. Dep't, 220 Ga. 674, 141 S.E.2d 396 (1965); Sanders v. Carney, 224 Ga. 429, 162 S.E.2d 351 (1968); Gainesville Carpet Mart v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 225 Ga. 315, 168 S.E.2d 159 (1969); Matuszczak v. Kelly, 233 Ga. 914, 213 S.E.2d 875 (1975).

Nature of relief sought.

- Whether a complaint sets forth an equitable or a legal cause of action depends upon the relief prayed for. Burgess v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 48, 169 S.E. 364 (1933).

Whether an action is one at law or in equity is determined by the nature of the relief sought, rather than the form of the allegations of the complaint. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 177 Ga. 427, 170 S.E. 222 (1933); Griffin v. Securities Inv. Co., 181 Ga. 455, 182 S.E. 594 (1935); Dobbs v. FDIC, 187 Ga. 569, 1 S.E.2d 672 (1939); Regal Textile Co. v. Feil, 189 Ga. 581, 6 S.E.2d 908 (1940); Comstock v. Tarbush, 200 Ga. 320, 37 S.E.2d 148 (1946); City of Summerville v. Georgia Power Co., 204 Ga. 276, 49 S.E.2d 661 (1948); United States Cas. Co. v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 212 Ga. 569, 94 S.E.2d 422 (1956); State Hwy. Dep't v. Hewitt Contracting Co., 221 Ga. 621, 146 S.E.2d 632 (1966); Gifford v. Jackson, 223 Ga. 155, 154 S.E.2d 224 (1967).

To make a case one for equity jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, it must contain allegations and prayers for equitable relief. Jones v. Van Vleck, 224 Ga. 796, 164 S.E.2d 724 (1968).

Litigants will not be permitted to evade this paragraph by adding spurious prayer for equitable relief. Alderman v. Crenshaw, 208 Ga. 71, 65 S.E.2d 178 (1951), overruled on other grounds, Wiley v. Wiley, 233 Ga. 824, 213 S.E.2d 682 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Prayer for equitable relief does not make equity action.

- Complaint containing allegations appropriate only to action for damages does not assume character of equity action merely by virtue of prayer for equitable relief. Atlanta Fin. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 189 Ga. 121, 5 S.E.2d 242 (1939); Hollinshed v. Shadrick, 212 Ga. 624, 94 S.E.2d 705 (1956).

Complaint will not be construed as suit in equity merely because it is filed in the superior court and is styled "complaint in equity." Burgess v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 48, 169 S.E. 364 (1933).

A complaint is not to be treated as a case in equity merely because of general language so terming it where the allegations of fact and the specific prayers do not support the general language used. Dobbs v. FDIC, 187 Ga. 569, 1 S.E.2d 672 (1939).

Allegations of a complaint must be applicable to equitable relief prayed, and there must be a prayer either for the specific relief prayed or for general relief. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 179 Ga. 890, 177 S.E. 703 (1934); Hollinshed v. Shadrick, 212 Ga. 624, 94 S.E.2d 705 (1956).

Allegation to effect that equitable relief is necessary to avoid multiplicity of suits is merely conclusion of pleader; without allegations to support it, the action is not one in equity within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Woolsey v. Mimms, 209 Ga. 360, 72 S.E.2d 706 (1952).

Equitable defense does not make equity case.

- The posing of an equitable defense in response to a motion for summary judgment in a case in the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals clearly does not make it a case in equity. Capitol Fish Co. v. Tanner, 192 Ga. App. 251, 384 S.E.2d 394 (1989).

Failure to appeal judgment denying reformation eliminates jurisdiction.

- Where plaintiff cobroker has not appealed the grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiff's pleadings seeking to reform the contract based upon a mutual mistake of fact of the parties, the reformation sought therein is not now before the court on appeal which would have rendered jurisdiction of this case in the Supreme Court. MPI Corp. v. Northside Realty Assocs., 151 Ga. App. 516, 260 S.E.2d 499 (1979), rev'd, 245 Ga. 321, 265 S.E.2d 11 (1980).

Dismissal of equity action removes equity jurisdiction from counterclaim.

- Where a defendant, in answer to an equitable complaint for injunctive relief, sets up a money demand, and asks a judgment therefor against the complainant and, after the grant of a temporary restraining order, the complainant voluntarily dismisses the action, such a dismissal removes all equitable questions involved in the case. Rogers v. Miller Peanut Co., 199 Ga. 835, 35 S.E.2d 469 (1945).

Nature of order.

- The nature of the order containing the underlying contested issues of law will govern the appellate path in the Court of Appeals under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b). Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Medical Clinic, Inc., 220 Ga. App. 805, 470 S.E.2d 252 (1996), aff'd, 267 Ga. 177, 476 S.E.2d 587 (1996).

Supreme Court has jurisdiction in appeal from grant of permanent injunction.

- Where the general judgment and decree includes the grant of a permanent injunction, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the writ of error (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49,5-6-50) excepting to such general judgment and decree granting equitable relief. Pinkard v. Mendel, 216 Ga. 487, 117 S.E.2d 336 (1960), later appeal, 217 Ga. 562, 123 S.E.2d 770 (1962).

Where a complaint is brought by the corporate operator of a business alleging that a license ordinance of a municipality sought to be enforced is unconstitutional and praying for process, a temporary restraining order, and for a permanent injunction, such a case is an equity case within the meaning of this paragraph. City of Atlanta v. Royal Peacock Social Club, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 648, 168 S.E.2d 335 (1969) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Supreme Court has jurisdiction over injunctive relief.

- The Supreme Court had jurisdiction where the primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying injunctive relief given the jury's finding of misappropriation of trade secrets and use of those trade secrets by defendants. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Heinemann, 268 Ga. 755, 493 S.E.2d 132 (1997).

Where prayer for injunction is mere surplusage, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Gulf Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. McNeal, 222 Ga. 454, 150 S.E.2d 685 (1966); Tierce v. Davis, 225 Ga. 574, 170 S.E.2d 228 (1969).

A prayer for permanent injunction without alleging facts which would support the prayer for such relief is insufficient to place jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. Stone v. First Nat'l Bank, 223 Ga. 804, 158 S.E.2d 382 (1967).

In complaint seeking injunction against criminal prosecution pending adjudication of questions raised in complaint, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Tierce v. Davis, 225 Ga. 574, 170 S.E.2d 228 (1969).

Requirement that injunctive relief be substantive issue.

- Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not attach simply because pleadings contain a prayer for an injunction or any other form of equitable relief; instead, an equity case for purposes of Supreme Court jurisdiction is a case in which a substantive issue raised on appeal involves the legality or propriety of equitable relief. Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Medical Clinic, Inc., 267 Ga. 177, 476 S.E.2d 587 (1996); Powell v. Norman Elec. Galaxy, Inc., 229 Ga. App. 99, 493 S.E.2d 205 (1997).

No jurisdiction where denial of injunction was not appealed.

- Where the only request for equitable relief made by appellants in their complaint was for an injunction to halt construction of road improvements, and the denial of that request was not appealed, there was not currently any claim for equitable relief pending in the case and jurisdiction over the appeal was in the Court of Appeals rather than the Supreme Court. Clay v. Department of Transp., 198 Ga. App. 155, 400 S.E.2d 684 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 400 S.E.2d 684 (1991).

Equitable defense does not make action equity case.

- Where an action is one at law and the defendant's answer, if at all equitable in nature, is purely defensive, the sustaining of which would result simply in a general verdict in favor of the defendant, the case is not an "equity case" within the meaning of this paragraph. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Bischoff, 179 Ga. 255, 175 S.E. 560 (1934); Alderman v. Crenshaw, 208 Ga. 71, 65 S.E.2d 178 (1951), overruled on other grounds, Wiley v. Wiley, 233 Ga. 824, 213 S.E.2d 682 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Petition to set aside judgment on equitable grounds not equity case.

- A petition filed in the court where a judgment was rendered to set aside the judgment on the ground of mental incapacity to enter into contract and of insanity existing at the time the judgment was rendered is not "an equity case" as is contemplated by this paragraph. Perry v. Fletcher, 174 Ga. 180, 162 S.E. 285 (1932) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Response to motion to dismiss petition denominated "plea of equitable estoppel" and not seeking any affirmative equitable relief does not confer jurisdiction on Supreme Court and not seeking any affirmative equitable relief does not confer jurisdiction on Supreme Court under this paragraph because it does not change the character of the cross action from a money demand to a suit in equity. Rogers v. Miller Peanut Co., 199 Ga. 835, 35 S.E.2d 469 (1945) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Where petition subject to demurrer (now motion to dismiss) on ground of misjoinder of parties or causes of action is brought, the fact that no demurrer is filed will not convert it into equity case. Dobbs v. FDIC, 187 Ga. 569, 1 S.E.2d 672 (1939).

Where there is no objection to appointment, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction.

- Where suit, as originally brought, was one in equity seeking the appointment of a receiver, to which there is no objection, nor is there any complaint as to anything done, the case before the Supreme Court on writ of error (see §§ 5-6-49,5-6-50) does not involve any equitable relief, or the application of any rule of equitable procedure; the question in issue is one of law, and is not such as to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court but that it be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Refrigeration Appliances, Inc. v. Atlanta Provision Co., 210 Ga. 475, 80 S.E.2d 683 (1954).

Fact that verdict and judgment were obtained by receiver as substituted plaintiff does not make case one in equity. Henley v. Colonial Stages S., Inc., 184 Ga. 445, 191 S.E. 445 (1937).

Supreme Court has jurisdiction in action involving equitable setoff.

- Where petitioner, a nonresident railroad, brought an action ex contractu against a resident of this state for the collection of freight charges owing the petitioner, and by cross action the defendant set off an action ex delicto for negligence, a court of equity would take jurisdiction thereof, under former Code 1933, § 37-308 (see now O.C.G.A. § 23-2-76), and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction. Atlanta Paper Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 211 Ga. 185, 84 S.E.2d 359 (1954).

In controversy arising out of complaint for interpleader, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Freeman v. Atlanta Police Relief Ass'n, 62 Ga. App. 523, 8 S.E.2d 711 (1940); Finney v. Green, 90 Ga. App. 321, 83 S.E.2d 65 (1954).

In judgment against corporate director for fraud, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

- Where a judgment is not merely against a corporation to which an overpayment was made, but also against one of the directors who was liable, not because the director received the overpayment, but because the director wrongfully took that much and more money out of the capital assets of the corporation, rendering it insolvent, in fraud of the plaintiff's rights, the case presented is one in equity. Regal Textile Co. v. Feil, 189 Ga. 581, 6 S.E.2d 908 (1940).

In action involving conventional subrogation, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Lee v. Holman, 52 Ga. App. 543, 183 S.E. 837, aff'd, 182 Ga. 559, 186 S.E. 189 (1936).

Where claimant of personalty seeks equitable relief, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

- Where one files a claim to personalty levied upon under an attachment or other process, and in aid of that claim files an amendment in which the person seeks affirmative equitable relief, the original proceeding at law is converted into a proceeding both at law and in equity. In such a case, when a writ of error is sued out to review the final judgment, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to determine the assignments of error set out in the bill of exceptions. Benton v. Benton, 164 Ga. 541, 139 S.E. 68 (1927).

Contract law issues.

- Georgia Court of Appeals, rather than the Georgia Supreme Court, had jurisdiction over the appeal because the propriety of equitable relief was ancillary to the underlying substantive issues of contract law that were the focus of the appeal including whether the parties made a mutual mistake in their agreement over the purchase of the acquisition loan. First Chatham Bank v. Liberty Capital, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 821, 755 S.E.2d 219 (2014).

Contract claim against county barred by sovereign immunity.

- Builder's contractual and quasi-contractual claims against a county and the county's officials for an interest in a sewer pumping station were properly dismissed by the trial court because those claims were barred by sovereign immunity as there was no written contract to enforce. Layer v. Barrow County, 297 Ga. 871, 778 S.E.2d 156 (2015).

Action for specific performance.

- An appeal from an order granting summary judgment against the plaintiff seeking specific performance of an alleged agreement for the sale of land was within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, even though the plaintiff had included an alternative prayer for damages in the complaint. Stephens v. Trotter, 205 Ga. App. 497, 422 S.E.2d 568 (1992).

In an action for the violation of restrictive covenants, because the "primary issue" to be resolved on appeal was whether the trial court properly construed the contracts and the viability of any equitable claim was ancillary thereto, the appeal was outside the realm of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Redfern v. Huntcliff Homes Ass'n, 271 Ga. 745, 524 S.E.2d 464 (1999).

Affidavit of illegality did not give Supreme Court jurisdiction.

- Where simple law case made by foreclosure on personal property was halted by affidavit of illegality, denying that defendant owes the debt, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Pritchett, 217 Ga. 52, 121 S.E.2d 17 (1961).

In action at law to recover judgment upon note secured by deed to land, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. Burgess v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 48, 169 S.E. 364 (1933).

In proceeding to establish copy of lost deed, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction.

- Where a petition in a superior court to establish a copy of a deed claimed to have been lost alleged only that the debtor resided in the county in which the suit was filed, that the debtor had executed to the plaintiff a certain deed, a true copy of which was attached to the petition, and that the deed had been lost, and in which petition the only prayer was that "the clerk of this court issue a rule nisi calling upon (the defendant) to show cause, if any he has, why the copy deed aforesaid should not be established in lieu of said lost original," such petition was a mere statutory proceeding to establish a copy of the deed claimed to have been lost, and was not a suit in equity such as to grant appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. Loftin v. Carroll County Bd. of Educ., 195 Ga. 689, 25 S.E.2d 293 (1943).

In proceeding to subject trust estate to payment of debt, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. The suit did not seek or pray for any relief not allowable in a court of law under the statutory procedure under Art. 4, Ch. 12, T. 53. Robinson v. Lindsey, 184 Ga. 684, 192 S.E. 910 (1937).

Prayer added to set aside contract did not give Supreme Court jurisdiction.

- In petition seeking money damages because of alleged fraudulent misrepresentations inducing the plaintiff to sign a contract of sale for the purchase of an automobile, the addition of a prayer that the contract of sale "be set aside on the grounds of fraud" was not such a prayer for equitable relief as to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction of the appeal. Douglas v. Currie Ford Co., 103 Ga. App. 75, 118 S.E.2d 586 (1961).

Where order requires executor to secure additional bond, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction.

- Order of the superior court on appeal from the court of ordinary (now probate court) requiring executor to secure an additional surety bond within 15 days and, upon the executor's failure to comply, revocation of the executor's letters of executorship and order to make an accounting are reviewable solely by the Court of Appeals. Goodman v. Little, 213 Ga. 178, 97 S.E.2d 567 (1957).

Where plaintiff asks for special lien against fund in garnishment, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Henley v. Colonial Stages S., Inc., 184 Ga. 445, 191 S.E. 445 (1937).

In motion to revoke order of incorporation on grounds that movant had acquired prior use to name used by the corporation, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. Methodist Episcopal Church S., Inc. v. Decell, 60 Ga. App. 843, 5 S.E.2d 66 (1939).

Where holder of junior judgment claims older judgment void on grounds of insanity, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction.

- Where a case involves the distribution of money arising from the sale of property under a senior judgment and execution, and the holder of a junior judgment and execution claims the fund upon the ground that the judgment in the older case is void, because at the time of its rendition the defendant therein was insane and confined in the state sanitarium, it is not an equity case within the meaning of the Constitution declaring the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and will be transferred to the Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction. Burkhalter v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 170 Ga. 237, 152 S.E. 98 (1930).

In money rule against sheriff under former Civil Code 1910, § 5348 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-13-13), the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. Alsabrook v. Prudential Ins. Co., 174 Ga. 637, 163 S.E. 706 (1932).

In action for accounting against deceased agent, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction.

- Suit brought against administration of intestate on grounds that the administrator had been verbally appointed agent of plaintiff's intestate and had made no accounting or settlement was an action at law and not an equity case. Goodwyn v. Roop, 181 Ga. 327, 182 S.E. 4 (1935).

In discovery ancillary to recovery of funds from guardian, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. Williams v. Farmers State Bank, 147 Ga. 569, 94 S.E. 998 (1918).

In action to recover assets of stockholder of insolvent corporation, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction.

- A suit to recover the statutory liability of an alleged stockholder of an insolvent institution, in the hands of the Superintendent of Banks for liquidation, and to have the property seized under the writ of attachment in pursuance of law and subjected to payment of the alleged liability, is not a suit in equity. Pignatel v. Mobley, 173 Ga. 410, 160 S.E. 411 (1931).

In action for recovery of money had and received, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Orient Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, 193 Ga. 241, 17 S.E.2d 703 (1941).

Action for money had and received.

- Though a petition filed in the superior court may contain allegations authorizing the rendition of a money judgment against the defendant therein, as upon an action in equity upon the doctrine of subrogation, or as upon an action at law for money had and received, if the prayer of the petition seeks the recovery of the money judgment as for money had and received, in the absence of any other prayer, the case presented is not an equity case within the meaning of the constitutional provision giving the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction of equity cases. Jasper School Dist. v. Gormley, 184 Ga. 756, 193 S.E. 248 (1937).

Equitable adoption.

- Appeal in which the substantive issue involves the legality or propriety of a trial court's declaration that a certain individual is or is not the virtually adopted child of a decedent is an action in equity that invokes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Georgia under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(2); to the extent Walden v. Burke, 282 Ga. App. 154, 637 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) may have been read as indicating the contrary, it was disapproved. Morgan v. Howard, 285 Ga. 512, 678 S.E.2d 882 (2009).

Action involving riparian rights to water.

- Because equitable principles were at the core of a trial court's determination as to whether an appellee had made a reasonable use of the water the appellee shared with the appellants, jurisdiction over the appeal was properly in the Supreme Court of Georgia under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(2). Tunison v. Harper, 286 Ga. 687, 690 S.E.2d 819 (2010).

Interpretation of trust not within supreme court's jurisdiction over equity cases.

- Appeals that involve the proper interpretation of a trust provision do not come within the supreme court's general appellate jurisdiction over "equity cases," Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(2), because the resolution of that legal issue will affect the administration of the trust. Durham v. Durham, Ga. , S.E.2d (June 18, 2012).

Appeals challenging orders granting and denying motions for summary judgment were transferred to the court of appeals because the cases did not come within the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction over "equity cases" under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(2); the sole issue presented on appeal was how to interpret a specific provision of a legal document, the in terrorem clause of the trust, which was a straightforward legal question and one that did not require any analysis that could be termed an evaluation of equitable considerations. Durham v. Durham, Ga. , S.E.2d (June 18, 2012).

In proceeding to establish copy of lost will, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction.

- Where the proceeding was not one to probate a copy of a lost or destroyed will under former Civil Code 1910, § 3863 (see now O.C.G.A. § 53-3-6), but was one to establish a copy of a lost record of a will therefore duly probated and admitted to record, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction under this paragraph. Bond v. Reid, 152 Ga. 481, 110 S.E. 281 (1922) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

In dispute over identity of beneficiary, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction.

- The issue of which of two persons of the same name is the beneficiary named in a testator's will does not involve either the validity of a will or the construction of a will. Scheridan v. Scheridan, 231 Ga. 729, 204 S.E.2d 293 (1974).

In a proceeding to determine heirship, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction.

- In an action to determine heirship where the parties did not raise, nor did the trial court consider or resolve, any issue relating to the validity or meaning of decedent's will, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of the appeal. Goodman v. Hammonds, 224 Ga. App. 387, 480 S.E.2d 397 (1997).

Will dispute within Court of Appeals' jurisdiction upon transfer.

- Court of Appeals had jurisdiction upon the transfer by the Supreme Court of Georgia of an appeal of a will dispute as the Supreme Court's determination that the issue did not involve the validity or meaning of the will, such that it was ancillary, was binding; the Court of Appeals nonetheless had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. Simmons v. England, 323 Ga. App. 251, 746 S.E.2d 862 (2013).

Where provisions of will incidentally relied upon to show title to stock, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction.

- Where certain provisions of a will are incidentally relied on to show title to corporate stock as the basis of stockholder's liability and no question is made as to construction or validity of the will, but both sides treat it as valid and meaning the same thing as bequeathing the capital stock in question to the defendant, the case does not involve the validity or construction of a will. Pignatel v. Mobley, 173 Ga. 410, 160 S.E. 411 (1931).

In proceeding to select replacement for executor, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction.

- Where the purpose of an action is the selection of an executor to succeed one who is resigning because of ill health, the construction of the testator's will is only incidentally involved, if at all, and the nature of the alleged cause will be determined by the controlling object for which the proceeding is instituted and the character of the relief sought. Measured by this rule, the proceeding does not make a case involving the construction of a will within the constitutional provision relating to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Darnell v. Tate, 208 Ga. 23, 64 S.E.2d 582 (1951).

Denial of motion for new trial, subject of which is qualification of nominated executors of probated will, does not involve validity or construction of a will. Thomasson v. Barber, 191 Ga. 262, 11 S.E.2d 887 (1940).

Sentence to life imprisonment does not change nature of conviction.

- When a person on trial for murder is found guilty of that offense, but with a recommendation by the jury that the person be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary, the person is convicted of a capital felony. Caesar v. State, 127 Ga. 710, 57 S.E. 66 (1907).

If under a murder indictment one is convicted, not of murder but of a lower grade of homicide such as manslaughter, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction since the defendant has not been convicted of the capital felony as charged. Mika v. State, 196 Ga. 473, 26 S.E.2d 616 (1943).

Plea of guilty, accepted and entered by the court, is a "conviction." McCrary v. State, 215 Ga. 887, 114 S.E.2d 133 (1960).

Supreme Court has jurisdiction of all counts of indictment once conviction shown.

- Although "conviction of a capital felony" is critical to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, once the conviction is shown, then the court has jurisdiction of that "case," including all counts of the indictment on which the accused was found guilty and all enumerations of error arising therefrom regardless of their subject matter. Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975).

Supreme Court had jurisdiction over post conviction motion seeking transcript in murder case.

- The Supreme Court of Georgia had jurisdiction over an appeal from a post-conviction motion seeking a transcript from a defendant's original murder case under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(8), and the motion was not a motion in the nature of mandamus subject to the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 15-3-3.1. Henderson v. State, 303 Ga. 241, 811 S.E.2d 388 (2018).

Convictions of rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery are no longer convictions of capital felonies for appellate jurisdictional purposes and jurisdiction of these appeals lies in the Court of Appeals. Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977).

Mere indictment of capital felony does not give Supreme Court jurisdiction.

- Where there has been indictment, but no trial and no conviction of a capital felony, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction. Robinson v. State, 209 Ga. 48, 70 S.E.2d 514 (1952).

The mere fact that a capital offense is charged in an indictment does not give the Supreme Court jurisdiction of a criminal case, but there must be a conviction of a capital felony. McCrary v. State, 215 Ga. 887, 114 S.E.2d 133 (1960).

Jurisdiction of change of venue motion in Court of Appeals.

- The Court of Appeals, and not the Supreme Court, has appellate jurisdiction of a murder case involving change of venue. Wilburn v. State, 140 Ga. 138, 78 S.E. 819 (1913); Scoggins v. State, 24 Ga. App. 677, 102 S.E. 39 (1920); Ruffin v. State, 151 Ga. 743, 108 S.E. 29 (1921).

The jurisdiction of all venue cases of this class (motion to change venue after an indictment for a capital felony is vested in the Court of Appeals, and not the Supreme Court, provided no constitutional question is raised in the lower court. Humphrey v. State, 175 Ga. 666, 165 S.E. 587 (1932).

Denial of pretrial motion no basis for appeal.

- Denial of a motion for new trial on a plea of insanity at the time of trial on an indictment for murder, when, in fact, there had been no trial upon the murder charge, cannot afford a basis for jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Spell v. State, 225 Ga. 237, 167 S.E.2d 642 (1969).

Objection to illegally seized evidence does not give jurisdiction.

- Where, in a criminal trial, a part of the evidence was objected to upon the ground that it was obtained by an unlawful search of the defendant's house, the error complained of is not of such a character as to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction. Thompson v. State, 174 Ga. 804, 164 S.E. 202 (1932).

Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction in cases involving misdemeanor offenses unmixed with equitable or constitutional questions. Hilliard v. State, 209 Ga. 497, 74 S.E.2d 65 (1953).

Supreme Court has jurisdiction over attachment for contempt in violating injunction.

- An attachment for contempt in violating an injunctive order, though having some of the characteristics of a criminal proceeding, is so connected with the injunction that a writ of error to review a judgment imposing a fine or a term of imprisonment for such contempt should be treated as an equity case within this paragraph. Tomlin v. Rome Stove & Range Co., 183 Ga. 183, 187 S.E. 879 (1936); Wagner v. Commercial Printers, Inc., 203 Ga. 1, 45 S.E.2d 205 (1947) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Where a citation seeking a judgment for criminal contempt is filed as a branch of an equity case in which the judgment enjoined the defendant from committing the acts which form the basis for the contempt citation, the contempt case comes within the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the equity case. Holcomb v. Johnston, 103 Ga. App. 116, 118 S.E.2d 387 (1961).

In appeal of trial court's finding of contempt of witness in divorce proceeding, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Crocker v. Crocker, 232 Ga. 97, 205 S.E.2d 308 (1974).

In appeal of judgment finding appellant guilty of contempt in failing to obey notice to produce certain papers into court where the contempt feature arises out of the question of law as to the right to require such records produced, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction. Cranford v. Cranford, 225 Ga. 60, 165 S.E.2d 847 (1969).

Child custody.

- Custody controversies involving delinquent children, unruly children, or deprived children are not cases "in the nature of habeas corpus" and are not within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975).

In a custody controversy in the nature of habeas corpus, the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction to decide the issue only if the case is transferred to the juvenile court by proper order of the superior court; and, in such a transferred case, appellate jurisdiction is lodged in the Supreme Court of Georgia. Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975).

Where the natural parent of a child contended that there had never been a transfer of custody to defendant, the parent properly brought the complaint as habeas corpus, and the appeal of the case should have remained with the Supreme Court. Johnson v. Smith, 251 Ga. 1, 302 S.E.2d 542 (1983).

Proceeding for contempt for violation of mandamus involves extraordinary remedy.

- A proceeding for contempt in violation of a mandamus absolute is so connected with the mandamus that a writ of error to review a judgment therein should be treated as a case involving an extraordinary remedy within this paragraph. Settle v. McWhorter, 203 Ga. 93, 45 S.E.2d 210 (1947) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Death penalty proceedings.

- Prisoner's appeal in a suit seeking records from the prisoner's criminal case, which was not filed under the criminal docket numbers but as a separate civil mandamus petition, was not within the Supreme Court of Georgia's murder jurisdiction under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(8); however it was within the court's jurisdiction over extraordinary remedies in death penalty proceedings under O.C.G.A. § 15-3-3.1(4). Still, the appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 42-12-8. Brock v. Hardman, 303 Ga. 729, 814 S.E.2d 736 (2018).

Appellate jurisdiction of custody dispute in Supreme Court.

- In case of dispute over custody between parents, original jurisdiction exists exclusively in courts having jurisdiction of habeas corpus or divorce and alimony actions, in both of which the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction on appeal. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 99 Ga. App. 770, 109 S.E.2d 821 (1959).

Supreme Court has jurisdiction in proceeding for modification of alimony judgment. Perry v. Perry, 213 Ga. 847, 102 S.E.2d 534 (1958).

Sheriff failed to secure bond in divorce action.

- The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction of a suit against a sheriff and the sheriff's sureties, to enforce a liability against them for failure of the sheriff to obtain from the defendant in a suit for divorce and alimony an appearance bond as ordered by the trial court. Swain v. Jaudon, 147 Ga. 773, 95 S.E. 696 (1918).

In citation for contempt based upon failure to comply with judgment rendered by court of another state, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. Henderson v. Henderson, 209 Ga. 148, 71 S.E.2d 210 (1952).

In action in which defense alleges divorce in plaintiff's action for damages for death of spouse, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Thompson v. Central of Ga. Ry., 214 Ga. 130, 103 S.E.2d 555 (1958).

Where exceptions are taken to an order sustaining a demurrer (now motion to dismiss) on an oral motion to strike defendant's answer and to judgment in action upon contract for payment of alimony, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Arnold v. Arnold, 217 Ga. 430, 122 S.E.2d 734 (1961).

In action based solely upon contract for support in settlement of alimony and praying for recovery of sums agreed upon, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. Hayes v. Hayes, 191 Ga. 237, 11 S.E.2d 764 (1940).

Petition for support under uniform act.

- The petition of a divorced wife for support of two minor children by her former husband, brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 11, T. 19) is not a divorce or alimony case within the meaning of this paragraph. O'Quinn v. O'Quinn, 217 Ga. 431, 122 S.E.2d 925 (1961) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Action on foreign judgment for alimony is simply an action on debt of record and is not an alimony case. McLendon v. McLendon, 192 Ga. 70, 14 S.E.2d 477 (1941); Johnson v. Johnson, 223 Ga. 147, 154 S.E.2d 13 (1967).

Suit brought by one against former spouse seeking to domesticate out-of-state judgment in a divorce proceeding and to have spouse attached for contempt and ordered to pay arrearages was a suit on a foreign judgment, not a divorce or alimony case within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution, and jurisdiction of the appeal was in the Court of Appeals. Lewis v. Robinson, 254 Ga. 378, 329 S.E.2d 498 (1985).

Family violence actions.

- Because family violence actions involve neither divorce nor alimony, they do not fall within the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction and, therefore, jurisdiction lies in the Georgia Court of Appeals. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 270 Ga. 461, 510 S.E.2d 810 (1999).

A case involving a "domestic relations" issue wherein appellant sought domestication and "correction" of a foreign divorce decree, normally within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, also involved claims based upon an unincorporated settlement agreement which raised no "domestic relations" issue and, therefore, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the direct appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the former husband as to the former wife's claims for specific performance of the settlement agreement and jurisdiction over the rulings on all the former wife's claims, including the "domestic relations" claim. Eickhoff v. Eickhoff, 263 Ga. 498, 435 S.E.2d 914 (1993).

Non-custodial parent receiving child support.

- Trial court erred by incorrectly starting with the father's presumptive amount of child support and incorrectly applying a parenting time deviation available only to the noncustodial parent to him under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b)(1)-(7) when the court ordered him to pay the non-custodial mother child support per month. Williamson v. Williamson, 293 Ga. 721, 748 S.E.2d 679 (2013).

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of appeals of contempt actions involving child custody.

- Having eschewed jurisdiction over appeals which involve child custody but not a judgment for divorce and alimony and having held in Munday v. Munday, 243 Ga. 863, 257 S.E.2d 282 (1979), that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of appeals involving child custody, the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction of contempt actions involving child custody. Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507, 350 S.E.2d 437 (1986).

Contempt order entered in divorce case.

- Where the jury specifically designates a property transfer as alimony in a divorce case, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction of an appeal of a contempt order entered therein, which by law is subject to application for discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court. Cale v. Byrdwell, 166 Ga. App. 901, 305 S.E.2d 468 (1983).

Georgia Supreme Court, as opposed to the Georgia Court of Appeals, had jurisdiction over a discretionary appeal by a former spouse of a contempt ruling relating to a property distribution portion of a divorce decree pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(6) as the application for contempt was ancillary to the divorce action and not a new civil action; thus, it fell within the Georgia Supreme Court's jurisdiction over divorce and alimony cases. Morris v. Morris, 284 Ga. 748, 670 S.E.2d 84 (2008).

Tort action.

- Wife's claim for damages for a motorcycle accident against her husband involved only a tort claim, and was not a divorce case within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(6), even though the wife sought a divorce in another count of the complaint, and the Supreme Court of Georgia did not have jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal of the denial of the husband's motion to dismiss, which had been treated as a motion for summary judgment; the wife's argument that the appeal fell within the Supreme Court of Georgia's appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues was rejected as she did not specify any allegedly unconstitutional statutes, and argued only that the interspousal tort immunity doctrine, as codified in O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8, was unconstitutional as applied. Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175, 587 S.E.2d 32 (2003).

Writ of mandamus.

- Superior court's order that the county issue building permits to the developer amounted to a writ of mandamus and, thus, the Georgia Supreme Court properly had appellate jurisdiction over the county's appeal. Union County v. CGP, Inc., 277 Ga. 349, 589 S.E.2d 240 (2003).

Action for damages.

- Because an ex-wife and children sought damages for a decedent's alleged failure to comply with an insurance provision in a divorce decree, and not a recovery of alimony or child support, the Georgia Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a discretionary appeal under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(6) and the orders appealed from were subject to the discretionary appeal requirements of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(2); therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed their direct appeal. Walker v. Estate of Mays, 279 Ga. 652, 619 S.E.2d 679 (2005).

In action at law for deceit.

- A suit seeking to recover damages for misrepresentations inducing the petitioner to purchase described real property where the sole prayer of the petition is for a money judgment as compensation for injury done, the suit must be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Elliott v. Dolvin, 160 Ga. 320, 127 S.E. 651 (1925).

In action on account, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction. Fuller v. Cox, 206 Ga. 332, 57 S.E.2d 173 (1950).

In action to remove obstructions from private way under former Code 1933, § 83-119 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-9-59), the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. Carter v. Kinman, 231 Ga. 759, 204 S.E.2d 299 (1974).

The Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court, had jurisdiction of an action begun in the probate court as a petition for removal of an obstruction of a private way, which was appealed as such to the superior court, and which also concerned whether plaintiffs had an easement across defendant's property. Stutts v. Moore, 218 Ga. App. 624, 463 S.E.2d 30 (1995).

In judgment discharging rule nisi issued by superior court judge on charges of inefficiency of certain members of county board of education, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. State v. Walker, 209 Ga. 523, 74 S.E.2d 461 (1953).

In petition seeking recovery against surety on guardian's bond, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. Gunby v. Roberts, 205 Ga. 346, 53 S.E.2d 370 (1949).

To review determination by judge of superior court as to whether particular case is within jurisdiction of justice court, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. Smith v. Atlanta Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Ga. App. 254, 155 S.E. 535 (1930).

Where only question is plaintiff's right to recover attorney's fees, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction. Pickett v. Georgia F. & A.R.R, 214 Ga. 263, 104 S.E.2d 450 (1948).

In action against State Revenue Commissioner to recover money paid as corporation license tax, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction. Atlanta Labor Temple Ass'n v. Williams, 214 Ga. 263, 104 S.E.2d 449 (1958).

In cases involving revenues of the state, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction.

- The enactment of the 1983 Constitution superseded the Supreme Court's order in Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977), giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases involving revenues of the state; thus, all pending cases which involve revenues of the state and which have been docketed in the Supreme Court will be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Collins v. AT & T Co., 265 Ga. 37, 456 S.E.2d 50 (1995).

Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction in proceeding to confirm and validate revenue anticipation certificates. Dade County v. State, 201 Ga. 241, 39 S.E.2d 473 (1946).

Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction in adoption proceeding. Criswell v. Jones, 187 Ga. 55, 199 S.E. 804 (1938).

An appraisal proceeding pursuant to former § 14-2-251 (see now O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1330) is legal, not equitable, in character; and thus no right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court lies from such a proceeding. Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 250 Ga. 828, 301 S.E.2d 635 (1983).

Non-capital murder trial.

- In non-capital murder trial, the Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction under the Georgia Constitution to evaluate the merits of defendant's direct appeal from a denied double jeopardy plea, despite the Court of Appeals' failure to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court. Rhyne v. State, 264 Ga. 176, 442 S.E.2d 742 (1994).

Class action challenging cheating on exam.

- In an appeal pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III(2), arising from a class action suit challenging cheating on a city's firefighter exam, a trial court abused the court's discretion in fashioning injunctive relief specific to appealing non-party firefighters because the firefighters were not bound by the judgment since the firefighters were never joined in the action. Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375, 738 S.E.2d 52 (2013).

Court not precluded from disposing of issues not reached by Court of Appeals.

- While ordinarily the Supreme Court, in granting certiorari, does not undertake to dispose of issues not reached by the Court of Appeals in its decision, it is not precluded from doing so under this paragraph. State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309, 275 S.E.2d 646 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III).

Certification of question authorized.

- The Court of Appeals was authorized to certify a question to the Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of retroactive application of the cap on damages recoverable against the state provided in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26. Department of Human Resources v. Phillips, 223 Ga. App. 520, 478 S.E.2d 598 (1996).

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to consider merits of any question which is omitted in the trial court, and it is upon errors alleged by the complaining party to have been committed in the court below that the court must confine itself. Yarbrough v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 176 Ga. 780, 168 S.E. 873 (1933); Herndon v. State, 179 Ga. 597, 176 S.E. 620 (1934), appeal dismissed, 295 U.S. 441, 55 S. Ct. 794, 79 L. Ed. 1530 (1935); Calhoun v. State, 211 Ga. 112, 84 S.E.2d 198 (1954); Willingham v. Lee, 227 Ga. 425, 181 S.E.2d 49 (1971).

Enumeration of errors complaining of rulings not appearing of record cannot be considered by Supreme Court. Cowart v. Cowart, 223 Ga. 487, 156 S.E.2d 94 (1967).

Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction and it cannot decide questions raised for first time on appeal. Kitchens v. State, 228 Ga. 624, 187 S.E.2d 268 (1972).

Appellate courts have no original jurisdiction and will decide no question on appeal not clearly presented to and passed upon by the trial court. Security Mgt. Co. v. King, 132 Ga. App. 618, 208 S.E.2d 576 (1974).

Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction.

- It is the province of the appellate court to consider only such questions as were presented to the trial court. Accordingly, an assignment of error is limited by the objections made at the time the evidence was offered. The objections cannot be enlarged by the addition of new matter as argument or grounds of error in a motion for new trial. Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S.E. 597 (1934), appeal dismissed with opinions, 295 U.S. 441, 55 S. Ct. 794, 79 L. Ed. 1530 (1935).

The Supreme Court is a court for the correction of errors, and has no original jurisdiction; it will not pass upon questions on which no ruling has ever been made by the trial judge. South View Cem. Ass'n v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863 (1945).

The Supreme Court is limited in its consideration of a case to the rulings actually made by the trial court to which there is exception. Walker v. State, 220 Ga. 415, 139 S.E.2d 278 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 381 U.S. 355, 85 S. Ct. 1557, 14 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1965).

Any error not enumerated shall be disregarded. Windsor v. Southeastern Adjusters, Inc., 221 Ga. 329, 144 S.E.2d 739 (1965).

Party alleging error has burden of showing it in the record. Tukes v. State, 238 Ga. 114, 230 S.E.2d 841 (1976).

All interested persons are necessary parties.

- All persons who are interested in sustaining or reversing the judgment of the court below are necessary parties in the Supreme Court, and must be made parties to the bill of exceptions. Greeson v. Taylor, 160 Ga. 392, 128 S.E. 177 (1925).

Appeal to United States Supreme Court tolls term for case.

- Where on appeal from Georgia Supreme Court to the United States Supreme Court the judgment has been reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings, the appeal tolls the term for the case, and the Georgia Supreme Court still has jurisdiction to give such direction and make such disposition of the case as it may deem proper, not inconsistent with the opinion and judgment of the United States Supreme Court. Georgia Power Co. v. City of Decatur, 181 Ga. 187, 182 S.E. 32 (1935), aff'd sub nom. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. City of Decatur, 297 U.S. 620, 56 S. Ct. 606, 80 L. Ed. 925 (1936).

Case transferred when outside jurisdiction.

- Where an action was held by the Supreme Court to be a tort action, and not for equitable accounting, it will be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Callaway v. Pearson, 146 Ga. 632, 92 S.E. 43 (1917).

When case transferred to Court of Appeals entered on docket.

- When a case is transferred by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals during a term of the latter court and before the docket of the term is by order of the court closed, such case shall be entered upon the docket of the court when received, which shall be the first term; but when such transferred case is received by the clerk of the court after the docket for the term has been by order of the court closed, it shall be entered upon the docket of the next term, which shall be the first term of the case in the court to which it is transferred. Atlantic C.L.R. Co. v. Georgia Sweet Potato Growers' Ass'n, 171 Ga. 30, 154 S.E. 698, answer conformed to, 42 Ga. App. 82, 154 S.E. 915 (1930).

Referring to prior case as "essentially similar" insufficient.

- It is not sufficient to refer to a former case decided by the Supreme Court and to certify that the prayers and the allegations of the petition are "essentially similar" to the case mentioned. Such certification necessarily includes an inference or opinion on the question as to whether the allegations and prayers are "essentially similar." Gormley v. Slicer, 177 Ga. 430, 170 S.E. 224 (1933).

ALR.

- Jurisdiction of state court over divorce suit by resident of United States reservation, 46 A.L.R. 993.

Validity of contract as affected by public policy as an independent question for the federal courts, or one as to which they are bound to follow the decisions of the state court, 57 A.L.R. 435.

Jurisdiction of state courts of actions in relation to interstate shipments, 64 A.L.R. 333.

Jurisdiction to order performance of positive acts in another state, 71 A.L.R. 1351.

Right of federal courts in passing upon the validity or construction of state statute or constitutional provision, or rights and obligations accruing thereunder, to exercise their own judgment independent of latest state court decisions thereon rendered subsequent to the accrual of the right in question, 97 A.L.R. 515.

Propriety of certiorari to review decisions of public officer or board granting, denying, or revoking permit, certificate, or license required as condition of exercise of particular right or privilege, 102 A.L.R. 534.

Power of court to prescribe rules of pleadings, practice, or procedure, 110 A.L.R. 22; 158 A.L.R. 705.

Superintending control over inferior tribunals, 112 A.L.R. 1351.

Jurisdiction of state court over actions involving patents, 167 A.L.R. 1114.

Adjudication of property rights of spouses in action for separate maintenance, support, or alimony without divorce, 74 A.L.R.2d 316.