42 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1888–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. O'Donnellgreen2 sentences2017Second, to the extent that Appellant’s argument suggests that his waiver of a jury trial colloquy was constitutionally infirm, we observe that a voluntary waiver of a jury trial will be found knowing and intelligent when the “on- record colloquy indicates that the defendant knew the essential ingredients of a jury trial which are necessary to understand the significance of the right being waived.” Commonwealth v. O’Donnell, 740 A.2d 198, 207-208 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). 2003In Commonwealth v. O'Donnell, 559 Pa. 320 , 740 A.2d 198, 211 (1999), this Court adopted the following principles as applicable to a capital defendant's waiver of his right to be sentenced by a jury pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(b): Before a voluntary waiver may be accepted as knowing and intelligent, the on-record colloquy must show that the defendant fully comprehended the significance of the right being waived and must indicate that, at a minimum, the defendant knew the essential protections inherent in a jury trial as well as the consequences attendant upon a relinquishment of those safegu | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1981A voluntary waiver of a jury trial will not be valid unless the record indicates the accused “knew the essential ingredients of a jury trial which are necessary to understand the significance of the right he was waiving.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368 , 312 A.2d 597 (1973) as appears in Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17 , 334 A.2d 610 (1975). 1981A voluntary waiver of a jury trial will not be valid unless the record indicates the accused “knew the essential ingredients of a jury trial which are necessary to understand the significance of the right he was waiving.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368 , 312 A.2d 597 (1973) as appears in Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17 , 334 A.2d 610 (1975). | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Diehlgreen2 sentences1992Commonwealth v. Diehl, 378 Pa. 214 , 107 A.2d 543 (1954), held that in a non-capital case, when defendant is out on bail and refuses to be present at a portion of his trial, his absence at any stage of the proceeding may be construed as a voluntary waiver of the right to be present. 1992Commonwealth v. Diehl, 378 Pa. 214 , 107 A.2d 543 (1954), held that in a non-capital case, when defendant is out on bail and refuses to be present at a portion of his trial, his absence at any stage of the proceeding may be construed as a voluntary waiver of the right to be present. | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences1997Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 234 , 307 A.2d 922, 927 (1973) (willingness of defendant to speak to police, indicated by interview initiated by defendant, and Miranda warnings constitutes a voluntary waiver). 15 . 1997Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 234 , 307 A.2d 922, 927 (1973) (willingness of defendant to speak to police, indicated by interview initiated by defendant, and Miranda warnings constitutes a voluntary waiver). 15 . | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Feltongreen2 sentences1977The principle was made into a rule in 1968 with the adoption of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1117(a): “The defendant’s absence without cause shall not preclude proceeding with the trial including the return of the verdict.” We reiterated the law in Commonwealth v. Felton, 224 Pa.Super. 398 , 307 A.2d 51 (1973), and concluded, as we do now, that a defendant may, in a non-capital case, voluntarily waive his right to be present at his trial if he is present at the beginning of trial, thereby knows of its commencement and subsequently absents himself from the trial. 1977The principle was made into a rule in 1968 with the adoption of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1117(a): “The defendant’s absence without cause shall not preclude proceeding with the trial including the return of the verdict.” We reiterated the law in Commonwealth v. Felton, 224 Pa.Super. 398 , 307 A.2d 51 (1973), and concluded, as we do now, that a defendant may, in a non-capital case, voluntarily waive his right to be present at his trial if he is present at the beginning of trial, thereby knows of its commencement and subsequently absents himself from the trial. | 1 | 2 |
Burstein v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurancegreen1 sentence2024Rush, 265 A.3d at 796 (reasoning that UIM coverage applies broadly whenever an insured suffers injuries arising out of the use of a motor vehicle regardless of vehicle ownership); Burstein, 809 A.2d at 209 (explaining that, pursuant to the concept of universal portability, UIM coverage “follows the person, not the vehicle”). | 1 | 1 |
Rush, M. v. Erie Insurance Exchangegreen1 sentence2024Rush, 265 A.3d at 796 (reasoning that UIM coverage applies broadly whenever an insured suffers injuries arising out of the use of a motor vehicle regardless of vehicle ownership); Burstein, 809 A.2d at 209 (explaining that, pursuant to the concept of universal portability, UIM coverage “follows the person, not the vehicle”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lawsongreen1 sentence2019He also did not identify this alleged witness during the colloquy as a person who could provide him an alibi[.] The law is clear that “a voluntary waiver of testimony bars a claim of ineffective assistance for failure to testify.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 762 A.2d 753, 756 (Pa. Super. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Whartongreen1 sentence2013Brubacher Ex cavating, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bridges), 575 Pa.168, 835 A.2d 1273, 1277 (2003); Dale Manufacturing Company v. Bressi, 491 Pa. 493 , 421 A.2d 653, 654 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Dale Manufacturing Co. v. Bressigreen2 sentences2013Brubacher Ex cavating, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bridges), 575 Pa.168, 835 A.2d 1273, 1277 (2003); Dale Manufacturing Company v. Bressi, 491 Pa. 493 , 421 A.2d 653, 654 (1980). 2013Brubacher Ex cavating, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bridges), 575 Pa.168, 835 A.2d 1273, 1277 (2003); Dale Manufacturing Company v. Bressi, 491 Pa. 493 , 421 A.2d 653, 654 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Harman Ex Rel. Harman v. Borahgreen2 sentences2008Harman v. Borah, 562 Pa. 455, 469 , 756 A.2d 1116, 1123 (2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). ¶ 14 In granting summary judgment to Monaghan, the trial court held that the following language, found on the reverse side of Tayar’s lift ticket, constituted a voluntary waiver of liability on the part of Tayar: PLEASE READ! 2008Harman v. Borah, 562 Pa. 455, 469 , 756 A.2d 1116, 1123 (2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). ¶ 14 In granting summary judgment to Monaghan, the trial court held that the following language, found on the reverse side of Tayar’s lift ticket, constituted a voluntary waiver of liability on the part of Tayar: PLEASE READ! | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fletchergreen1 sentence2000See Fletcher, 750 A.2d at 274-75 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Moringreen2 sentences1999Commonwealth v. Morin, 477 Pa. 80, 85 , 383 A.2d 832, 834 (1978). 1999Commonwealth v. Morin, 477 Pa. 80, 85 , 383 A.2d 832, 834 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. McCrackengreen2 sentences1997Commonwealth v. McCracken, 540 Pa. 541, 551 , 659 A.2d 541, 546 (1995) (Supreme Court must defer to credibility determinations made by trial court which had the opportunity to observe demeanor and hear testimony of witnesses.) Thus, since appellant initiated the interview in which he gave statements concerning the Gutman murder, that he was advised of his Miranda warnings and that he waived his right to counsel on that date, we conclude that the statements were made after a voluntary waiver of appellant’s rights. 1997Commonwealth v. McCracken, 540 Pa. 541, 551 , 659 A.2d 541, 546 (1995) (Supreme Court must defer to credibility determinations made by trial court which had the opportunity to observe demeanor and hear testimony of witnesses.) Thus, since appellant initiated the interview in which he gave statements concerning the Gutman murder, that he was advised of his Miranda warnings and that he waived his right to counsel on that date, we conclude that the statements were made after a voluntary waiver of appellant’s rights. | 1 | 1 |
| McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Industries, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Fordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Rundlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Milewski v. Ashe
green
2 sentences1956Milewski v. Ashe, 363 Pa. 596 , 70 A. 2d 625 , where former Chief Justice Maxbv ruled that where a defendant in a felony case is not in custody, his absence from the courtroom when the verdict is announced may be construed as a voluntary waiver on his part of his right to ¡be present. 1956Milewski v. Ashe, 363 Pa. 596 , 70 A. 2d 625 , where former Chief Justice Maxbv ruled that where a defendant in a felony case is not in custody, his absence from the courtroom when the verdict is announced may be construed as a voluntary waiver on his part of his right to ¡be present. | 3 | 1954–1956 |
In the Interest of T.B.
green
2 sentences2016This Court has opined that a voluntary waiver is one that is “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception.” Id. 2014In support he relies on In re TB., 11 A.3d 500 (Pa. Super. 2010) where the Superior Court found that the juveQile defendant's voluntary waiver was not knowing and·intelligent. | 2 | 2014–2016 |
Lee v. State
green
2 sentences1989See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State [273] Ind. [439] 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). 1983See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State, Ind., *124 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss.1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). | 2 | 1983–1989 |
State v. Clifton
green
2 sentences1989See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State [273] Ind. [439] 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). 1989See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State [273] Ind. [439] 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). | 2 | 1983–1989 |
People v. Mason
green
2 sentences1989See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State [273] Ind. [439] 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). 1989See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State [273] Ind. [439] 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). | 2 | 1983–1989 |
Grey v. State
green
2 sentences1989See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State [273] Ind. [439] 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). 1983See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State, Ind., *124 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss.1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). | 2 | 1983–1989 |
Randolph Daniel Keiper v. Hoyt C. Cupp, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary
green
2 sentences1989See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State [273] Ind. [439] 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). 1983See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State, Ind., *124 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss.1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). | 2 | 1983–1989 |
State v. Bowden
green
2 sentences1989See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State [273] Ind. [439] 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). 1983See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State, Ind., *124 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss.1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). | 2 | 1983–1989 |
McAdoo v. State
green
2 sentences1989See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State [273] Ind. [439] 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). 1989See also: Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.1975); People v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.3d 121 , 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Grey v. State [273] Ind. [439] 404 N.E.2d 1348 (1980); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me.1975); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976); State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177 , 531 P.2d 256 (1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis.2d 596 , 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). | 2 | 1983–1989 |
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1978Therein we reasoned: Although we cannot presume a voluntary waiver of any constitutional right from a silent record, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Commonwealth v. Cornitcher, 447 Pa. 539 , 291 A.2d 521 (1972), the issues here are whether a waiver can be found and upheld where it appears on the record in a subsequent hearing and the sufficiency of the subsequent colloquy in proving a knowing and intelligent waiver. 1978Therein we reasoned: Although we cannot presume a voluntary waiver of any constitutional right from a silent record, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Commonwealth v. Cornitcher, 447 Pa. 539 , 291 A.2d 521 (1972), the issues here are whether a waiver can be found and upheld where it appears on the record in a subsequent hearing and the sufficiency of the subsequent colloquy in proving a knowing and intelligent waiver. | 2 | 1973–1978 |
Carnley v. Cochran
green
2 sentences1978Therein we reasoned: Although we cannot presume a voluntary waiver of any constitutional right from a silent record, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Commonwealth v. Cornitcher, 447 Pa. 539 , 291 A.2d 521 (1972), the issues here are whether a waiver can be found and upheld where it appears on the record in a subsequent hearing and the sufficiency of the subsequent colloquy in proving a knowing and intelligent waiver. 1978Therein we reasoned: Although we cannot presume a voluntary waiver of any constitutional right from a silent record, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Commonwealth v. Cornitcher, 447 Pa. 539 , 291 A.2d 521 (1972), the issues here are whether a waiver can be found and upheld where it appears on the record in a subsequent hearing and the sufficiency of the subsequent colloquy in proving a knowing and intelligent waiver. | 2 | 1973–1978 |
Commonwealth v. Cornitcher
green
2 sentences1978Therein we reasoned: Although we cannot presume a voluntary waiver of any constitutional right from a silent record, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Commonwealth v. Cornitcher, 447 Pa. 539 , 291 A.2d 521 (1972), the issues here are whether a waiver can be found and upheld where it appears on the record in a subsequent hearing and the sufficiency of the subsequent colloquy in proving a knowing and intelligent waiver. 1978Therein we reasoned: Although we cannot presume a voluntary waiver of any constitutional right from a silent record, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Commonwealth v. Cornitcher, 447 Pa. 539 , 291 A.2d 521 (1972), the issues here are whether a waiver can be found and upheld where it appears on the record in a subsequent hearing and the sufficiency of the subsequent colloquy in proving a knowing and intelligent waiver. | 2 | 1973–1978 |
Oregon v. Bradshaw
green
1 sentence2022Bradshaw 462 U.S. at 1045-46 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2017On appeal, this Court thoroughly analyzed the suppression court testimony, and ultimately agreed with the 1994 suppression court’s findings that “[A]ppellant understood his ____________________________________________ 1 Unless otherwise specified by the designation “1994 Counsel” all references to trial counsel refer to counsel in the instant case. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -6- J-S49005-17 Miranda rights and issued a voluntary waiver of those rights.” Commonwealth v. Sadik, No. 630 PITTSBURGH 1994, unpublished memorandum at 7 (Pa. Super. filed May 16, 1995). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Hill
green
1 sentence2015Id., at 261 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Oregon v. Elstad
green
2 sentences2001In disposing of this notion, the Court stated that “[tjhis Court has never held that the psychological impact of a guilty secret qualifies as state compulsion or compromises the voluntariness of a subsequent informed waiver”, id. at 312, 105 S.Ct. 1285 , and concluded that: absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. 2001In disposing of this notion, the Court stated that "[t]his Court has never held that the psychological impact of a guilty secret qualifies as state compulsion or compromises the voluntariness of a subsequent informed waiver", id. at 312, 105 S.Ct. 1285 , and concluded that: absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Com. v. Ah Thank Lee green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Commonwealth v. Graham green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Commonwealth v. Johnson green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Hughes green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Livingston v. South Carolina green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Reed v. Cranor green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Commonwealth v. Starr green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Commonwealth v. Williams green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Commonwealth v. Kyle green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Commonwealth v. Boyd green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Commonwealth v. Smith green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Thompson green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| United States v. Claude John Scallion, Raymond Lynn Buckelew, James Laney Jenkins and Judson Lee Drane green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| United States v. Leroy Eaddy green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Myrick green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Michigan v. Mosley green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Hopt v. People of Territory of Utah green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Lewis v. United States green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Pennsylvania v. Felton green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Maroney green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Com. Ex Rel. Lockhart v. Myers green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Girard Fire & Marine Insurance v. Hebard neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Emmons v. McCreery green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Firmstone v. Mack green | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.