voluntary waiver in Virginia

2004In deciding the issue of the sufficiency of the warning for failure to appear, the trial judge commented on Sullivan’s signature on the bond recognizance form and found that “we must assume when we see a signature of anyone upon any legal document that they read the document and they were forewarned to the extent that the document so states.” Based on those findings, the trial judge determined that Sullivan made “a voluntary waiver of [his] presence” at trial. -4- On similar facts in Cruz, see 24 Va. App. at 458-59 , 482 S.E.2d at 882 , we held that “the trial court properly found that [the de

2004In deciding the issue of the sufficiency of the warning for failure to appear, the trial judge commented on Sullivan’s signature on the bond recognizance form and found that “we must assume when we see a signature of anyone upon any legal document that they read the document and they were forewarned to the extent that the document so states.” Based on those findings, the trial judge determined that Sullivan made “a voluntary waiver of [his] presence” at trial. -4- On similar facts in Cruz, see 24 Va. App. at 458-59 , 482 S.E.2d at 882 , we held that “the trial court properly found that [the de

2014See Thompson, 968 F. Supp. at 314 (“[Although this court is unaware of a case which specifically addresses a beneficiary’s purported waiver of FEGLI benefits through a prenuptial agreement, it is nonetheless clear that no matter what type of contract the insured executes to the contrary, a designated beneficiary prevails against all other claimants.”) (citing O ’Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that an “insured’s designation of beneficiary under FEGLI prevails for all purposes” despite contractual agreement to do otherwise)).

2014See Thompson, 968 F. Supp. at 314 (“[Although this court is unaware of a case which specifically addresses a beneficiary’s purported waiver of FEGLI benefits through a prenuptial agreement, it is nonetheless clear that no matter what type of contract the insured executes to the contrary, a designated beneficiary prevails against all other claimants.”) (citing O ’Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that an “insured’s designation of beneficiary under FEGLI prevails for all purposes” despite contractual agreement to do otherwise)).

2013When legislators are protected under the scope of legislative immunity, the legislators must "at a proper time, 11 and in a proper manner, claim the benefit of [the] privilege." Geyer's Lessee v. Irwin, 4 U.S. 107, 107-08 (1790).

2009He argues, however, that his failure to object to the trial court’s acceptance of his plea does not bar his claim on appeal under Rule 5A:18 because “mere silence is insufficient to indicate a voluntary waiver of constitutional rights.” This Court has previously held that “[Rule 5A:18] applies to issues involving constitutional principles.” West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 337 , 597 S.E.2d 274, 278 (2004) (citing Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 544-45 , 535 S.E.2d 182, 185 (2000)).

2009He argues, however, that his failure to object to the trial court’s acceptance of his plea does not bar his claim on appeal under Rule 5A:18 because “mere silence is insufficient to indicate a voluntary waiver of constitutional rights.” This Court has previously held that “[Rule 5A:18] applies to issues involving constitutional principles.” West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 337 , 597 S.E.2d 274, 278 (2004) (citing Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 544-45 , 535 S.E.2d 182, 185 (2000)).

2009He argues, however, that his failure to object to the trial court’s acceptance of his plea does not bar his claim on appeal under Rule 5A:18 because “mere silence is insufficient to indicate a voluntary waiver of constitutional rights.” This Court has previously held that “[Rule 5A:18] applies to issues involving constitutional principles.” West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 337 , 597 S.E.2d 274, 278 (2004) (citing Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 544-45 , 535 S.E.2d 182, 185 (2000)).

2009He argues, however, that his failure to object to the trial court’s acceptance of his plea does not bar his claim on appeal under Rule 5A:18 because “mere silence is insufficient to indicate a voluntary waiver of constitutional rights.” This Court has previously held that “[Rule 5A:18] applies to issues involving constitutional principles.” West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 337 , 597 S.E.2d 274, 278 (2004) (citing Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 544-45 , 535 S.E.2d 182, 185 (2000)).

2007The Federal Circuit, in balancing a party’s constitutional right to a juiy trial against the freedom to contract, has found that a voluntary waiver of the right to a juiy trial “suffers from no inherent constitutional legal infirmity.” Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed.

1995See Wright, 245 Va. at 184 - 86, 427 S.E.2d at 385-86 .

1995See Wright, 245 Va. at 184 - 86, 427 S.E.2d at 385-86 .

1991The fact that alcohol has been consumed by the defendant becomes another factor in the overall consideration of whether defendant’s waiver of his right to remain silent was the "product of a rational intellect and a free will." Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 974 (1977).