voluntary waiver in South Carolina

2024See id. at 200 , 391 S.E.2d at 246 ("Once a voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is made, that waiver continues until the individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent . . . .").

2024See id. at 200 , 391 S.E.2d at 246 ("Once a voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is made, that waiver continues until the individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent . . . .").

2015We affirm the ruling of the trial judge pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200 , 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) ("Once a voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is made, that waiver continues until the individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circumstances exist which establish that his 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self- determination critically impaired.'" (quoting State v. Moultrie, 273 S.C. 60, 62 , 254 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1979))); State v. Smith, 259 S.C. 496, 499

2015We affirm the ruling of the trial judge pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200 , 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) ("Once a voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is made, that waiver continues until the individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circumstances exist which establish that his 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self- determination critically impaired.'" (quoting State v. Moultrie, 273 S.C. 60, 62 , 254 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1979))); State v. Smith, 259 S.C. 496, 499

2026See Wroten v. State, 301 S.C. 293, 294 , 391 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1990) ("While a specific inquiry by the trial judge expressly addressing the disadvantages of a pro se defense is preferred, the ultimate test [of the waiver analysis] is not the trial judge's advice but rather the defendant's understanding."); id. ("If the record demonstrates the defendant's decision to represent himself was made with an understanding of the risks of self-representation, the requirements of a voluntary waiver will be satisfied.").

2026See Wroten v. State, 301 S.C. 293, 294 , 391 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1990) ("While a specific inquiry by the trial judge expressly addressing the disadvantages of a pro se defense is preferred, the ultimate test [of the waiver analysis] is not the trial judge's advice but rather the defendant's understanding."); id. ("If the record demonstrates the defendant's decision to represent himself was made with an understanding of the risks of self-representation, the requirements of a voluntary waiver will be satisfied.").

2019If the record demonstrates the defendant's decision to represent himself was made with an understanding of the risks of self-representation, the requirements of a voluntary waiver will be satisfied." 301 S.C. 293 , 294, 391 S.E.2d 575 , 576 (1990) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright , 800 F.2d 1057 , 1065 (11th Cir. 1986) ).

2002Wroten, 301 S.C. at 294 , 391 S.E.2d at 576 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1065 (11th Cir.1986)) (emphasis added).

2016As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury Jennings was not required to tell police the location of her child: State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479 , 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010) ("The trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 135-36 , 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) (providing a statement "obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588,

2016As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury Jennings was not required to tell police the location of her child: State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479 , 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010) ("The trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 135-36 , 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) (providing a statement "obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588,

2016As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury Jennings was not required to tell police the location of her child: State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479 , 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010) ("The trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 135-36 , 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) (providing a statement "obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588,

2015See id. ("The test of voluntariness is whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession."); id. ("When reviewing a trial [court's] ruling concerning voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial [court's] ruling is supported by any evidence."); id. at 602, 683 S.E.2d at 508 ("Once a voluntary waiver is made, it continues until the individual being questioned indicates he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circum

2003To be deemed voluntary, a confession may not be “extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of improper influence.” State v. Rochester , 301 S.C. 196, 200 , 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (S.C. 1990) (citing Hutto v. Ross , 429 U.S. 28, 30 , 97 S. Ct. 202, 203 , 50 L.

2003To be deemed voluntary, a confession may not be “extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of improper influence.” State v. Rochester , 301 S.C. 196, 200 , 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (S.C. 1990) (citing Hutto v. Ross , 429 U.S. 28, 30 , 97 S. Ct. 202, 203 , 50 L.

2021See State v. Smith, 268 S.C. 349 , 352–54, 234 S.E.2d 19 , 20–21 (1977) ("The decisions are voluminous that the signing of a written waiver is usually sufficient [to constitute a voluntary waiver]."); see also Moses, 390 S.C. at 514–15, 702 S.E.2d at 401–02 (holding a juvenile who could read and write on a third grade level voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights because the officer read the juvenile's rights verbatim from a waiver of rights form and asked if he understood the rights).

2021See State v. Smith, 268 S.C. 349 , 352–54, 234 S.E.2d 19 , 20–21 (1977) ("The decisions are voluminous that the signing of a written waiver is usually sufficient [to constitute a voluntary waiver]."); see also Moses, 390 S.C. at 514–15, 702 S.E.2d at 401–02 (holding a juvenile who could read and write on a third grade level voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights because the officer read the juvenile's rights verbatim from a waiver of rights form and asked if he understood the rights).

2021See State v. Smith, 268 S.C. 349 , 352–54, 234 S.E.2d 19 , 20–21 (1977) ("The decisions are voluminous that the signing of a written waiver is usually sufficient [to constitute a voluntary waiver]."); see also Moses, 390 S.C. at 514–15, 702 S.E.2d at 401–02 (holding a juvenile who could read and write on a third grade level voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights because the officer read the juvenile's rights verbatim from a waiver of rights form and asked if he understood the rights).

2019"If the record demonstrates the defendant's decision to represent himself was made with an understanding of the risks of self-representation, the requirements of a voluntary waiver will be satisfied." Wroten, 301 S.C. at 294 , 392 S.E.2d at 576.

2016As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury Jennings was not required to tell police the location of her child: State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479 , 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010) ("The trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 135-36 , 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) (providing a statement "obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588,

2016As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury Jennings was not required to tell police the location of her child: State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479 , 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010) ("The trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 135-36 , 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) (providing a statement "obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588,

2016As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury Jennings was not required to tell police the location of her child: State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479 , 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010) ("The trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 135-36 , 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) (providing a statement "obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588,

2016As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury Jennings was not required to tell police the location of her child: State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479 , 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010) ("The trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 135-36 , 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) (providing a statement "obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588,

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015See id. ("The test of voluntariness is whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession."); id. ("When reviewing a trial [court's] ruling concerning voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial [court's] ruling is supported by any evidence."); id. at 602, 683 S.E.2d at 508 ("Once a voluntary waiver is made, it continues until the individual being questioned indicates he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circum

2015See id. ("The test of voluntariness is whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession."); id. ("When reviewing a trial [court's] ruling concerning voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial [court's] ruling is supported by any evidence."); id. at 602, 683 S.E.2d at 508 ("Once a voluntary waiver is made, it continues until the individual being questioned indicates he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circum

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015We affirm the ruling of the trial judge pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200 , 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) ("Once a voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is made, that waiver continues until the individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circumstances exist which establish that his 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self- determination critically impaired.'" (quoting State v. Moultrie, 273 S.C. 60, 62 , 254 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1979))); State v. Smith, 259 S.C. 496, 499

2015We affirm the ruling of the trial judge pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200 , 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) ("Once a voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is made, that waiver continues until the individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circumstances exist which establish that his 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self- determination critically impaired.'" (quoting State v. Moultrie, 273 S.C. 60, 62 , 254 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1979))); State v. Smith, 259 S.C. 496, 499

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2015As to the trial court's denial of Bolt's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 45 ,

2007Watts v. State , 347 S.C. 399, 402 , 556 S.E.2d 368, 370 (2001).

2007Watts v. State , 347 S.C. 399, 402 , 556 S.E.2d 368, 370 (2001).

2003State v. Reed , 332 S.C. 35, 42 , 503 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1998). “Once a voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is made, that waiver continues until the individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circumstances exist which establish that his ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.’” State v. Rochester , 301 S.C. 196, 200 , 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) (quoting State v. Moultrie , 273 S.C. 60, 62 , 254 S.E.2d 294, 294-95 (1979)).

2003State v. Reed , 332 S.C. 35, 42 , 503 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1998). “Once a voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is made, that waiver continues until the individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circumstances exist which establish that his ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.’” State v. Rochester , 301 S.C. 196, 200 , 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) (quoting State v. Moultrie , 273 S.C. 60, 62 , 254 S.E.2d 294, 294-95 (1979)).