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12 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1999–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whalen v. Roegreen2 sentences2019In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court explained that the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” comprises “at least two different kinds of interests[:] . . . the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and . . . the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” 429 U.S. 589, 598-601 (1977) (footnotes omitted). 2019In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court explained that the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” comprises “at least two different kinds of interests[:] . . . the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and . . . the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” 429 U.S. 589 , 598–601 (1977) (footnotes omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Dellinger v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 294 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blackmongreen1 sentence2025See id. | 1 | 1 |
State of Tennessee v. David Dwayne Bellgreen1 sentence2017In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court will uphold the trial court’s findings of fact “unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tenn. 2014) (citing State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 556 (Tenn. 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
State of Tennessee v. David Hooper Climer, Jr.green1 sentence2017In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court will uphold the trial court’s findings of fact “unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tenn. 2014) (citing State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 556 (Tenn. 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
Strenten Vujosevic v. John R. Rafferty, Superintendent of Rahway State Prison, and W. Carey Edwards, Attorney General of New Jerseygreen1 sentence2005See United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that under “Mosley, a court need determine specifically whether there has been a voluntary waiver only after the government has carried its burden of showing that it complied with [all of] the required procedures”); accord Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023, 1028-31 (3rd Cir.1988) (holding that under Mosley , the government failed to demonstrate a valid waiver when police did not “scrupulously honor” the suspect’s invocation of his right to remain silent by reinterrogating him about the same crime). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Pasquale G. Barone, A/K/A Patsy, A/K/A Anthony Caponegreen1 sentence2005See United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that under “Mosley, a court need determine specifically whether there has been a voluntary waiver only after the government has carried its burden of showing that it complied with [all of] the required procedures”); accord Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023, 1028-31 (3rd Cir.1988) (holding that under Mosley , the government failed to demonstrate a valid waiver when police did not “scrupulously honor” the suspect’s invocation of his right to remain silent by reinterrogating him about the same crime). | 1 | 1 |
Crowson v. Crowsongreen1 sentence2002Crowson v. Crowson, 742 So.2d 107, 109 (La.Ct.App.1999). [3] Importantly, the dissent maintains that "parents in many cases may make custodial decisions without fully understanding the legal ramifications of their choices." Characterizing the voluntary waiver of parental rights as a "trap for the unwary," the dissent expresses concern that parents may not fully understand the effect of such a waiver. | 1 | 1 |
Crosby v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000See, Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 260 , 113 S. Ct. 748 , 752 122 L. 2000See, Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 260 , 113 S. Ct. 748 , 752 122 L. | 1 | 1 |
Brandon v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1999Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tenn. App. 1992), stated, “If, after discovery of the fraud, [the defrauded party] does any act implying acquiescence therein, or remains silent under circumstances indicating such acquiescence, this will amount to a waiver of the fraud . . .” Such acts done after knowledge of the fraud are deemed to be a voluntary waiver of the fraud. 1999See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dwight v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2011Co., 701 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), which held that a voluntary waiver of workers’ compensation benefits did not prevent a UM carrier from reducing the benefits payable by the amount of compensation benefits that “were available to the plaintiff . . .” 701 S.W.2d at 622 . 2011Co., 701 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), which held that a voluntary waiver of workers’ compensation benefits did not prevent a UM carrier from reducing the benefits payable by the amount of compensation benefits that “were available to the plaintiff . . .” 701 S.W.2d at 622 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005Jackson, 270 S.W.2d at 390 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Landers v. Jones
green
1 sentence2001Our Supreme Court adopted a new approach, in keeping with the modern trend against such hyper-technical rules in the case of Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. 1994), which stated that the courts “. . . should only find a general appearance that waives a defendant's right to contest personal jurisdiction when the defendant has recognized the proper pendency of the cause by making a motion that goes to the merits or by filing an answer, without challenging personal jurisdiction. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.