voluntary waiver in Colorado

2011The majority's decision, however, effectively reads out this requirement and, as a result, holds section 16-3-309(5) constitutional in every case, including those cases, like this one, where there is an invalid waiver. [15] My conclusion that section 16-3-309(5) was applied unconstitutionally in this case is in accord with our analysis in Mojica-Simental , stating that "[i]f a defendant does not have actual notice of the requirements of the statute, or mistakenly fails to notify the prosecution to have the technician present to testify, there is a significant possibility that a defendant's fai

2011My conclusion that section 16-3-309(5) was applied unconstitutionally in this case is in accord with our analysis in Mojica-Simental, stating that a defendant does not have actual notice of the requirements of the statute, or mistakenly fails to notify the prosecution to have the technician present to testify, there is a significant possibility that a defendant's failure to act may not constitute a voluntary waiver of his fundamental right to confrontation." 73 P.3d at 20-21 .

1995In assessing the validity of Mack's voluntary waiver, the district court should consider whether coercive governmental conduct played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 (Colo.1991), and whether Mack's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowingly and intelligently made.

1994In assessing the validity of Sutherland’s voluntary waiver, the district court should consider whether coercive governmental conduct played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 (Colo.1991), and whether Sutherland’s waiver of her Miranda rights was knowingly and intelligently made.

1995In assessing the validity of Mack's voluntary waiver, the district court should consider whether coercive governmental conduct played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 (Colo.1991), and whether Mack's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowingly and intelligently made.

1995In assessing the validity of Mack's voluntary waiver, the district court should consider whether coercive governmental conduct played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 (Colo.1991), and whether Mack's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowingly and intelligently made.

2025Moreover, when the right at issue is statutory, the actions of counsel are relevant because “[c]ounsel may waive a defendant’s statutory rights.” Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 16 ; Johnson, ¶ 26. ¶ 12 In Johnson, the supreme court found a voluntary waiver of a subsection (2)(a) claim when (1) the defendant signed a plea agreement and stipulation for deferred judgment and sentence, agreeing both to pay restitution and permit the prosecution to provide restitution information to the district court after the sentencing hearing; (2) the defendant told the court that he understood and agreed to t

2025Similarly, here, we conclude Quezada’s repeated requests for a hearing to be set on a date determined by the district court, combined with his failure to object to a hearing outside the statutory period or to raise the issue at any point before this appeal, “reflects ‘conduct that 7 manifests an intent to relinquish a right or privilege.’” Roberson, ¶ 17 (quoting Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 28 ).

2025People v. Roberson, 2025 CO 30 , ¶ 16.

2021“When the [s]tate moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 753–54 (1982). ¶53 In C.S., we embraced the test from Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981), for when fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent in a termination proceeding.

2015A defendant's mental illness "is one factor to be considered in determining whether the statement was voluntary," Smith, 716 P.2d at 1118 (citing Raffaelli, 647 P.2d at 235 ), because mental illness could impact whether the defendant's statement arose due to threats, promises, or undue influence. 119 If the trial court finds that the defendant has made a voluntary waiver, it must also determine whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent.

2015A defendant's mental illness "is one factor to be considered in determining whether the statement was voluntary," Smith, 716 P.2d at 1118 (citing Raffaelli, 647 P.2d at 235 ), because mental illness could impact whether the defendant's statement arose due to threats, promises, or undue influence. 119 If the trial court finds that the defendant has made a voluntary waiver, it must also determine whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent.

2008Whatever the precise rationale that led the signatories to agree to Article IV(e)'s anti-shuttling provision, see Bozeman, 533 U.S. at 154-46 , 121 S.Ct. 2079 , it clearly dove-tails with the article's requirement for speedy disposition, once a receiving state invokes its statutory prerogatives.

2008Whatever the precise rationale that led the signatories to agree to Article IV(e)'s anti-shuttling provision, see Bozeman, 533 U.S. at 154-46 , 121 S.Ct. 2079 , it clearly dove-tails with the article's requirement for speedy disposition, once a receiving state invokes its statutory prerogatives.

1997Because it may arise on remand, we address and reject defendant’s contention that his decision to be re-interviewed without counsel was not knowing or intelligent, or a voluntary waiver of his rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

1997Because it may arise on remand, we address and reject defendant’s contention that his decision to be re-interviewed without counsel was not knowing or intelligent, or a voluntary waiver of his rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

1996A "defendant's statement that he did not want to testify is evidence of a voluntary waiver...." Chavez II, 853 P.2d at 1153 .

1996However, "[a]bsent an adequate advisement, a defendant's waiver of the right to testify, though perhaps voluntary, cannot be knowing and intelligent." Milton, 864 P.2d at 1100 (citing Chavez II, 853 P.2d at 1153 ).

1996However, "[a]bsent an adequate advisement, a defendant's waiver of the right to testify, though perhaps voluntary, cannot be knowing and intelligent." Milton, 864 P.2d at 1100 (citing Chavez II, 853 P.2d at 1153 ).

1988Drawing on the standard of waiver developed in cases involving non-detainer speedy trial rights, see People v. Gallegos, 192 Colo. 450 , 560 P.2d 93 (1977); Harrington v. District Court, 192 Colo. 351 , 559 P.2d 225 (1977), we concluded in Sevigny that a voluntary waiver in the context of IAD speedy trial rights “requires a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period,” and that “mere silence, by itself, does not prove a waiver.” Sevigny, 679 P.2d at 1075 .

1988Drawing on the standard of waiver developed in cases involving non-detainer speedy trial rights, see People v. Gallegos, 192 Colo. 450 , 560 P.2d 93 (1977); Harrington v. District Court, 192 Colo. 351 , 559 P.2d 225 (1977), we concluded in Sevigny that a voluntary waiver in the context of IAD speedy trial rights “requires a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period,” and that “mere silence, by itself, does not prove a waiver.” Sevigny, 679 P.2d at 1075 .

1988Drawing on the standard of waiver developed in cases involving non-detainer speedy trial rights, see People v. Gallegos, 192 Colo. 450 , 560 P.2d 93 (1977); Harrington v. District Court, 192 Colo. 351 , 559 P.2d 225 (1977), we concluded in Sevigny that a voluntary waiver in the context of IAD speedy trial rights “requires a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period,” and that “mere silence, by itself, does not prove a waiver.” Sevigny, 679 P.2d at 1075 .

1988Drawing on the standard of waiver developed in cases involving non-detainer speedy trial rights, see People v. Gallegos, 192 Colo. 450 , 560 P.2d 93 (1977); Harrington v. District Court, 192 Colo. 351 , 559 P.2d 225 (1977), we concluded in Sevigny that a voluntary waiver in the context of IAD speedy trial rights “requires a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period,” and that “mere silence, by itself, does not prove a waiver.” Sevigny, 679 P.2d at 1075 .

1988See People v. DeBaca, 736 P.2d 25 (Colo.1987); People v. Fish, 660 P.2d 505 (Colo.1983).